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INTRODUCTION 
My assignment in this symposium’s dialogue about the potential of a 
right to counsel in civil cases in the United States is to supply a foreign 
perspective—to suggest what, if anything, the United States might have to 
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learn from what has happened abroad as to this right.  In one sense, it 
would be possible to merely provide a brief overview in a single sentence, 
and end the article.  That sentence would read: Most European and several 
countries elsewhere in the world have recognized a right to counsel in 
many or most civil cases for as long as decades or even centuries—and 
many of those countries are willing to spend, proportionately, anywhere 
from three to twelve times as much of their national income as the U.S. 
currently does on the provision of counsel to their lower income popula-
tions in civil cases. 
But while that sentence might be an adequate headline and for some 
readers perhaps a big surprise, it fails to supply the essential details that 
make the foreign experience so important in the United States.  It does not 
suggest why American courts should pay attention to what has happened in 
constitutional law abroad.  It also does not explain why American legisla-
tors should care about how their foreign compatriots have structured the 
right in their countries or the problems they face and how they have tried to 
address those problems.  Finally, it does not suggest what an equal rights 
statute might look like if legislators tried to apply those lessons in the con-
text of U.S. civil litigation. 
I have been writing about foreign legal aid programs for over three dec-
ades, starting with a collaboration with Professors Mauro Cappelletti and 
James Gordley on the first book-length comparative study of civil legal aid 
as it evolved in Europe and North America.1  Over the years, I have written 
another half dozen articles on the subject.2  Thus, I don’t approach this sub-
ject with a clean slate, and not everything in this Article will be brand new.  
Rather, what follows gathers together themes and information from prior 
writings and updates.  In some instances, it amplifies both the information 
and the themes, then applies some of the lessons of the foreign experiences 
to the design of a draft statute that implements a right to equal justice, and 
therefore a right to counsel when one is needed to satisfy that guarantee. 
 
 1. See generally MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1975). 
 2. See generally Earl Johnson, Jr., Access to Justice, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2001); Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Jus-
tice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United States and Other Industrial Democracies, 
24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S83 (2000); Earl Johnson, Jr., The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: 
An International Perspective, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341 (1985); Earl Johnson, Jr., Toward 
Equal Justice: Where the United States Stands Two Decades Later, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LE-
GAL ISSUES 199 (1994); Earl Johnson, Jr., Will Gideon’s Trumpet Sound a New Melody? The 
Globalization of Constitutional Values and Its Implications for a Right to Equal Justice in 
Civil Cases, 2(1) SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 201 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, Will Gideon’s 
Trumpet Sound a New Melody?]. 
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This Article begins with a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of 
a right to equality before the law in civil cases, and how that theory found 
its way into statutes and constitutional provisions in both Europe and the 
United States.  This is followed by an examination of how courts on the 
two continents and elsewhere in the world have interpreted the constitu-
tional provisions that emanated from this theory and why those decisions 
are relevant to courts in the United States.  The Article then describes how 
nations that have the right as a matter of statutory or constitutional law 
have implemented it.  This leads to discussion of a draft generic state sta-
tute that would apply some of the lessons learned from the foreign expe-
rience to the American context.  Finally, the Article will consider the like-
lihood that American jurisdictions will adopt the right and make the level 
of financial commitment that so many other nations already have made. 
I.  EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW AS A PRECEPT OF THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 
In an article I wrote a few years ago, I argued that the right to counsel 
found in most European countries finds its basis in the social contract 
theory that emerged on that continent during the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries.3  This remains the beginning point for this Article too: be-
cause social contract theory was so influential among the principal found-
ers of the United States, it provides the foundation for the position that U.S. 
jurisdictions have reason to find the European experience persuasive when 
considering the prospect of a statutory and especially constitutional right to 
counsel in civil cases.  Consequently, a shortened version of that earlier ar-
ticle seems in order. 
 As that earlier article pointed out, most European nations were ruled for 
centuries by kings and emperors, absolute monarchs many of whom 
claimed the source of their power descended from God, and consequently 
they possessed a divine right to govern the lesser mortals who populated 
their countries.4  But then a group of brilliant political philosophers began 
to write about a brand new vision—what they called the social contract.5  
As men like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke ex-
plained, a government’s right to govern did not descend from God in hea-
ven, but from the consent of the governed right here on earth.  These philo-
sophers argued that individual citizens surrendered their rights, including 
their right to settle disputes through the use of force, only in exchange for a 
 
 3. See Johnson, Will Gideon’s Trumpet Sound a New Melody?, supra note 2, at 205. 
 4. See id. at 203. 
 5. See id. 
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sovereign’s promise to provide all of those citizens justice, peace, and the 
possibility of a better life.6  This fundamental notion came to be called the 
“social contract”—an agreement among a nation’s individual citizens and 
between those citizens and that nation’s government.7 
 One of the essential terms of that social contract is the guarantee of 
“equality before the law”—the principle or “precept” that citizens from dif-
ferent economic classes will stand equal in the courts or other forums the 
government provides for resolving disputes.8  It is based on the notion that 
individuals would not give up their natural right to settle disputes through 
force unless the sovereign offered a peaceful alternative in which they have 
a fair chance to prevail if in the right, no matter whether they are rich, poor, 
or something in between.9  Society, in turn, breaches this term of the social 
contract if its forums favor one class of citizens over those of another 
class—the rich over the poor, for example.  Members of the disfavored 
class cannot be presumed to have agreed to submit to an unjust sovereign.  
Thus, the equal administration of justice among different economic classes 
is an essential underpinning of any society purportedly resting on the con-
sent of the governed. 
“Equality before the law” would have remained only a theoretical right 
in Europe, as it still is in the United States, except that during the nine-
teenth century, nation after nation on the European continent recognized 
that there was only one way to guarantee the parity among economic 
classes and adopted statutory rights to counsel in civil as well as criminal 
cases.  France enacted a statutory civil right to counsel in 1851,10 Italy em-
 
 6. See id. 
 7. As John Locke, perhaps the social contract thinker most influential with the found-
ing fathers of our own nation, explained: “Political power, is that power which every man 
having in the state of nature has given up into the hands of the society . . . with this express 
or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good . . . and to punish the breach of the law 
of Nature in others . . . .  And this power has its original only from compact and agreement, 
and the mutual consent of those who make up the community.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES 
OF GOVERNMENT 65 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., William Benton 1952) (1690) (empha-
sis added). 
 8. “The safety of the People requireth further, from him or them that have the Sove-
reign Power, that Justice be equally administered to all degrees of People; that is, that as 
well the rich and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done 
them; so as the great may have no greater hope of impunity, when they do violence, disho-
nour, or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these does the like to one of them; 
For in this consisteth Equity; to which, as being a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign 
is . . .  subject . . . .” THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 184 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin 
Books 1968) (1651) (emphasis added). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, at 19 n.57 (citing Law of Jan. 22, 1851, arts. 
1-20 [1851] Bull. des Lois 93). 
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bodied that right in its procedural laws at the moment of its birth as a nation 
in 1865,11 and Germany enacted a right to civil counsel when it became a 
nation in 1877.12  The rest of Europe was not far behind.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century or early in the twentieth century, most European nations 
had created statutory rights to counsel in civil cases.13   
At the time they were first enacted, these statutory rights to counsel were 
virtually costless to the governments creating them.  That was because they 
conscripted private lawyers to represent indigent litigants, requiring them 
to serve without compensation in return for the privilege of practicing law 
and earning fees from those clients who could afford to pay.  (This was the 
system commonly used in the United States, too, but only in criminal cases.  
In those jurisdictions where criminal defendants had statutory or constitu-
tional rights to counsel, the lawyers fulfilling those rights even in federal 
courts were expected to serve without compensation.14)  In most European 
countries, it was well into the twentieth century before governments began 
paying for the right they had created, and some still do not.15 
This social contract’s basic precept of equality before the law found its 
way into the constitutions or basic laws of several European nations.  These 
provisions guaranteed that all citizens were “equal before the law” or in all 
judicial proceedings had a right to a “fair trial.”16  Social contract theorists, 
especially John Locke, also influenced those men who were responsible for 
America’s founding documents.  Thomas Jefferson ranked Locke as one of 
the three greatest thinkers in history17 and as one noted historian observed, 
“Locke was an intellectual godparent of James Madison, the ‘Father of the 
Constitution.’”18  Thus, it is no surprise that the Preamble to the U.S. Con-
stitution sets forth “To Establish Justice” as one of the nation’s four prima-
ry goals,19 nor is it surprising, given the importance of the social contract, 
 
 11. See id. at 19 n.59 (citing Law of Dec. 6, 1865, no. 2627, [1865] Racc. Uff. 2846). 
 12. See id. at 19 n.62 (citing Jan. 30, 1877, ZPO §§ 114-27 (C. H. Beck 1970)). 
 13. Many of these other historical statutory “right to counsel” provisions are set forth in 
CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, at 16-27. 
 14. See U.S. Courts, History of the Defender Services for the U.S. Federal Courts, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/defenderservices/history.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). 
 15. See generally CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, at 19-20. 
 16. See discussion infra Part II. 
 17. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Trumbull, American painter (Feb. 15, 1789), 
available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm033.html (ordering portraits of “the 
three greatest men that have ever lived,” referring to John Locke, Francis Bacon, and Isaac 
Newton). 
 18. LEE CAMERON MCDONALD, WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY: THE MODERN AGE 111 
(1962). 
 19. “We the People of the United States, in Order to . . . establish Justice . . . do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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that the Bill of Rights guarantees all U.S. citizens “due process” in any 
judicial proceedings where their “life, liberty, or property” is at stake.20  
And, after the Civil War, the United States also added the analog of the 
“equality before the law” guarantee that many European countries had al-
ready adopted—that is, “equal protection of the laws.”  As the Supreme 
Court explained long ago: 
The Fourteenth Amendment, in declaring that no State “shall deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” un-
doubtedly intended . . . that equal protection and security should be given 
to all . . . that they should have like access to the courts of the country for 
the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of 
wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts . . . .21 
Given the comparable language in the constitutions on both continents, 
and the common source and concepts they embodied, one might have antic-
ipated that courts on both sides of the Atlantic would interpret that lan-
guage the same way.  For the most part, however, this has not been the 
case. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW 
The Swiss Supreme Court was the first European court to confront the 
issue of whether the social contract’s constitutional guarantees require the 
state to provide free attorneys to civil litigants who cannot afford to pay for 
their own.22  The year was 1937, a full quarter-century before the U.S. Su-
preme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, granting indigent criminal de-
fendants in this country a right to free counsel.23  The Swiss federal consti-
tution is one of those containing an express guarantee of equality before the 
law but with no mention of counsel, simply providing that “[a]ll Swiss are 
equal before the law.”24 
In the case before it, the Swiss Supreme Court concluded that poor 
people could not be equal before the law in the regular civil courts, unless 
 
 20. “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 21. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) (emphasis added). 
 22. See Francis William O’Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The 
Swiss Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5 (1967) (citing Tribunal Fédéral Suisse [TFS] [Highest 
Court in Switzerland] Oct. 8, 1937, 63 Arrêts du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse [ATF] I 209 
(Switz.)). 
 23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 24. Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, Constitution fédérale de 
la Confédération suisse, [aBV], [aCst] [Constitution of 1874], May 29, 1874, AS 1 (1875), 1 
RO, 1 (1875), art. 4 (Switz.), translated in CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, at 705. 
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they had lawyers just like the rest of the citizenry.25  The court reasoned the 
constitutional principle of equality before the law requires the Cantons to 
provide a free lawyer “in a civil matter where the handling of the trial de-
mands knowledge of the law.”26  In subsequent decisions, the Swiss Su-
preme Court has explained and expanded the circumstances in which the 
governments of the Cantons (the rough equivalent of our state govern-
ments) must supply free lawyers to poor litigants appearing in their civil 
courts.27  Meanwhile, it was not until 1972 that the Swiss Supreme Court 
mandated free counsel in criminal cases.28 
The Swiss right to counsel decision proved to be an early precursor for 
similar rulings across Europe.  In 1979, forty-two years after the Swiss Su-
preme Court’s decision (and three decades ago) the European Court on 
Human Rights was called upon to decide whether that continent’s relatively 
new convention guaranteeing citizens certain basic rights required signato-
ry governments to provide free lawyers to indigent litigants in civil cases.  
This document, the “European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
 
 25. See O’Brien, supra note 22, at 5. 
 26. Id. 
 27. In a 1952 decision, filed more than a decade before the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Gideon v. Wainwright, the Swiss Supreme Court explained the expansion of right to counsel 
in civil cases that had already evolved in that country: 
This Court has consistently affirmed that a party who is unable to afford the costs 
of a lawsuit without jeopardizing the livelihood of himself and his family and 
whose case is not unfounded, is entitled under the provisions of Article 4 of the 
Constitution (principle of equality) to a right of judicial protection.  This right 
means that the judge must consider his case, that the indigent litigant shall not be 
required to pay court costs in advance nor to post security for costs, and further 
that he is to be granted the assistance of a lawyer (without cost) in all cases where 
a lawyer is required for the adequate protection of his interests. This right of the 
indigent to judicial protection embraces every action to be taken during the pro-
ceeding of the first instance [trial court] . . . and this right extends also to chal-
lenges against the judgment of the first instance [appeals].  According to recent 
decisions of this Court, a case must be considered to have no probability of suc-
cess only when the probability of failure clearly prevails or when the case must be 
considered capricious. 
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] July 9, 1952, 78 Entscheidungen des Schweizeris-
chen Bundesgerichts [BGE] I 193 (Switz.), translated in CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, 
at 704-06 (emphasis added). 
 28. The opinion declaring a right to counsel in civil cases also summarized the status of 
the right to counsel in criminal cases as of that time. “Cantonal legislation may prescribe 
that a lawyer will be provided an accused only in serious cases . . . .”  O’Brien, supra note 
22 at 5 (quoting Tribunal Fédéral Suisse [TFS] [Highest Court in Switzerland] Oct. 8, 1937, 
63 Arrêts du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse [ATF] I 209 (Switz.)).  But in 1972, the Swiss Su-
preme Court modified this rule, holding the Cantons must grant every indigent criminal de-
fendant a lawyer, except where his case clearly lacked merit. See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 706 (citing Tribunal Fédéral Suisse [TFS] [Highest Court in Switzerland] Sept. 27, 
1972, Arrêts du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse [ATF] I 340 (Switz.)). 
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mental Freedoms,”29 does not contain a clause explicitly mentioning a right 
to counsel.  Indeed, the only reference to civil litigation with potential re-
levance to the issue was found in Article Six of the Convention.30  Consis-
tent with a fundamental precept of the social contract, Article Six does 
guarantee all civil litigants a “fair hearing.”31  But if and when a “fair hear-
ing” required governments to supply lawyers to litigants unable to afford 
their own remained a matter of interpretation and, thus, an open question to 
be decided by the European Court.32 
For most European countries, this was largely an irrelevant question be-
cause they already provided free counsel either as a matter of statutory or 
constitutional right.33  But Ireland was almost unique among European 
countries in having no legal aid program of any kind.  So when an indigent 
wife named Mrs. Airey wanted to file a judicial separation suit against her 
husband, she could not get a lawyer.  When she asked the trial court to ap-
point counsel, the judge refused, explaining Ireland did not provide free 
counsel to indigents in civil cases.  The court instead invited Mrs. Airey to 
represent herself in that court. When Mrs. Airey appealed the denial of 
counsel to the Irish Supreme Court the result was the same, and she re-
ceived the same explanation.  She then appealed to the European Court of 
Human Rights, with a young Irish barrister and law professor, Mary Robin-
son, as her advocate before that court.34 
Significantly, this was not a case where an individual citizen was op-
posed by her government in a civil case, for instance, because officials 
were trying to take something from her or had denied her some financial 
support or other substantive benefit to which she thought she was entitled.  
Rather, the issue here was the essence of equality before the law: a dispute 
between private citizens with different levels of economic resources, one of 
 
 29. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.  
 30. Id. at art. 6, § 1. 
 31. “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time.”  Id.  
The United Nations also has adopted a similar guarantee in civil cases, after echoing the so-
cial contract’s precept of equality before the law.  The relevant section reads: “All persons 
shall be equal before the courts and tribunals.  In the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a 
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law.”  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, § 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 99 
U.N.T.S. 171 (emphasis added). 
 32. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, supra note 29, at art. 6, § 3(c). 
 33. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
 34. See generally Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 305 (1979). 
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whom could not afford to employ a lawyer, and the other who could and 
did.  Moreover, Mrs. Airey was the plaintiff, who had brought the case, not 
a defendant who had been involuntarily dragged into court.  Finally, the 
main relief she was seeking was monetary.  At that time, Ireland did not al-
low divorce, so Mrs. Airey could not gain freedom to marry someone else, 
but only the right to live separately from her husband and to receive “sepa-
rate maintenance” out of his earnings.35  As a result, Mrs. Airey presented 
the European Court with what might be seen as the ultimate issue, one that 
an advocacy organization bent on establishing a right to counsel under the 
European Convention probably would have raised only after a succession 
of favorable decisions in intermediate situations. Airey was asking the 
court to establish a right to counsel for a plaintiff seeking essentially mone-
tary relief in a case against another private person. 
Nonetheless, in Airey, the European Court did not focus on these factors, 
but only whether any litigant could receive a fair hearing in the regular 
courts in such a case without the assistance of a lawyer.  After examining 
that question from several angles, the judges concluded the answer was no, 
and that the fair hearing guarantee of the European Convention required 
member governments to provide free counsel to those unable to afford their 
own.36  In the course of its opinion in Airey, the European Court first em-
phasized that a party’s opportunity to be physically present in court was not 
access to justice in any real sense and certainly not enough to satisfy the 
requirements of a democratic society. 
The Convention is intended to guarantee . . . rights that are practical and 
effective.  This is particularly so of the right of access to the courts in view 
of the prominent place held in a democratic society . . . . 
. . . . 
[T]he possibility to appear in person before the High Court does not pro-
vide the applicant with an effective right of access.37 
The European Court went on to emphasize that governments have an af-
firmative duty to provide to their private citizens a level playing field when 
they oppose one another in the courts—even if that requires providing a 
free lawyer to the side that is unable to afford her own. 
 
 35. It was not until a constitutional amendment passed by a slim margin in 1995 (the 
15th Amendment) that Ireland became the last European nation to legalize divorce. Before 
that, people in failing marriages could only obtain judicial separations. See Anthony Tyler 
Barnes, Ireland’s Divorce Bill: Traditional Irish and International Norms of Equality and 
Bodily Integrity at Issue in a Domestic Abuse Context, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 643 
(1998). 
 36. Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 305 (1979). 
 37. Id. at 314-15 (emphasis added). 
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The [Irish] Government maintain that . . . in the present case there is no 
positive obstacle emanating from the State and no deliberate attempt by 
the State to impede access; the alleged lack of access to court stems not 
from any act on the part of the authorities but solely from Mrs. Airey’s 
personal circumstances, a matter for which Ireland cannot be held respon-
sible under the Convention. . . .  [T]he Court does not agree . . . .  In the 
first place, hindrance in fact can contravene the Convention just like a le-
gal impediment.  Furthermore, fulfilment of a duty under the Convention 
on occasion necessitates some positive action on the part of the State; in 
such circumstances, the State cannot simply remain passive, and “there is 
. . . no room to distinguish between acts and omissions.”  The obligation 
to secure an effective right of access to the courts falls into this category 
of duty.38 
In holding that effective access in civil litigation required representation 
by counsel, the European Court discussed many of the same justifications 
that the U.S. Supreme Court went through in the landmark decision of 
Gideon v. Wainright.39  The European Court mentioned the other side in 
most of these cases had elected to have lawyers, that most civil litigants 
who were on the same side of this type of case and could afford lawyers in 
fact employed them, and that the procedures and substantive legal rules 
were relatively complex.40  The European Court went even further in justi-
fying the need for counsel, referring to expert testimony by a lawyer expe-
rienced in representing clients in similar cases before the Irish courts who 
testified to the complexity of the procedures and the substantive law.41 
This ruling now controls litigation for some forty-five nations across Eu-
rope, and in turn, the majority of the world’s western industrial democra-
cies.  Although this case was decided over thirty years ago, the European 
Court of Human Rights recently made it clear the principle announced in 
Airey v. Ireland remains the governing law for member nations. 
England has the most comprehensive and generously funded civil legal 
aid system in the world.42  But it still denies counsel in a few types of cas-
es, including the prosecution or defense of libel and defamation lawsuits.43  
Thus, when the McDonald’s corporation sued two members of Greenpeace 
for participating in the preparation and distribution of some allegedly libel-
ous pamphlets, the defendants were denied legal aid, despite being demon-
 
 38. Id. at 315-16 (citations omitted). 
 39. Compare id. at 314-15, with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 40. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
 41. Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 314-15. 
 42. See infra note 185 and accompanying table. 
 43. See Steel v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 22, 414 (2005) (“[L]egal aid was not 
available for defamation proceedings in the United Kingdom.”). 
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strably poor.44  What ensued was a legal proceeding that lasted over a dec-
ade with the McDonald’s Corporation’s expensive and skilled lawyers 
ted against the impoverished demonstrators struggling to represent them-
selves with only occasional pro bono help from a few lawyers.  The result, 
as might be expected, was a judgment against the two defendants, awarding 
McDonald’s 60,000 pounds in damages.45 
Ultimately, that judgment and, in particular, the English government’s 
denial of counsel to the demonstrators found its way to the European Court 
of Human Rights.  In Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom,46 the European 
Court found the failure to provide counsel to the indigent demonstrators 
denied them the “fair hearing” guaranteed by the European Convention on 
Human Rights.47  Under the precedent established in Airey v. Ireland, the 
court reversed the judgment, not only reinforcing the fair hearing and “ef-
fective access to justice” dimensions of the Airey opinion,48 but also intro-
ducing “equality of arms” between competing litigants as a governing prin-
ciple: 
The Court recalls that the Convention is intended to guarantee practical 
and effective rights.  This is particularly so of the right of access to court 
in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to 
a fair trial.  It is central to the concept of a fair trial, in civil as in criminal 
proceedings, that a litigant is not denied the opportunity to present his or 
her case effectively before the court (ibid.) and that he or she is able to en-
joy equality of arms with the opposing side.49 
The European Court then proceeded to explain how and why the appel-
lants lacked effective access and did not enjoy equality of arms against 
McDonald’s team of lawyers, even though they had limited legal assistance 
from pro bono counsel and the trial judge was helpful to them. 
It is not in dispute that they could not afford to pay for legal representa-
tion themselves, and that they would have fulfilled the financial criteria 
for the grant of legal aid.  They received some help on the legal and  
procedural aspects of the case from barristers and solicitors acting pro  
bono . . . . 
The Government has laid emphasis on the considerable latitude afforded 
to the applicants by the judges of the domestic courts, both at first in-
stance and on appeal, in recognition of the handicaps under which the ap-
 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 305, 314-15 (1979). 
 49. Steel, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 22, 427 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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plicants laboured.  However, the Court considers that, in an action of this 
complexity, neither the sporadic help given by the volunteer lawyers nor 
the extensive judicial assistance and latitude granted to the applicants as 
litigants in person, was any substitute for competent and sustained repre-
sentation by an experienced lawyer familiar with the case and with the 
law of libel. . . . 
. . . . 
In conclusion, therefore, the Court finds that the denial of legal aid to the 
applicants deprived them of the opportunity to present their case effec-
tively before the court and contributed to an unacceptable inequality of 
arms with McDonald’s. There has, therefore, been a violation of Art.6 
(1).50 
In this case, the European Court made an interesting and quite revealing 
choice of language—“equality of arms”—to describe what governments 
must provide in the judicial context.  It underscores the social contract ori-
gins of the duty.  In order to honor the promise of equality before the law, 
inducing individual citizens to surrender the natural right to use “arms” in 
forcibly resolving disputes with their neighbors, governments must guaran-
tee that those citizens will enter the courtroom with the modern equivalent 
of the “arms” necessary to give them a fair chance in that arena, e.g., law-
yers. 
Also noteworthy is the way the European Court in Steel and Morris 
demonstrated how it would encourage governments to abide by the duty to 
provide counsel in the civil context.  In criminal cases, governments face 
the reversal of criminal convictions unless they supply the defendants with 
counsel.  But governments suffer no particular loss if a civil judgment 
gained by a represented party is reversed because the government failed to 
provide counsel to the indigent party.  The European Court of Human 
Rights not only reversed the judgment against the two Greenpeace mem-
bers in Steel and Morris, but also went a step further.  It awarded the suc-
cessful defendants over 80,000 Euros in damages and costs—to be paid, 
not by the McDonald’s Corporation, but by the English government for its 
violation of the defendant’s right to counsel under the European Conven-
tion.51 
 
 50. Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added).  Elsewhere in the opinion, the court makes it clear 
governments are not required to provide absolute equality of arms between parties, but ra-
ther rough equality.  That is, for instance, if the affluent party has the highest-priced, most 
qualified lawyer in town, the government need not furnish the legal aid client with one pos-
sessing the same expertise. See id. at 427-28. 
 51. Id. at 439-40. 
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In 1981, two years after the European court decided Airey, the U.S. Su-
preme Court had the opportunity to interpret the U.S. Constitution’s equiv-
alent of the European Constitution’s fair hearing mandate in civil cases—
our Due Process clause.  The case was Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services of Durham County.52  It presented what from nearly every pers-
pective appeared to be a far more favorable fact situation for deciding the 
indigent litigant had a right to government-supplied counsel than Mrs. Air-
ey presented the European Court two years earlier.  In Lassiter, the oppos-
ing party was the government, not a private individual.  The indigent was 
the defendant, not the plaintiff, and at stake was not money or other proper-
ty, but whether an indigent mother would permanently lose her legal con-
nection to her own child.53  In other words, on the surface it was the ideal 
first case to bring before the nation’s highest court on the civil right to 
counsel issue, rather than the ultimate case the facts of Airey v. Ireland 
brought to the European Court of Human Rights in 1979. 
But, in another sense, it was the worst possible case to bring to any court 
on this issue.  The petitioner was a convicted murderer who allegedly had 
not been in contact with her child for several years at the time the State 
sought to terminate her parental rights.54  The State did not provide to Ms. 
Lassiter the assistance of counsel, and she did not request counsel as an in-
digent.55  A lawyer opposed Ms. Lassiter in her case.56  Furthermore, had 
the Supreme Court reversed the termination order and remanded for a hear-
ing where the mother was represented by counsel, it is highly doubtful that 
the most skilled trial lawyer in America could have won her case.  Only be-
cause a young lawyer was bent on taking this particular case to the nation’s 
high court—against the pleas of experienced legal services’ lawyers—did it 
come up for decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.57 
In light of this unpromising factual context, it actually is rather surpris-
ing that four of the nine Justices nonetheless voted to reverse the termina-
tion decision on grounds that Ms. Lassiter had been denied her constitu-
tional right to counsel.58  The five Justices in the majority, however, 
 
 52. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
 53. Id. at 20-24. 
 54. Id. at 20-21. 
 55. Id. at 21-22. 
 56. Id. at 29, 55. 
 57. Interview with Gregory Malhoit, Professor, North Carolina Central University 
School of Law (Jan. 5, 2010).  Professor Malhoit was the Executive Director of East Central 
County Legal Services in Raleigh, North Carolina from 1971 to 1992. 
 58. It is not unlikely that the Court would have reached the opposite result as the majori-
ty of the 1981 Court did, had the Lassiter case been heard by the Supreme Court a few years 
earlier. 
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produced an opinion that has stood without challenge and denied counsel to 
millions of poor people for nearly three decades.59  Not surprisingly for that 
era in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the opinion fails to even mention Air-
ey v. Ireland.60 
The majority opinion rested its rationale on a presumption it inferred, not 
from affirmative language in prior opinions declaring a right to counsel on-
ly in cases where physical liberty was at stake, but from the absence of lan-
guage saying there was a right in cases where other interests were involved. 
The pre-eminent generalization that emerges from this Court’s precedents 
on an indigent’s right to appointed counsel is that such a right has been 
recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if 
he loses the litigation. . . . 
. . . . 
[W]e thus draw from them the presumption that an indigent litigant has a 
right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of 
his physical liberty.  It is against this presumption that all the other ele-
ments in the due process decision must be measured.61 
The dissenters challenged both the presumption and its underlying gene-
ralization about the Court’s precedents, but the majority moved on from 
this foundation and adopted the three-part test devised in Mathews v. El-
dridge for a very different purpose,62 as the appropriate approach in decid-
ing whether due process demanded the appointment of counsel for indi-
gents in cases not implicating physical freedom. 
The case of Mathews v. Eldridge propounds three elements to be eva-
luated in deciding what due process requires, viz., the private interests at 
stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will 
lead to erroneous decisions.  We must balance these elements against each 
other, and then set their net weight in the scales against the presumption 
that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is 
unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.63 
 
 59. For a comprehensive examination of state appellate cases on the right to counsel is-
sue in the years after the Lassiter opinion was issued, see Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: 
An Overview of State-Court Right-to-Counsel Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186 
(2006).  As Professor Pastore reports, virtually all of these subsequent opinions upheld de-
nials of counsel to poor people, relying on Lassiter as a broad and nearly automatic prohibi-
tion against appointing counsel in civil cases. 
 60. This is something that would probably not happen in the present day given the inter-
est in foreign decisions which several Justices on the current Court have recently expressed. 
 61. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27. 
 62. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 63. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (citation omitted). 
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While the dissenters agreed and also applied the Eldridge factors, they 
disagreed the “net weight” of those factors had to overcome a presumption 
against appointment of counsel in civil cases.”64  In weighing the Eldridge 
factors, the majority conceded the “private interest at stake,” a parent’s in-
terest in “the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her 
children” was “a commanding one.”65  The majority then pointed out the 
“government’s interest” was two-fold.  On the one hand, like the parent, it 
has an interest in an accurate and just determination of whether the child 
should remain tethered to the parent.66  But, on the other hand, it also has a 
pecuniary interest in avoiding the cost of providing counsel to the parent 
and the cost of a delayed and perhaps longer proceeding.  Significantly, the 
majority conceded that additional cost was not sufficient “to overcome pri-
vate interests as important as those here . . . .”67  Thus, it was the third El-
dridge factor—the risk of error—that the majority found determinative in 
calculating the “net weight” to set on the scale with the presumption 
against appointed counsel.68 
In Lassiter, the Court emphasized the relative informality of the pro-
ceeding, somehow discounted studies showing represented parents pre-
vailed several times as frequently as unrepresented ones in North Carolina 
termination cases (as they did in some other jurisdictions), and also focused 
tightly on the particular factual circumstances of the case and the litigant.69  
Significantly, along the way, even the majority Justices highlighted cir-
cumstances that they felt might alter the equation enough to overcome the 
presumption.  Finally, the majority refused to articulate any standards for 
deciding when counsel would be constitutionally required, but opted in-
stead for a retroactive case-by-case evaluation of whether the absence of a 
lawyer denied due process in a particular case.70 
The dissenters examined the same three Eldridge factors, reached a dif-
ferent balance, and also disputed the merits of the retroactive case-by-case 
approach that the Gideon case had rejected for criminal cases, and for much 
the same reasons.71  Thus, by a one-vote margin, the U.S. Supreme Court 
put the United States on the other side of a vast gulf between our country 
and Europe on the issue of the right to counsel in civil cases. 
 
 64. Id. at 42. 
 65. Id. at 27. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 28. 
 68. Id. at 27-28. 
 69. Id. at 33. 
 70. Id. at 28-34. 
 71. Id. at 42-52. 
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Only by focusing solely on the informality of the proceedings in the 
Lassiter case could one possibly reconcile that opinion with Airey v. Irel-
and.  There simply is no way to reconcile the Airey opinion or its progeny 
with Lassiter’s presumption against a right to counsel in civil cases.  As the 
Lassiter opinion and its progeny have made abundantly clear, a fair hearing 
is a fair hearing, and effective access to justice is effective access to jus-
tice—whether the proceeding involves physical liberty or some other vital 
interest.72 
In the years since the Airey and Lassiter opinions were filed, two other 
nations—Canada and South Africa—have weighed in on the issue of a 
right to counsel in civil cases.  In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada 
found a constitutional right to counsel in the “fair hearing” guarantee in 
Canada’s first written constitution, the relatively new “Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.”  The Canadian case, J.G. v. New Brunswick,73 arose in 
what would be called a dependency or neglect case in the United States.  
Rather than threatening the ultimate termination of parental rights as North 
Carolina did in Lassiter, the province of New Brunswick only sought to 
continue its custody of a mother’s children for another six months.  None-
theless, after determining the temporary loss of custody of one’s child qual-
ified as a threat to the mother’s “security of the person,”74  Chief Justice 
Lamer proceeded to explain why the mother had a constitutional right to 
free counsel using language reminiscent of Airey v. Ireland. 
Section 7 guarantees every parent the right to a fair hearing when the 
state seeks to obtain custody of their children. . . . 
. . . . 
For the hearing to be fair, the parent must have an opportunity to present 
his or her case effectively.  Effective parental participation at the hearing 
 
 72. The European Court of Human Rights interpreted a clause that required “fair hear-
ings” in cases involving a person’s “civil rights and obligations” just as the U.S. Constitu-
tion guarantees “due process” in cases involving “life, liberty, or property”—not just those 
where some liberty interest is at stake. See generally Steel v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 22 (2005); Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 305 (1979).  Nothing in the Eu-
ropean Court’s Airey or Steel decisions even hints at some presumption that “fair hearings” 
or “effective access to justice” or “equality of arms” are not ordinarily required in civil cases 
unless a litigant’s “physical liberty” is at stake.  Quite the contrary, in neither of those cases 
was the litigant’s “physical liberty” involved in any way.  The absence of a threat to physi-
cal liberty was not even mentioned—or presumably even considered relevant—in deciding 
that the indigent litigants were entitled to free counsel. 
 73. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Cmty. Servs.) v. G.(J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 
(Can.). 
 74. Id. at 61-62. 
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is essential for determining the best interests of the child in circumstances 
where the parent seeks to maintain custody of the child. . . . 
. . . . 
In the circumstances of this case, the appellant’s right to a fair hearing re-
quired that she be represented by counsel.75 
Justice Lamer reached this conclusion by considering “the seriousness of 
the interests at stake, the complexity of the proceedings and the capacities 
of [J.G., the mother threatened with losing custody for another six 
months].”76 
Then, in 2001, the Land Claims Court of South Africa reached this issue 
in the case of Nkuzi v. The Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
The Legal Aid Board.77  This time, unlike New Brunswick or Lassiter, the 
dispute was not between a government and a private citizen but between 
two private parties.  Moreover, purely property rights, not parental or other 
liberty-related interests, were at stake. 
The Land Claims Court has jurisdiction over eviction actions between 
tenants or occupiers of land and those asserting ownership.  Most of those 
tenants or occupiers are poor, uneducated blacks, while those bringing the 
eviction actions tend to be wealthy whites.  It only took the court two sen-
tences in a two-page opinion to capture the essence of the rationale for a 
right to counsel in civil cases.  It wrote, “[t]here is no logical basis for dis-
tinguishing between criminal and civil matters.  The issues in civil matters 
are equally complex and the laws and procedures difficult to understand.”78  
Accordingly, the court declared that those 
whose security of tenure is threatened or has been infringed, have a right 
to legal representation or legal aid at State expense if substantial injustice 
would otherwise result, and if they cannot reasonably afford the cost the-
reof from their own resources.  The State is under a duty to provide such 
legal representation or legal aid through mechanisms selected by it.79 
 
 75. Id. at 55, 73, 75 (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. at 75. 
 77. 2002 SA 733 (LCC) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/ 
2001/31.pdf. 
 78. Id. at 5. 
 79. Id. (emphasis added).  For a thorough account of the Nkuzi case including the back-
ground on the litigation that resulted in the court’s opinion, along with an interesting analy-
sis of its broader implications, see Jeremy Perelman, The Way Ahead? Access-to-Justice, 
Public Interest Lawyering, and the Right to Legal Aid in South Africa: The Nkuzi Case, 41 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 357 (2005).  The litigation was brought by two public interest organiza-
tions, the Nkuzi Development Association, a South African NGO specializing in land 
reform issues, and the Legal Resource Center, a leading South African public interest law 
firm, which represented the NGO in the litigation. Id. at 357. 
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Neither the South African government nor the Legal Aid Board appealed 
the Nkuzi decision to a higher court and the ruling is being followed and 
enforced in all land eviction cases.80  Of special relevance to the central 
theme of this Article, the lawyers presenting the Nkuzi case presented a so-
phisticated argument based on comparative and international human rights 
law, including Airey and New Brunswick.  “They anchored their legal aid 
entitlement claim in comparative law, basing it on the right to a fair trial (as 
in Airey and New Brunswick) that complemented a constitutional right to 
security of land tenure.”81  Perhaps the United States, as one of the world’s 
older democracies, might learn something from the willingness of one of its 
newer democracies, South Africa, to take into account constitutional devel-
opments elsewhere. 
III.  WHAT THE FOREIGN EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS ABOUT DEFINING 
THE SCOPE OF A “RIGHT TO EQUAL JUSTICE” IN CIVIL CASES 
Whether it were to be established through a constitutional amendment or 
through legislation, the right to counsel in civil cases is likely to be quite 
different and more complex than the right in criminal prosecutions.  As in-
terpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Constitution guarantees an abso-
lute right to counsel in all criminal cases where there exists a threat of in-
carceration; that is, a right to representation by a full-fledged lawyer in all 
such cases.82  This is a simple and straightforward, but expensive, right to 
enforce.  In criminal cases, this right is easily justified, by both the serious-
ness of criminal penalties and the complexity of the criminal process.  The 
Constitution not only guarantees counsel, but also dictates the essential 
elements of criminal procedure that make the assistance of counsel neces-
sary to equal justice for criminal defendants.  It is distinctly adversarial and 
features such elements as: jury trials; complex rules of evidence; constitu-
tional rights against self-incrimination and illegally obtained evidence that 
must be raised or waived in the heat of the courtroom battle; ever more in-
tricate and onerous sentencing schemes; and a dozen other guaranteed, or at 
least universal elements that make self-representation, or representation by 
anything less than a skilled lawyer, a foolish alternative. 
In contrast, the civil—or, more accurately, the non-criminal—arena is 
far more diverse.  There is no single model but rather a panoply of models 
(and potential models) for resolving disputes.  The regular civil courts—the 
 
 80. Interview with Vidhu Vedalankar, Executive Dir. of S. Afr. Legal Aid Bd., in Cam-
bridge, Mass. (June 15, 2003). 
 81. Perelman, supra note 79, at 395. 
 82. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (stating that “lawyers in criminal 
courts are necessities, not luxuries”). 
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forums in which traditional contract, tort, and property litigation occurs—
are often every bit as complex as the criminal courts, indeed sometimes 
more so.  Hence, lawyers are as essential for civil litigants in these forums 
as they are for criminal defendants in criminal trials.  As the European 
Court emphasized in both the Airey and Steel and Morris decisions, the as-
sistance of a lawyer is essential to a fair hearing and to effective access to 
justice.83  In such proceedings, any parties who face represented opponents 
without a lawyer of their own lack the “equality of arms” the European 
Court found essential in Steel and Morris.84  Consequently, it seems rea-
sonable to expect any right to equal justice in civil cases to be co-extensive 
with the right to counsel when low-income litigants appear in the tradition-
al civil courts or any other forum where the procedures and/or substantive 
law approaches the complexity found in the criminal process. 
In its Airey decision, the European Court of Human Rights also recog-
nized the possibility that many civil disputes might be decided in forums 
and through processes in which the parties would have effective access to 
justice and enjoy fair hearings without being represented by lawyers. 
[W]hilst Article 6 (1) guarantees to litigants an effective right of access to 
the courts for the determination of their “civil rights and obligations,” it 
leaves to the State a free choice of the means to be used towards this end.  
The institution of a legal aid scheme—which Ireland now envisages in 
family law matters—constitutes one of those means but there are others 
such as, for example, a simplification of procedure.  In any event, it is not 
the Court’s function to indicate, let alone dictate, which measures should 
be taken; all that the Convention requires is that an individual should en-
joy his effective right of access to the courts in conditions not at variance 
with Article 6 (1).85 
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights qualified its holding in Air-
ey, requiring member governments to provide free counsel to indigent liti-
gants in civil cases.  The court mandated counsel only in cases where the 
procedures or the substantive law is sufficiently complex that the expertise 
of lawyers makes a substantial difference to the litigant’s chances of suc-
cess.86  The holding left open the option for governments to offer forums 
where poor litigants could enjoy effective access to justice without legal 
counsel.  Thus, what the European Court of Human Rights has announced 
for the signatory nations to the European Convention in Airey and Steel and 
 
 83. See Steel v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 22, 427 (2005); Airey v. Ireland, 2 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 305, 314 (1979). 
 84. See Steel, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 427. 
 85. Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 317 (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. 
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Morris is not a right to counsel as such, but more accurately, a right to 
equal justice—a fair hearing in which indigent parties enjoy “equality of 
arms” with their better-heeled adversaries, however that equality is 
achieved. 
It appears reasonable to anticipate that an American court likewise 
would place parameters around any right to counsel based on either the due 
process or equal protection clauses.  But if the judgment of whether a pro-
ceeding satisfies this right to equal justice is to be made retrospectively on 
a case-by-case basis, the right becomes virtually meaningless: low-income 
clients denied counsel would be forced to appeal that denial to the appellate 
courts in order to find out whether their particular circumstances meant 
they had been deprived of their constitutional right to equal justice.  Only 
rarely would such an appellate challenge be feasible—primarily when a le-
gal aid organization chose to allocate a portion of its limited resources to 
take that appeal for the indigent litigant.  Consequently, as a practical mat-
ter, trial courts and other forums would be free to adopt their own interpre-
tations of whether the constitutional right to justice required the provision 
of free counsel to indigents appearing in their proceedings. 
Thus, if they are to guarantee truly effective access to low income civil 
litigants, appellate courts would not only have to recognize a right to equal 
justice, but also gradually establish definitive standards.  Those standards 
would have to define when legal representation was required and when jus-
tice could be achieved without providing poor people with free counsel.  In 
some instances, justice might be achieved by providing less expensive, 
non-lawyer advocates,87 and in others, by designing forums that truly oper-
ate fairly without trained advocates of any kind.88  In all likelihood, the lat-
ter would mean a shift from an adversarial model to an inquisitorial model 
of dispute resolution in those forums, in which the judge or other decision-
 
 87. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 
21, 193, 201 (1998).  This empirical study compared outcomes and perceptions in low-level 
administrative hearings where some parties were represented by lawyers and others by non-
lawyer advocates.  The author concluded non-lawyer advocates achieved equivalent or near-
ly equivalent results for their clients as did the lawyer advocates.  The process used in the 
administrative proceedings he studied, however, was comparatively informal and the subs-
tantive law was comparatively straightforward and self-contained. 
 88. See generally Talbot “Sandy” D’Alemberte, Tributaries of Justice: The Search for 
Full Access, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 631 (1998).  For an international survey that included 
alternative forums not requiring lawyers, see ACCESS TO JUSTICE:  VOLUME II—PROMISING 
INSTITUTIONS (Mauro Cappelletti & John Weisner eds., 1979).  For an analysis of innovative 
approaches derived from this survey, see Earl Johnson, Jr., Thinking About Access: A Pre-
liminary Typology of Possible Strategies, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE: VOLUME III—EMERGING 
ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 5 (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant G. Garth eds., 1979). 
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maker rather than the parties bore the primary responsibility for uncovering 
and presenting the facts, as well as identifying the relevant legal principles. 
It may be tempting for appellate courts to draw such a test in broad 
strokes, for instance, to hold that counsel is required in all cases heard in 
“courts” but not in other forums.  This approach disregards the reality that 
legal assistance may be required for effective access to justice even in fo-
rums other than the courts.  Meanwhile, some forums labeled as courts, 
such as California’s small claims courts, may be far fairer to unrepresented 
disputants than arbitration, most administrative bodies, and similar non-
judicial tribunals. 
A sounder approach would be to articulate an overarching standard ac-
companied by a presumption with any exceptions requiring verification by 
empirical testing.  The overarching test?  What the European Court stated 
so artfully: all disputants are entitled to effective access to the court or other 
dispute-resolving forum.  The presumption?  Virtually the opposite of the 
presumption the U.S. Supreme Court majority announced in Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services—a presumption that effective access re-
quires the government to supply free representation by a lawyer, or a non-
lawyer representative where sufficient, to those who are unable to afford 
their own representation in all non-criminal cases.89 
This presumption could only be overcome where a court can legitimately 
certify that the particular forum deciding the dispute can and does provide a 
fair and equal opportunity for justice to those who lack such representation.  
For obvious reasons, it would be virtually impossible to overcome this pre-
sumption in a dispute where the lawyer represented the other side.  Like-
wise, it would be rare in cases where nearly everyone on the same side as 
the indigent disputant, who could afford representation, employs a lawyer 
or other paid representative.  As the Gideon and Airey opinions emphasize, 
both of these factors furnish powerful empirical evidence supporting the 
need for representation. 90 
The more likely candidates for overcoming this presumption would be 
existing or future forums specifically designed to function without lawyers 
or other representation.  In most instances, this means forums built around 
an inquisitorial rather than adversarial model of dispute resolution.  The fo-
rum itself, rather than the disputants, would have to absorb the primary re-
sponsibility for uncovering the facts and legal principles critical to a proper 
 
 89. See 452 U.S. 18, 25-28 (1981). 
 90. This factor was mentioned both by the European Court of Human Rights in civil 
proceedings and U.S. Supreme Court in criminal cases as strong evidence that indigent par-
ties needed free counsel when opposing those represented parties. See generally Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Airey, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 305, 314-315. 
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decision.  This might represent a difficult, but certainly not impossible 
transformation for a judicial system and legal profession historically com-
mitted to the adversarial model.  California’s creation several decades ago 
of small claims courts that bar lawyers or other professional representation 
offers some evidence that innovative forums might evolve, offering effec-
tive access to justice for disputants lacking representation.91  Nonetheless, 
the difficulty of designing dispute resolution forums, capable of operating 
fairly and effectively without professional representation, is suggested by 
the fact that the California small claims system has found it necessary to 
begin employing a coterie of small claims court advisors.  Although they 
do not represent litigants in the courtroom, these “advisors” do help liti-
gants assemble the evidence that they will need and prepare litigants for 
their appearances before the small claims court judges.92 
Except where forums exist or are created which truly offer disputants ef-
fective access to justice without representation by counsel, the right to 
equal justice in civil cases, as is true in all criminal cases, requires the pro-
vision of counsel to those unable to afford their own.  Indeed, only the dec-
laration of a guaranteed right to equal justice, and little short of that step, 
appears likely to supply a powerful enough incentive for governments to 
get serious about developing innovative forums calculated to afford unre-
presented disputants fair and equal access to justice.93 
On December 1, 2009, the European Community embraced something 
approaching the above formula when the Treaty of Lisbon finally came into 
force, enacting a series of major revisions to the Community’s basic struc-
ture.94  Included was a Charter of Fundamental Rights.  This Charter in-
 
 91. “Except as permitted by this section, no attorney may take part in the conduct or de-
fense of a small claims action.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.530(a) (West 2003).  The ex-
ceptions are for proceedings in which the attorney is a party or the law firm of which he is a 
member is a party. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.530(b) (West 2003). Attorneys also can be 
witnesses or give advice to a party before or after the hearing, and the like. CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 116.530(c) (West 2003).  The present jurisdictional limit of small claims courts in 
California is $ 5,000. 
 92. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.260 (West 2003) (“In each county, individual assis-
tance shall be made available to advise small claims litigants and potential litigants without 
charge . . . .”).  See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.920(b) (West 2003) (stating that courts 
must also provide all small claims litigants notice these advisory services are available to 
assist them). 
 93. It may be essential to guarantee a right to a different resource, specifically, for the 
millions of disputants who cannot understand or speak English.  For these people, there can 
be no equal justice—or justice of any kind—unless they have a right to an interpreter (or 
someone who can effectively communicate between them and the judge or other arbitrator 
deciding their case). 
 94. The European Community maintains a website that includes extensive treatment of 
the Treaty of Lisbon and the dramatic changes it makes to the Community’s institutions and 
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cludes a provision that guarantees legal aid in civil cases while still allow-
ing alternative strategies for delivering effective access to justice. Found in 
the Charter’s section on “Justice,” Article 47 reads as follows, with the le-
gal aid guarantee appearing in the final sentence: 
 
Article 47  
Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union 
are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in com-
pliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. 
Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and 
represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources 
in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.95 
One could imagine what it would mean if the United States adopted sim-
ilar language as a guarantee of what lower income Americans would enjoy 
when they appeared in tribunals deciding their disputes and enforcing their 
rights. It could come from a court, no longer fearing it was imposing an ob-
ligation that would mandate the expense of providing lawyers where lower 
income people could enjoy truly effective access to justice through less 
costly approaches. After setting the standard governments had to satisfy, 
the court could leave it to the other branches to work out the details.  Or al-
ternatively, the guarantee could result from a legislative effort that not only 
articulated the goal but designed, tested, and installed the full range of in-
stitutions and services required to achieve effective access to justice.  The 
Appendix, infra, presents a draft statute that attempts to demonstrate how a 
right similar to that which the European Community enacted in Article 47 
might be implemented if it became law in an American jurisdiction. 
 
basic arrangements. See EUROPA – Treaty of Lisbon, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_ 
en.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2010). Readers visiting this website can access everything from 
brief overviews of the changes the Treaty achieved to the full text of the Treaty, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, and all the other associated documents. 
 95. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 47, Dec. 1, 2009, 
2007 O.J. (c 303) (emphasis added), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:0001:0016:EN:PDF (emphasis supplied.).  This provi-
sion of the Charter applies to both the Community institutions and within the member na-
tions when Community laws are being enforced. The European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as interpreted by Airey v. Ireland and its progeny contin-
ues to guarantee a similar right when domestic laws are involved. See supra note 94. 
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IV.  WHAT FOREIGN EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS ABOUT THE DESIGN OF A 
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTING A RIGHT TO EQUAL JUSTICE 
A. Eligibility Criteria 
In defining the types of cases to which the right applies, and for which 
applicants can apply for services with a reasonable expectation of receiving 
legal aid, nearly all these countries use an “everything but” approach, in 
contrast to limiting the right to a list of specific types.  In other words, the 
statutes list the exceptions, not the rule—with the legal aid program cover-
ing any and all case types not specifically excluded.96  Among the case 
types commonly excluded are defamation, election disputes, and alienation 
of affections.97  Significantly, research has not uncovered any country that 
 
 96. See, e.g., CAROLYN REGAN, INT’L LEGAL AID GROUP, NATIONAL REPORT: ENGLAND 
AND WALES 5 (2009), available at http://www.ilagconference.org/reports/England%20-
%20CR_.pdf (distributed as part of the ILAG Conference: Delivering Legal Services Across 
Diverse Communities).  In New Zealand, as is true in a number of countries, legal aid is 
“demand driven,” with annual budgets only being estimates of what will be required to ac-
commodate the cases actually granted legal aid in the coming year, and with supplemental 
appropriations required if predictions are exceeded. See INT’L LEGAL AID GROUP, NATIONAL 
REPORT: NEW ZEALAND 3 (2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL REPORT: NEW ZEALAND], available 
at http://www.ilagconference.org/reports/New_Zealand.pdf (distributed as part of the ILAG 
Conference: Delivering Legal Services Across Diverse Communities).  In the Netherlands, 
the Netherlands Constitution as well as the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms guarantees legal aid.  Article 18 of the Dutch constitution provides: 
“(1) Everyone may be legally represented in legal and administrative proceedings. (2)  
Terms concerning the supply of legal aid to persons of limited means shall be laid down by 
Act of Parliament.” Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [GW.] [Constitution] 
art. 7 (Neth.), available at http://www.minbzk.nl/english/@4800/the_Constitution_of; see 
also SUSANNE PETERS ET AL., INT’L LEGAL AID GROUP, NATIONAL REPORT: THE NETHER-
LANDS 2 n.3 (2009), available at http://www.ilagconference.org/reports/Netherlands.pdf 
(distributed as part of the ILAG Conference: Delivering Legal Services Across Diverse 
Communities). 
For an excellent survey of key provisions in the legal aid statutes of European nations, 
see Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon as a Human Right: Is the U.S. Going to Join Step with the 
Rest of the Developed World?, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 769 (2006), and especial-
ly the chart included therein. 
 97. Ireland excludes most real property, small claims, licensing, and group actions, as 
well as defamation and election contests.  LEGAL AID BD., NATIONAL REPORT: IRELAND 4 
(2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL REPORT: IRELAND], available at http://www.ilagconference. 
org/reports/Ireland.pdf (distributed as part of the ILAG Conference: Delivering Legal Ser-
vices Across Diverse Communities).  New Zealand does not exclude any categories of cases 
heard in the courts from potential coverage by the legal aid scheme, but does exclude some 
tribunals. See NATIONAL REPORT: NEW ZEALAND, supra note 96, at 9.  The Netherlands ap-
pears to be one of the few nations that does not exclude any case types or official forums 
from coverage under its legal aid program. See PETERS ET AL., supra note 96.  Quebec ex-
cludes defamation, election cases, breach of promise of marriage, or plaintiffs in alienation 
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excludes cases against government agencies from the right to counsel.  It is 
common, however, to limit the statutory right to representation before the 
regular courts, and leave citizens to their own devices when appearing in 
administrative proceedings before tribunals, administrative courts, and the 
like,98 although some may provide advice and assistance short of represen-
tation.99 
This does not mean legal aid will be provided automatically to anyone 
with a case in the non-excluded case categories.  All of the statutes impose 
some sort of “merits” test.  That is, before the legal aid program will pro-
vide legal representation to a financially eligible applicant, the applicant’s 
prospects for a successful prosecution or defense of the claim must pass 
some threshold.  The height of that threshold varies and is expressed in dif-
ferent language among the different countries.  Some phrase the test as a 
“reasonable probability of success,”100 others as a “reasonable grounds for 
 
of affections cases. Legal Aid Act: Revised Statutes of Quebec, div. II, § 2, ch. A-14, cl. 4.8 
(Can.), available at http://www.ccjm.qc.ca/pages/loi_eng.html. 
 98. See NATIONAL REPORT: IRELAND, supra note 97.  In Scotland, legal aid is not availa-
ble before tribunals except those “listed in the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986.”  COLIN 
LANCASTER, INT’L LEGAL AID GROUP, NATIONAL REPORT: SCOTLAND 103 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter NATIONAL REPORT: SCOTLAND] (distributed as part of the ILAG Conference: Legal Aid: 
A New Beginning?). 
 99. In Ireland, for example, while legal aid does not provide representation before any 
administrative tribunal except the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, it can give advice and assis-
tance to those who are appearing before those tribunals. See NATIONAL REPORT: IRELAND, 
supra note 97. 
 100. In Germany, it is phrased as a “reasonable prospect of success.” Zivilprozeβordnung 
[ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] § 117 (formerly § 114(1) and described in CAPPELLETTI ET 
AL., supra note 1, at 94).  That formulation dates back to 1931 and represented a change 
from a more liberal standard that allowed legal aid unless the applicant’s case was “without 
some prospect of success.”  CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, at 94 n.32.  A recent decision 
of the German Constitutional Court has liberalized the test somewhat, by declaring that legal 
aid cannot be denied if the prospects of success turn on a “difficult” question of law that has 
not yet been decided by the Supreme Court.  See MATTIAS KILLIAN, INT’L LEGAL AID 
GROUP, GERMAN LEGAL AID BY THE SCRUFF OF ITS NECK—OR JUST IN A BAD QUARTER OF AN 
HOUR? 59, 61 (2005) (distributed as part of the ILAG Conference: Legal Aid in the Global 
Era) (This implies legal aid could not be denied on the basis that the applicant’s case lacks 
merit because of a legal interpretation made by a lower court).  In Hong Kong, the applicant 
must have a “reasonable prospect for success or of deriving some tangible benefit” as well 
as having a “reasonable grounds for bringing or defending” the action.  INT’L LEGAL AID 
GROUP, NATIONAL REPORT: HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2 (2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL REPORT: HONG KONG], available at 
http://www.ilagconference.org/reports/Hong_Kong.pdf (emphasis added) (distributed as 
part of the ILAG Conference: Delivering Legal Services Across Diverse Communities); see 
also Quebec Legal Aid Act, div. II, § 2, cl. 4.11(1) (requiring denial or withdrawal of repre-
sentation if the “applicant cannot establish the probable existence of his right”) (emphasis 
added). 
JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:25 PM 
182 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
bringing or defending” the case,101 and yet others will grant legal aid unless 
the applicant’s case is “manifestly inadmissible or devoid of founda-
tion.”102  It is not absolutely clear, however, whether these different formu-
lations of the merits test make that much difference in determining whether 
a given applicant in a given country will be represented in a given case.103 
Most nations also impose a “significance” test, again framed in different 
ways in different statutes.104  Recognizing that rich people can afford to 
and sometimes do fight over what would be considered inconsequential in 
objective terms, governments obviously want to avoid squandering public 
resources on those sorts of disputes when they involve people financially 
eligible for legal aid.  Some nations do so by merely excluding “trivial” 
cases.105  Others require the applicant’s pursuit of the case to pass a “rea-
 
 101. In Ireland, there must be “reasonable grounds for taking or defending” the proceed-
ings.  See NATIONAL REPORT: IRELAND, supra note 97, at 4. 
 102. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text for this formulation, which the Swiss 
Supreme Court declared is not just a statutory test, but a Constitutional as well (and thus is 
not subject to amendment).  It has been suggested that in Brazil, the proper test to be applied 
by a civil Public Defender (a salaried lawyer representing both plaintiffs and defendants in 
civil cases) may be even lower than the “manifestly unreasonable” standard.  “It is the Pub-
lic Defender’s obligation, even when there are limited chances of success, to propose suita-
ble judicial measures.  The Public Defender only will be excused from doing so when con-
vinced of the impropriety of any measure or that the measures . . . may reveal that they are 
contrary to the interests of the party.”  CLEBER ALVES, INT’L LEGAL AID GROUP, NATIONAL 
REPORT: BRAZIL 10-11 (2009), available at http://www.ilagconference.org/reports/Brazil. 
pdf (distributed as part of the ILAG Conference: Delivering Legal Services Across Diverse 
Communities). This test is suggested in a legal aid system (the State of Rio) where all the 
services are delivered by salaried attorneys and there is no statute or regulation articulating 
any form of merits or significance test.  In France, the merits test is satisfied if the appli-
cant’s case is not “manifestly inadmissible or devoid of substance.”  See European Comm’n, 
European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters - Legal Aid—France, 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_aid/legal_aid_fra_en.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 
2009).  But this test apparently applies only to plaintiffs who are bringing suit against some-
one else and not to defendants who are defending against a lawsuit brought against them by 
another.  In that instance, no merits test is required.  Id. 
 103. It would be interesting to conduct some cross-country empirical research—or at 
least present hypothetical factual scenarios to those charged with making eligibility deci-
sions in nations using different tests.  This might reveal whether the same facts would result 
in grants of legal aid in countries using a more liberal-sounding formula but denials in coun-
tries using what appears to be stricter language.  But no such research exists, to the best of 
my knowledge.  It also would be interesting to study whether those making eligibility de-
terminations are less liberal in their application of the “merits” (and/or “significance”) test 
when budget pressures increase or, worse, a budget cap is imposed.  In other words, are 
these tests a form of a “valve” that can be widened or narrowed to respond to the legal aid 
program’s financial situation or the relative number of poor people applying for services at 
different times? 
 104. See discussion supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. 
 105. In Brazil, rules governing the legal profession preclude representation by govern-
ment-funded as well as privately-funded lawyers in “inconsistent or careless” (e.g., frivol-
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sonableness” test in addition to means and merits tests,106 or that the litiga-
tion costs are not “unreasonable in relation to the possible gain or loss.”107  
England combines the merits and significance tests in a formula that asks 
whether a person of modest but sufficient means would employ counsel to 
prosecute or defend the case.108 
All countries, of course, impose a financial means test.  But in many of 
the European and common law countries, government-funded legal servic-
es are not confined to the poor.  Instead, these programs provide free ser-
vices to the poor and partially-subsidized services to those whose incomes 
put them above that level.109  In the Netherlands, for instance, nearly half 
the population is eligible for some level of government-subsidized legal aid 
in civil cases.110  Those programs that cover people above the poverty level 
have developed sliding scale eligibility criteria with the size of the govern-
ment subsidy declining as the applicants’ incomes increase.  Those near the 
poverty line may receive a subsidy in the neighborhood of 80-90% of the 
 
ous) cases. See ALVES, supra note 102, at 10.  Some legal aid statutes list specific case types 
considered too trivial to warrant public funded legal aid.  Quebec, for instance, bars legal aid 
in “parking ticket” cases.  Quebec Legal Aid Act, div. II, § 2, cl. 4.12. 
 106. In Scotland, for example, an applicant must satisfy a “reasonableness” test as well as 
financial eligibility and “probable cause” tests before receiving legal aid in civil cases.  See 
LANCASTER, supra note 98, at 103. 
 107. Quebec Legal Aid Act, div. II, § 2, cl. 4.11(3).  Quebec makes an exception to this 
cost-benefit limitation, however, where the “case or remedy threatens [the applicant’s] live-
lihood or ability to provide for . . . essential needs . . . .” Id.  Germany denies legal aid if a 
case, though having sufficient prospects for success, is deemed “capricious.”  That standard 
is interpreted to mean the case would not be brought by a middle-class person with the 
means to hire a lawyer. CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, at 94, nn.32 & 35 (citing 
Zivilprozeβordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] § 114(1)).  The Netherlands imposes 
both a merits and significance test.  See PETERS ET AL., supra note 96, at 4. 
 108. SETON POLLOCK, LEGAL AID: THE FIRST 25 YEARS 40-41 (1975) (“[I]n most cir-
cumstances, the two tests are covered by a single, practical test: would the lawyers [on the 
local “area committee”] adjudicating upon the application for legal aid have advised a pay-
ing client of their own to pursue the matter? . . .  The philosophy underlying this test is 
based on the principle that the person who has to proceed with the benefit of legal aid 
should be placed in a position neither better nor worse than that of a paying client.”). 
 109. New Zealand requires repayment of some of the cost of legal aid—sometimes in in-
stallments—from those recipients with “disposable capital” and/or “gross income” above a 
certain level.  See NATIONAL REPORT: NEW ZEALAND, supra note 96, at 9-11.  Quebec prov-
ince has two categories—“gratuitous legal aid” which is given completely free of charge to 
those below an income level defined by regulations, and “contributory legal aid” offered to 
those above that level but below a maximum income also set by regulation, and which re-
quires them to contribute a portion of the cost of their representation.  See Quebec Legal Aid 
Act, div. II, § 1, cls. 4.1-.2. 
 110. In 2007, “about 49% of the Dutch population [was] covered under the current Legal 
Aid Scheme.”  JAN VAN DIJK, INT’L LEGAL AID GROUP, NATIONAL FACTS—REPORT ON LE-
GAL AID IN THE NETHERLANDS 63 (2007) (distributed as part of the ILAG Conference: Legal 
Aid: A New Beginning?). 
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cost of the needed legal services while those at the upper end of the eligible 
population may only be entitled to a subsidy in the 10-20% range.111  
(Another way of characterizing these subsidies is to refer to the clients’ 
share of the total cost as a co-payment, with the level of the required co-
payment rising along with the clients’ income.) 
Several of the other nations also use a more refined means test than the 
flat gross income and assets schedule the Legal Services Corporation em-
ploys in the United States, with only family size affecting the eligibility le-
vels.112  These countries determine financial eligibility on the basis of the 
applicant’s “disposable” income and assets—after determining for which of 
several possible deductions from gross income or assets the particular ap-
plicant qualifies.113  As an example, some countries do not count a person’s 
primary residence—unless its value exceeds a certain amount—in calculat-
ing an applicant’s “disposable assets.”114  Some countries also deduct a 
“family allowance” or other common expenditures on necessities in calcu-
 
 111. For instance, in France, those in the income strata just above those eligible for com-
pletely free legal aid are entitled to an 85% government subsidy, while those near the maxi-
mum level for any legal aid assistance are only entitled to a 15% subsidy toward their total 
legal expenses.  See European Comm’n, supra note 102.  In New Zealand, the maximum 
repayment (what might be called a co-payment) for those just above the poverty line is 
much lower (roughly 3% of disposable capital and 5% of gross income) than those in the top 
strata of eligibility (roughly 25% of disposable capital and as much as 25% of gross in-
come).  See NATIONAL REPORT: NEW ZEALAND, supra note 96, at 10-11. 
 112. For the Legal Services Corporation’s 2009 eligibility guidelines, see ALAN W. 
HOUSEMAN, INT’L LEGAL AID GROUP, NATIONAL REPORT: UNITED STATES 8 (2009) (distri-
buted as part of the ILAG Conference: Delivering Legal Services Across Diverse Communi-
ties), available at http://www.ilagconference.org/reports/US%20-%20AH.pdf.  The maxi-
mum permissible income is fixed at 125% of the federal poverty level.  That federal poverty 
level, in turn, is established annually by the Department of Health and Human Services and 
determines eligibility for a number of federal programs.  This income eligibility schedule 
applies uniformly across the country, but individual programs can set their own asset ceil-
ings, which also must be satisfied if an applicant is to receive legal services. Id. at 8 n.16.  In 
2009, the maximum income level for a single person was $13,538, for a two-person family 
$18,213, and for a family of four it was $27,888, with further upward adjustments allowed 
for larger families. Local grantee agencies may not supply legal services to applicants whose 
incomes exceed the maximums on this national schedule, unless one of the narrow excep-
tions applies.  Among these are situations where most of the family income is devoted to 
medical or nursing home expenses, or when the applicant is seeking to maintain government 
benefits.  Id. at 8 (citing Regulations Relating to Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 1611 (1998)). 
 113. New Zealand utilizes a hybrid eligibility system—a flat gross income component, 
such as the United States, combined with a “disposable capital” component, the latter allow-
ing several permissible deductions.  See NATIONAL REPORT: NEW ZEALAND, supra note 96, 
at 8-11. 
 114. New Zealand not only deducts equity in a home up to $48,000, but the value of a 
vehicle used for domestic purposes, household furniture, clothing, and tools of the trade, 
along with short-term contingent liabilities and unsecured debts.  See NATIONAL REPORT: 
NEW ZEALAND, supra note 96, at 9. 
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lating an applicant’s “disposable income,” the only portion of his or her in-
come which is deemed available to purchase legal services.115 
B. Program Governance and Administrative Arrangements 
Nations also differ in choosing the institution assigned responsibility for 
administering the legal aid system.  Because the right to counsel in civil 
cases generally started with judges appointing lawyers to serve without 
compensation, in most countries the judicial system was in charge at the 
beginning.  That is still true in Germany,116 but most countries have shifted 
the administrative responsibility to some other body. 
When England instituted its comprehensive legal aid scheme in 1950, 
the government initially put the legal profession in charge, allowing the 
Law Society (the national association of solicitors roughly equivalent to the 
American Bar Association) to administer the scheme.117  Nearly four dec-
ades later, however, the English government decided the profession’s na-
tional organization should not remain in charge of a program that dispensed 
government funds to individual members of that profession.  It substituted 
an independent body, the Legal Aid Board,118 and a dozen years later 
 
 115. For instance, France excludes “family allowances and certain welfare benefits” in 
calculating whether an applicant’s income exceeds the income eligibility limits.  See Euro-
pean Comm’n, supra note 102. 
          In Germany, only “economically available income” is considered when determining 
financial eligibility for legal aid.  That figure is determined after deducting from gross earn-
ings “taxes, social security contributions, reasonable insurance premiums, work-related 
spendings, trade union membership fees, (reasonable costs for lodging, instalments [sic] for 
credits, maintenance payments, lump sums for the applicant, his/her wife/husband and for 
each child . . . .” KILIAN, supra note 100, at 60.  In Ireland, the “disposable income” used to 
determine financial eligibility is net of “various allowances in respect of dependants, mort-
gage, tax, etc.”  MOILING RYAN, INT’L LEGAL AID GROUP, NATIONAL REPORT: IRELAND 60  
(distributed as part of the ILAG Conference: Legal Aid: A New Beginning). 
 116. CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, at 51. 
 117. “[I]t shall be the responsibility of the Law Society . . . to administer this Part of the 
Act [the civil legal aid scheme].”  CAPPELLETTI, supra note 1, at 285 (citing Legal Aid Act, 
1974, § 15(1)(Eng.)).  For a thorough and insightful description of the English legal aid sys-
tem for the first twenty-five years it was administered by the Law Society, see POLLOCK, 
supra note 108.  Pollock was involved in the administration of the program from the outset 
and in charge for over a dozen years. 
 118. “In 1988, the government passed the Legal Aid Act 1988 which transferred the ad-
ministration of legal aid from the Law Society to the newly created Legal Aid Board (LAB).  
In the past, the Law Society had wanted control over the administration of legal aid, but by 
1986 it was somewhat relieved to be absolved of responsibility, given the amount of criti-
cism it had received from its members.” Frederick H. Zemans & Aneurin Thomas, Can 
Community Clinics Survive? A Comparative Study of Law Centres in Australia, Ontario and 
England, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL AID: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL STUDIES 
65, 80 (Francis Regan et al. eds., 1999). 
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created a new independent body, the Legal Services Commission,119 to as-
sume responsibility for the nation’s legal aid system. 
Many other jurisdictions, no matter where they started, have settled on 
independent organizations, public or quasi-public (not unlike our nation’s 
Legal Services Corporation), as the best approach to administering a legal 
aid program.120  Some nations, like ours, have a board of citizens chosen by 
the government that oversees the program and sets the basic policies.121  In 
a few nations, also like ours, the national program makes grants to regional 
or local entities which deliver the services to the clients in their areas of the 
country.122  In most, however, the national administration operates the en-
tire program—itself employing the local administrative staffs and also any 
salaried lawyers used to deliver legal services to the client community.123 
 
 119. “The Legal Services Commission has been responsible for commissioning legal aid 
services in England and Wales since 2000 [and is] set up as a non-departmental public body, 
sponsored by the Ministry of Justice.”  REGAN, supra note 96, at 1. 
 120. In Hong Kong, the independent body is the Legal Aid Services Council (“LASC”), 
with a board composed of eight members (half of them lawyers) and a chair who must be a 
non-lawyer, which oversees the Legal Aid Department, a part of the executive branch of 
government.  The latter directly administers legal aid.  See NATIONAL REPORT: HONG KONG, 
supra note 100, at 1. 
       In Ireland, immediately after the European Court of Human Rights decided Airey v. 
Ireland, see supra notes 37-42, 85 and accompanying text, the government created an “in-
dependent body, the Legal Aid Board . . . to administer the scheme . . . to make the services 
of solicitors and . . . barristers available to persons of modest means.”  See RYAN, supra note 
115, at 1. 
        In New Zealand, the program is administered by “The Legal Services Agency,” a 
Crown entity established by the Legal Service Act 2000 and governed by a board the Minis-
ter of Justice appoints.  See NATIONAL REPORT: NEW ZEALAND, supra note 96, at 2. 
       In the Netherlands, legal aid is administered by a Legal Aid Board with one central and 
five regional offices and reports both to the Minister of Justice and Parliament regarding 
legal aid matters. See PETERS ET AL., supra note 96, at 1-2. 
       In Quebec, the program is administered by the twelve-member “Commission des Ser-
vices Juridiques” headed by a full-time chair who can be a judge or lawyer and a full-time 
vice-chair who must be a lawyer, with the other commission members serving on a part-
time basis.  Quebec Legal Aid Act, div. III, §§ 1-18. 
 121. In England, “commissioners are appointed by the Secretary of State for Justice . . . 
and are responsible for [the legal aid program’s] strategic direction and generally oversee 
[the program’s] work.”  REGAN, supra note 96, at 1.  In Quebec, the government chooses the 
legal aid program’s twelve Commission members from “groups . . . who because of their 
activities are likely to contribute to the study and solution of the legal problems of the un-
derprivileged” and in consultation with those groups. Quebec Legal Aid Act, div. III, § 12. 
 122. In Quebec, for instance, the national commission is charged with responsibility for 
establishing and then financing regional and local “legal aid centres” which administer and 
provide legal aid in their geographic areas.  Quebec Legal Aid Act, div. IV, § 1, cl. 22(b)-
(c). 
 123. Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and New Zealand are examples of jurisdictions where 
a headquarters office administers the entire program, although often with the assistance of 
regional offices which have varying degrees of autonomy.  In Hong Kong, the Legal Aid 
JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:25 PM 
2010] EQUALITY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 187 
Often the independent legal aid entity—whether called a board, a com-
mission, or something else—will interface with the government department 
which is in charge of the justice system.  In many countries, the department 
involved will be the “ministry of justice” or carry some similar name.  Of-
ten a small office within that ministry will have prime responsibility for 
general supervision of the legal aid program and its budget.  It is that office 
to which the independent entity’s agency reports and to which it makes its 
budget requests and comes for budget adjustments.  It also is where the ent-
ity’s board would take any proposed changes in the legal aid program’s 
legislation or basic policies.124 
Programs also differ as to who determines an applicant’s eligibility to 
receive legal aid services.  In Germany, it remains the judges.125  In France, 
the judiciary has created legal aid bureaus attached to the courts.126  These 
bureaus have committees composed of lawyers and bureaucrats from other 
government agencies who review applications.127  When the Law Society 
 
Department administers both the salaried and judicare components of legal aid, but with 
oversight by the Legal Aid Services Council.  See NATIONAL REPORT: HONG KONG, supra 
note 100, at 1.  In the Netherlands, the Legal Aid Board “is entrusted with all matters con-
cerning administration, supervision and expenditure” of legal aid in that country, but the 
Board carries out those responsibilities through a central office and five regional offices.  
PETERS ET AL., supra note 96, at 1.  In New Zealand, the “Legal Services Agency” has re-
sponsibility for the administration of “legal aid and related schemes.”  In addition to the 
headquarters office, the Agency has twelve regional offices and two “Public Defence Ser-
vice Offices.” NATIONAL REPORT: NEW ZEALAND, supra note 96, at 2. 
 124. In New Zealand, the Minister of Justice retains considerable policy-making power 
over the Legal Services Agency that administers the legal aid program.  The Agency is sub-
ject to any written directives the Minister issues, and the Minister and the Agency negotiate 
an annual Memorandum of Understanding that describes the outputs the Agency will deliv-
er, the performance measures, and the Minister’s expectations, along with a financial fore-
cast. (Since legal aid is “demand driven” in New Zealand, that forecast may be exceeded, 
requiring a supplemental appropriation.)  NATIONAL REPORT: NEW ZEALAND, supra note 96, 
at 2-3. 
      In Quebec, the Deputy Administer of Justice and the Deputy Minister of Employment 
and Social Solidarity, or their representatives, are non-voting members of the Commission’s 
board.  Quebec Legal Aid Act, div. III, cl. 12.  The Commission also is required to send its 
budgetary estimates to the Minister of Justice and submit an annual financial report to that 
minister as well.  Id. at div. IX, §§ 84, 87. 
 125. See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, at 50-53. 
 126. Id. at 43-44. 
 127. These “bureaus” are attached to the courts and composed of members representing 
the legal profession and the government.  After the government began paying the lawyers 
representing those found eligible for representation by legal aid in 1972, the composition of 
the bureaus was changed to increase the proportion of government representatives.  The rea-
son “was a belief that the state should have closer supervision of the program now that state 
revenues [were] directly financing it.”  See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, at 44.  See id. 
at 43-46 for a description of how these bureaus and the French legal aid system function.  
JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:25 PM 
188 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
ran England’s legal aid system, those eligibility decisions were delegated to 
committees of local solicitors who applied the test of whether a person of 
means would litigate the case in question.128  In England now, and most 
other nations also, salaried lawyers or administrators make the eligibility 
determinations.129 
In most nations that have a rights-based legal aid system, applicants who 
are turned down have a right to appeal.130  In some, it is only an internal 
administrative appeal.131  But in others, an unsuccessful applicant also can 
appeal to, or at least receive review by, the judiciary,132 thus allowing court 
decisions to occasionally redefine or at least affect the standards applied in 
 
These “bureaus” still make the eligibility determinations.  See European Comm’n, supra 
note 102. 
 128. See POLLOCK, supra note 108, at 40-41.  These “Local Committees” of solicitors 
were initially selected by the eleven “Area Committees,” also solicitors, who were estab-
lished by a committee of the Legal Aid Society’s Council. Id. at 28.  The Area Committees 
had full-time secretaries and the Local Committees were staffed by either full-time or part-
time secretaries, but the committees themselves were composed of practicing solicitors. Id.  
An applicant denied legal aid by a Local Committee could appeal to the Area Committee. 
Id. at 54-55. 
 129. In Finland, for instance, salaried personnel at the State Legal Aid Offices decide 
whether legal aid is to be granted, even if the applicant originally went to a private law of-
fice that prepared an application and sent it to that state office—and even if that private law-
yer will be supplying the representation if the application is accepted.  MERJI MUILU, INT’L 
LEGAL AID GROUP, LEGAL AID IN FINLAND 47-48 (2007) (distributed as part of the ILAG 
Conference:  Legal Aid: A New Beginning?). 
       In the Netherlands, personnel at the regional Legal Aid Boards grant or deny applica-
tions for legal aid in court and administrative hearing cases, while front-line advice and brief 
assistance are provided to anyone at “Law Counters” without requiring an approved applica-
tion.  See PETERS ET AL., supra note 96, at 4-6. 
       In Quebec, the “director general” of the appropriate “regional legal aid center” is 
charged with making the ultimate eligibility decision, although the application is made at the 
“local legal aid center” closest to the applicant.  Quebec Legal Aid Act, div. VI, cls. 62-63. 
 130. In New Zealand, applicants denied service can first seek reconsideration by a Legal 
Services Agency staff member other than the one who first denied their requests.  If that 
fails to produce results, applicants can appeal to the Legal Aid Review Panel, an indepen-
dent body appointed by the NZ Attorney General and composed of lawyer and non-lawyer 
members that sit in panels of three considering only the paper record.  In FY 2007/08 these 
panels reversed a third of the denials and returned 17% to the Agency for reconsideration. 
See NATIONAL REPORT: NEW ZEALAND, supra note 96, at 6-7. 
 131. In Quebec, for instance, applicants have thirty days to appeal a denial to a three 
member “Review Committee.”  The decisions of this Committee are final and cannot be ap-
pealed to the courts.  Quebec Legal Aid Act, div. VI.2, cls. 74, 78-79. 
 132. In Finland, an applicant denied legal aid by a State Legal Aid Office can appeal di-
rectly to a court for a full review, and if the trial court denies relief, can appeal that decision 
to an appellate court. See MUILU, supra note 129, at 47.  In New Zealand, either the appli-
cant denied legal aid or the Legal Aid Agency may appeal to the High Court or the Court of 
Appeal from a decision of the Legal Aid Review Panel, see supra note 130, but only as to a 
question of law. Five such appeals were brought to the courts in FY 2007/08.  See NATION-
AL REPORT: NEW ZEALAND, supra note 96, at 7. 
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future eligibility determinations.  A few countries permit government offi-
cials or opposing litigants to appeal a grant of legal aid.133 
C. Delivery Systems 
The United States has followed such a different path than most of the 
rest of the world with respect to civil legal aid, that it has had little expo-
sure to the variety of delivery systems that have developed elsewhere in the 
world.  Lacking a right to counsel, the United States has relied principally 
on a “fixed resource” approach in which we employ a limited number of 
salaried lawyers and ask them to serve as many poor people as they can, 
supplemented by pro bono services contributed by private attorneys.134  
The many poor people that salaried lawyers and the available pro bono 
lawyers are unable to serve, simply go without counsel.  As described ear-
lier, the pattern in European countries, on the other hand, generally started 
with a right to counsel implemented by appointing private lawyers to serve 
without compensation.135  Thus, it was natural for the next stage to contin-
ue using those same private lawyers to provide the services but to pay them 
for their work on behalf of indigent clients. 
There remain at least a few jurisdictions—most notably, France136 and 
Germany137—that continue to rely exclusively on compensated private 
counsel to implement their statutory rights to counsel in civil cases; in Eng-
 
 133. In Quebec, for instance, “[e]very interested party in a dispute or a case may contest 
the financial eligibility” of a person granted legal aid in that case by filing an application 
with the three-member “Review Committee” that also hears appeals from applicants denied 
legal aid.  The decisions of the Review Committee are final in these challenges to grants of 
legal aid, just as they are final in appeals from denials. Quebec Legal Aid Act, div. VI.2, cls. 
75, 79. 
 134. For a recent concise but thorough description of the American system, see generally 
HOUSEMAN, supra note 112.  Although the vast majority of civil legal aid in the United 
States is delivered through salaried staff programs supplemented by pro bono private attor-
neys, the Legal Services Corporation does fund a handful of “judicare” and mixed “judicare 
and staff” programs scattered across the country. Id. 
 135. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. 
 136. See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, at 44-46.  In 1991, the 1972 legal aid legisla-
tions summarized in the Cappelletti book was replaced by a new Legal Aid Act (No. 91-
647) and the Decree No. 91-1266 of 18 December 1991.  It remains a pure judicare system, 
but there are some differences, including that applicants can now choose their own lawyers 
from the local bar, at least from those willing to take on legal aid clients, if they have a pre-
ference.  If not, the local bureaus composed of lawyers and government officials will assign 
private lawyers to serve those they find eligible for legal aid.  European Comm’n, supra 
note 102. 
 137. See KILLIAN, supra note 100, at 61 (“Fees for lawyers doing legal aid work are paid 
(in most cases with a discount) according to . . . scales of fees [set by the government].”). 
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land, it remains the dominant, but far from exclusive system.138  At the oth-
er extreme are a few—Ireland139 and at least one Brazilian state,140 for ex-
ample—that rely almost entirely on a cadre of salaried lawyers to carry the 
entire load of satisfying a right to counsel in civil cases.  (This is compara-
ble to the approach used in many American jurisdictions in criminal cas-
es—a right to counsel implemented through a cadre of salaried public de-
fenders.)  Furthermore, there remain a number of “fixed resource” systems, 
like the United States, which deploy salaried lawyers in offices around the 
country to handle as many cases as they can—among them South Africa141 
and most recently, the Peoples’ Republic of China.142  But systems that 
 
 138. The Community Legal Service (CLS), the civil legal services arm of the Legal Ser-
vices Commission: 
funds a variety of legal services, ranging from initial advice to full representation 
at court.  Funding for such services is delivered through contracts with solicitors 
and not-for-profit agencies [usually using non-lawyer staffs and limited to advice 
and out-of-court work]. Individual providers conduct the legal aid merits and 
means test for applicants for [advice and assistance short of representation, and 
representation in emergency cases and a limited range of family cases in the lower 
courts] . . . . For other levels of service, the provider will apply on the applicants 
behalf to the relevant regional office, where Legal Services Commission staff will 
decide whether the application meets the criteria for CLS funding. 
REGAN, supra note 96, at 40-41.  As the English legal aid program has evolved, it has added 
to the basic judicare component: first, “community law centers” that use salaried lawyers 
who focus on “poverty law” cases and community-wide problems in their geographic areas; 
second, not-for-profit organizations that deliver advice and representation through non-
lawyers; and more recently, Community Legal Advice Centers and Networks with staffs 
that provide legal advice in certain areas of the country. See id. 
 139. “Legal services are mainly provided by solicitors in the full-time employment of the 
[Legal Aid Board], working in Law Centres established by the Board.”  See RYAN, supra 
note 115, at 59. 
 140. For a description of the legal aid system in Rio de Janeiro, see ALVES, supra note 
102. 
 141. As described in the Legal Aid Board’s National Report: 
Since South Africa has moved from a primarily outsourced method of instructing 
private practitioners through the judicare system, to delivering legal aid by our sa-
laried in-house lawyers placed at more than 62 Justice Centres countrywide, the 
result of this shift is that more than 85% of our legal aid service is provided by in-
house staff.  The remaining share of the service is done by private lawyers through 
our judicare system and co-operation agreements. 
LEGAL AID BD., NATIONAL REPORT: SOUTH AFRICA 1 (2009), (distributed as part of the 
ILAG Conference: Delivering Effective Legal Aid Services Across Diverse Communities), 
available at http://www.ilagconference.org/reports/South%20Africa%20-%20JM.pdf.  
However, as the report indicates, the legal aid system in South Africa presently devotes 
most of its services to criminal cases.  “For the 2007/08 [fiscal year] out of our total legal 
delivery system, we were able to provide . . . 10% [of its resources] for civil matters.  We 
are intending to grow this service for the next three years to a target of 15%.”  Id. at 4. 
 142. See generally ZUO XIUMEI, INT’L LEGAL AID GROUP, NATIONAL REPORT: CHINA—
LEGAL AID SYSTEM IN CHINA (2009) (distributed as part of the ILAG Conference: Deliver-
ing Effective Legal Aid Services Across Diverse Communities).  Although the People’s Re-
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combine salaried and compensated private counsel to deliver civil legal aid 
appear to be the wave of the future in “rights based” civil legal aid systems. 
Legal aid programs that use both salaried lawyers and judicare are usual-
ly called “mixed” delivery systems and are becoming more and more com-
mon in Europe and the common law countries.143  But different countries 
tend to mix the two basic approaches in different ways.  There are at least 
four basic types: the “safety valve” or “overflow” mixed system; the “client 
option” mixed system; the “subject matter” mixed system; and the “func-
tion-based” mixed system.144 
The “safety valve” or “overflow” system is basically a staff attorney 
program that only uses compensated private counsel when client demand 
exceeds the capacity of the salaried staff offices.145  In Ireland, for exam-
ple, private lawyers only take on a limited number of cases when the sala-
ried staff lawyers cannot handle all the applicants arriving at their offices in 
a timely fashion.146  When the queue waiting to be served becomes too long 
at a legal aid office, the staff begins assigning cases to private lawyers from 
one of three panels.147 
 
public of China only started its legal aid program in 1997, it already has established more 
than 3000 legal aid centers staffed with over 4000 salaried lawyers, over 6000 other law 
graduates, and several thousand paraprofessional “legal aid workers.” Id. at 7.  In addition, 
the nation’s 130,000 private lawyers are expected to provide mandatory pro bono legal as-
sistance for the poor.  Id.  China’s legal aid lawyers handle three times as many civil cases 
as they do criminal cases—in 2008, 418,419 civil cases, 124,217 criminal cases, and 4223 
administrative cases.  Id. at 6.  The 4237 salaried legal aid lawyers, though augmented by so 
many non-lawyer resources, are only a drop in the bucket in a country of 1.3 billion people.  
They and the other professional and paraprofessional legal resources are focused almost en-
tirely on cases involving the clients’ earnings and other income, e.g., social insurance bene-
fits, spousal or child maintenance payments, wage or salary claims, and worker’s compensa-
tion.  Yet China’s poor receive a substantially larger share of that country’s total legal 
resources than do America’s poor people.  Fully three percent of China’s lawyers work as 
salaried lawyers in legal aid offices, which handle three times as many civil cases as crimi-
nal cases.  In the U.S., only two-thirds of a percent of the legal profession is working in civil 
legal aid programs. See infra note 192.  The U.S. would have to fund civil legal aid at over 
$5 billion a year to match China in this measure of a nation’s commitment to providing 
equality before the law to its low income citizens. 
 143. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice for America’s Poor in the Year 2020: Some Possibili-
ties Based on Experiences Here and Abroad, 58 DEPAUL L. REV., 393, 403-06 (2009). 
 144. See id. at 402-06. 
 145. See id. at 402-03. 
 146. See NATIONAL REPORT: IRELAND, supra note 97, at 2. 
 147. The Irish Legal Aid Board has set up three panels of private solicitors—one panel 
for “divorce and separation cases,” another for “family law matters at District (local) Court 
level,” and a third for “cases before the Refugee Appeals Tribunal.”  However, these panels 
have a limited function.  “The use of private practitioners is designed to improve access to 
legal aid services in situations where a law centre is not in a position to provide a timely 
service.”  Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added). 
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 Quebec province is the oldest and now nearly the only example of a pure 
“client option” mixed system.148  Created in 1973, the Quebec program 
combines a large province-wide network of offices staffed by salaried law-
yers with a judicare program.149  Although all applicants are expected to go 
through one of the salaried offices where their eligibility is determined, 
they have the option of requesting to be represented by either one of the of-
fice’s salaried lawyers or by a private lawyer chosen from a roster of pri-
vate lawyers interested in participating in the program.150  Those private 
lawyers, in turn, are compensated by the government for the services they 
furnish to the clients who chose them.151  Statistics reflect that clients are 
quite discriminating in making those choices—tending to choose salaried 
lawyers when they have cases involving government benefits, housing, and 
consumer issues, but electing to go to private lawyers more often in family 
law and criminal cases, the latter being the common grist of the private bar 
in the province.152  In fiscal year 2007-08, 66% of the Quebec Legal Aid 
budget was expended on representation by salaried staff and 34% on repre-
sentation by private attorneys.153 
The “subject matter” mixed system is exemplified by another Canadian 
province—Ontario.  That program started in the mid-1960s as a pure judi-
care system.154  But in the 1970’s the Ontario legislature created a prov-
ince-wide network of “legal clinics” staffed by salaried lawyers.155  Unlike 
Quebec, however, these lawyers were charged with handling primarily 
“poverty law” cases—those involving government benefits, housing, con-
sumer law, and the like, along with local community-wide issues.156  Fami-
 
 148. See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 1, at 614-17. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. at 617. 
 151. See id. at 584-628. 
 152. See id. at 614-17. 
 153. CANADIAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, LEGAL AID IN CANADA: RESOURCES AND 
CASELOAD STATISTICS—2007-2008, at 37 tbl.9.1 (2009). 
 154. See Legal Aid Ontario, Historical Overview [hereinafter Legal Aid Ontario Histori-
cal Overview], http://legalaid.on.ca/en/about/historical_overview.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 
2010).  Legal Aid Ontario, the independent public corporation that administers both criminal 
and civil legal aid in that province, reports that approximately 4000 private lawyers partici-
pate in the “judicare” component of the mixed system.  See Press Release, Legal Aid Ontar-
io, Attorney General Announces Tariff Increase for Legal Aid Lawyers (July 18, 2007), 
available at http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/news/newsarchive/0707-18_tariffincrease.asp.  
Some private attorneys also serve as “duty counsel,” staffing courtrooms and providing ad-
vice and limited assistance to people who show up without counsel.  Legal Aid Ontario, 
About Legal Aid Ontario, http://www.legalaid.on/ca/en/about/default.asp (last visited Feb. 
2, 2010). 
 155. Legal Aid Ontario Historical Overview, supra note 154. 
 156. See id. 
JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:25 PM 
2010] EQUALITY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 193 
ly law and criminal law remained the exclusive province of the private 
bar.157  So clients who have poverty law problems are expected to take 
those problems to a legal clinic and the salaried lawyers there will provide 
the representation.  But when they have family law or criminal cases, On-
tario residents are expected to look to compensated private counsel to han-
dle the problem.158  In recent times, the mix has become more complex 
with a few experimental pilot programs using salaried public defenders in 
some criminal courts and salaried lawyers also staffing some family 
courts.159  But the basic pattern remains the same—a split between salaried 
staff and compensated private counsel based on the subject matter of the 
client’s problem—hence the name “subject matter” mixed system. 
The Netherlands recently changed its legal aid program to what is best 
characterized as a function-based mixed system.  A few years ago, that 
country revamped its legal aid program and established an array of neigh-
borhood “law counters” staffed with salaried lawyers and supervised para-
legals.160  Anyone with a problem he or she thinks has a legal dimension 
may come to one of these “law counters” where the staff will diagnose the 
applicant’s problem—or often, set of problems.161  The staff then will try to 
resolve the problem short of litigation—including sending letters, making 
telephone calls, drafting legal documents, and the like—if the services can 
be accomplished within a single “consultation hour.”162  But if litigation is 
 
 157. See id.  Private attorneys also represent clients before certain administrative tribun-
als and refugee boards. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See ANGELA LONGO & LYNN IDING, INT’L LEGAL AID GROUP, EXPANDING THE MIX: 
INTRODUCING STAFF SERVICES—A WORK IN PROGRESS 303 (2005) (distributed as part of the 
ILAG conference: Legal Aid in the Global Era). 
 160. “At present, the Legal Services Counters annually provide easily accessible, free 
legal services to over a half a million clients.  The Counters are meant as a first step to re-
ceive legal aid and, if necessary, referral to a lawyer or mediator.”  PETERS ET AL., supra 
note 96, at 1. 
 161. Id. at 7. 
 162. There are now thirty of these Legal Services Counters spread evenly across the 
Netherlands, putting “every Dutch citizen . . . [within] . . . an approximately one hour jour-
ney by public transport.” Id.  Each has at least six legal advisors, some of whom can be pa-
ralegals.  They are designed to “look more like a shop than an office.  Inside is an open 
space with a waiting area and three desks” and behind that a “call centre,” where further in-
formation can be found via e-mail or telephone, and private rooms for consultation.  Id.  The 
legal advisors rotate among the advice desks, the call centre, and the consultation rooms. 
“Sophisticated computer software, specifically designed for the Legal Services Counters” 
helps the staff “correctly and quickly answer any client’s question.”  Id.  In 2008, of 645,000 
persons served at this counters, 376,000 were helped via the telephone, 149,000 at the ad-
vice counters, 87,000 required a “consultation hour,” and 33,000 were helped via e-mail and 
the website.  37,000 were referred to lawyers and 13,000 to mediators for extended legal 
services, generally involving potential or actual litigation.  Id. at 8-9. 
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necessary or becomes necessary later in the process, the client will be re-
ferred to a private lawyer, who will be compensated by the government for 
the representation he or she provides.163  So there is a functional divide.  
Salaried staff members provide all the legal advice and brief assistance, 
while compensated private lawyers handle all the more intensive assistance 
and representation in litigation, but only those services which lower income 
people may require.  At the same time, those eligible for legal aid (that is, 
about 40% of the Dutch population)164 can go directly to a private lawyer, 
and if litigation or other extended services will be required, the lawyer can 
prepare an application to the Legal Aid Board.165  Thus, the Legal Aid 
counters are not the only route to the services private lawyers supply, but 
they are the only source of legal advice and brief [one-hour maximum] as-
sistance the government will fund. 
To give an idea of how complex the mix between salaried lawyers and 
judicare can become, consider the legal aid program in Finland, which uses 
a combination of mixed systems.166  That nation has established a nation-
wide network of legal aid offices staffed by salaried lawyers.167  No matter 
how applicants enter the system, a legal aid office must determine their eli-
gibility for government-funded services.168  Similar to the “law counters” 
 
 163. “[P]rivate lawyers and mediators provide subsidized legal aid in more complicated 
or time-consuming matters.”  Id. at 1.  “In . . .  relatively simple legal problems, private 
lawyers are allowed to charge a standard three-hours service fee, of which the client contri-
butes only € 13.50 Euros [roughly $20] . . . . Whether or not a client is entitled to three-hour 
legal aid, depends on his monthly income.”  Id. at 3. 
If a problem is expected to take more than three hours, clients are entitled to legal 
aid only if they have been granted a so-called legal aid certificate.  In order to ob-
tain this, a . . . lawyer needs to make an application to the Legal Aid Board on be-
half of his client [which the Board will assess] . . . in terms of the client’s means 
and of the merits and significance of the problem.  Since April 2005 it is also 
possible to apply for a mediation certificate . . . to call in help from an indepen-
dent mediator, so as to settle an issue between himself and an [sic] another party. 
Id. at 4.  “As soon as a case is closed, the lawyer bills the Legal Aid Board for the services 
provided.  The Board, however, does not pay an hourly rate but a fixed fee for different 
types of services . . . based on extensive analyses of legal aid cases from the past . . . corres-
pond[ing] to an hourly rate of approximately € 107.” Id. at 13-14. 
 164. Id. at 12. 
 165. “Private lawyers obtain legal aid cases in two ways: either one of the Legal Services 
Counters refers a client to a lawyer, or a client contacts a registered lawyer on his [or her] 
own accord.”  Id. at 13. 
 166. See generally MUILU, supra note 129. 
 167. “With a population of about 5.2 million, and an area of about 340,000 [square kilo-
meters], Finland has 64 Legal Aid Offices, which are located mainly in municipalities with a 
district court.  The Legal Aid Offices have 18 branch offices and about 100 branch clinics 
where clients are seen as required. . . .  The total number of employees is just 460, of which 
half are lawyers . . . and the other half office staff.”  Id. at 48. 
 168. Id. at 51. 
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in the Netherlands, those offices diagnose the problem and are the exclu-
sive source of advice and representation short of litigation.169  Thus, there 
is a functional divide just as in the Netherlands.  Unlike the Netherlands, 
however, when Finnish residents have problems requiring litigation, the 
case is not automatically referred out to a compensated private counsel; in-
stead, as in Quebec, clients are given an option.170  They can ask a salaried 
attorney to represent them in court, or they can choose to have a private 
lawyer take over at the litigation stage.171  About 70% of the time clients 
elect private counsel, but in the rest they pick a salaried lawyer to handle 
their litigation.172  So, Finland is a mix of mixed systems—the “function-
based” and “client-option” systems. 
Should the United States indeed begin moving in the direction of a right 
to equal justice in civil cases, it may be forced to contemplate some form of 
mixed system.  Even with the anticipated development of forums where 
self-help assistance will be sufficient to provide low income litigants with 
effective access to justice when both sides lack counsel,173 and those fo-
rums where lay advocates may be sufficient,174 the residue of cases requir-
ing lawyers in all likelihood will exceed the numbers that can be handled 
even by a greatly expanded cadre of salaried legal aid lawyers.  Moreover, 
effectively implementing a right to equal justice requires a flexible re-
source, one that can expand and contract as demand increases or decreases 
from year to year.  The upsurge in applicants arriving at America’s legal 
services offices during the current economic downturn illustrates how 
quickly demand can overwhelm any fixed resource of salaried lawyers—in 
this instance, further overwhelming an already overwhelmed resource.175 
 
 169. “In matters that are not to be brought before a court (e.g. advice or drawing up of a 
document . . .), legal aid is given only by [salaried lawyers working at a State Legal Aid Of-
fice].”  Id. at 47.  There are exceptions, however, if the office staff has a conflict, or is too 
busy, or lacks the specialized knowledge required for a particular legal problem.  Id. 
 170. See id. at 51; PETERS ET AL., supra note 96, at 1. 
 171. “The recipient of legal aid has a choice of attorney in any court case.”  MUILU, supra 
note 129, at 51. 
 172. Salaried staff counsel represented in over 53,000 court cases and private lawyers 
represented in nearly 33,000 court cases. See id. at 50, 54, 57 (statistical figure calculated by 
author). 
 173. See infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 174. See infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 175. Elizabeth Stull, New York’s Empire State Counsel Working Overtime for Free, DAI-
LY RECORD (Rochester, N.Y.), Jan. 29, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 7518194.  Almost 
lost in this recent outcry about the upsurge in applicants appearing at legal services offices 
in the United States because of the current economic crisis is the fact that before the down-
turn, those offices already were having to turn away half of the eligible people with merito-
rious cases who sought their services. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DAILY DOCUMENTING THE JUS-
TICE GAP IN AMERICA 8 (2005), available at http://www.lsc.gov/press/documents/LSC% 
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Thus, at a minimum, even if the bulk of a “rights based” program were 
to be composed of salaried lawyers, there would be a need for a compen-
sated private counsel component to handle the “overflow” in years of high-
er than average demand.  Moreover, some clients are likely to arrive pre-
senting unusual legal problems with which salaried lawyers are unfamiliar 
yet within the specialty of some private lawyers.  It would seem to be less 
expensive and more effective to send such cases to the specialist in private 
practice.  But this represents the minimum need for a compensated private 
counsel component in a legal aid program which is based on a dominant, or 
at least sizeable, salaried staff component.  The foreign experience suggests 
there also may be some potential political advantages in having the entire 
legal profession invested in the government-funded legal aid program—not 
just as a matter of professional principle or pride, but as a matter of self-
interest. 
In any event, many features found in one or the other of the foreign legal 
aid programs described above influenced the design of a statute recently 
drafted by a group in the United States.  The next section of this Article 
provides an overview of that statute and the Appendix presents the full text. 
V.  DRAFTING A GENERIC STATE STATUTE IMPLEMENTING A RIGHT TO 
EQUAL JUSTICE WHICH DRAWS ON FOREIGN LAWS AND EXPERIENCES 
Several years ago, the California Commission on Access to Justice em-
barked on a project to design a statute that could implement a “right to 
equal justice,” including a guarantee of counsel when needed—a right that 
also could be characterized as a “right to equality before the law” or to “ef-
fective access to justice.”  The task force assigned this task was co-chaired 
by Professor Clare Pastore of the University of Southern California Law 
School, who had been a long-time legal services lawyer, and myself.  The 
Commission authorized this endeavor not because it expected to introduce 
or seek passage of such a statute anytime soon.  Rather, the purpose was to 
work through all the substantive and language issues involved in construct-
ing a “rights based” system and to surface issues that also might arise in 
drafting less ambitious statutory proposals. 
Because many other countries already have “rights-based” legal aid sys-
tems, we looked to the foreign models as well as some features, such as 
self-help assistance and lay advocate services, that have evolved in the 
United States and are more common here than elsewhere.  That this proved 
 
20Justice%20Gap_FINAL_1001.pdf.  The influx of the “new poor,” those who have lost 
jobs, substantial income, or homes as the economy collapsed, have merely flooded those 
already over-extended legal services offices. 
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a difficult assignment, despite the existence of foreign models, is suggested 
by the fact that it took four years and hundreds of person-hours to complete 
the process and produce a final draft. 
The right the draft statute sought to enforce was not an absolute right to 
counsel in all civil cases, but a right to effective access to justice through 
the level of assistance or representation appropriate to the type of case, na-
ture of the forum, characteristics of the competing litigants, and other rele-
vant circumstances.  In the end, the task force produced two draft statutes.  
One, called the “State Equal Justice Act,” would implement a “comprehen-
sive” right to equal justice that covered all types of legal problems and ser-
vices, including legal advice and assistance unrelated to litigation, with 
enumerated exceptions.176  The other, called the “State Basic Access Act,” 
was more limited in its scope, only providing a right in designated catego-
ries of “basic human needs”—essentially the same list as the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) included in its 2006 resolution urging governments to 
provide counsel as a matter of right.177  This latter statute also is narrower 
in a different sense.  Like the ABA resolution, it is confined to representa-
tion and assistance in courts and other adversarial proceedings such as ad-
ministrative hearings. 
The Appendix contains the full text of the more comprehensive version, 
the “State Equal Justice Act,” while the other one, the “State Basic Access 
Act” can be found on the Internet.178  For those who lack the time to read 
the full statute in the Appendix with its accompanying “Drafting Commit-
tee Commentaries” and explanatory “Notes,” or who want a guide to its 
key provisions, the following overview should prove helpful.179 
 
 176. CAL. COMM’N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, STATE EQUAL JUSTICE ACT 1 (2006), available 
at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/state_equal_justice_act/. 
 177. “RESOLVED: That the American Bar Association urges federal, state, and territori-
al governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income 
persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, 
such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody, as determined by 
each jurisdiction.” A.B.A. Task Force on Access to Civil Justice, ABA Resolution: Civil 
Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 507, 507 (2006) (emphasis added).   
The resolution was accompanied by a lengthy report justifying and defining the scope of the 
right to counsel that the resolution proposed, including discussion of circumstances where 
many lower income litigants can reasonably expect to enjoy equal justice without lawyers. 
 178. CAL. COMM’N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, STATE BASIC ACCESS ACT (2008), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/state_basic_access_act/. 
 179. Another overview of the draft statute, this one focusing on the issues confronted dur-
ing the drafting process, rather than describing the individual sections of the final draft of 
the statute, is available in an article written by the Task Force’s co-chair, Professor Clare 
Pastore. See generally Clare Pastore, The California Model Statute Task Force, 40 CLEA-
RINGHOUSE REV. 176 (2006). 
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Before going further, however, it should be made clear that the Task 
Force did not consider this to be a “model statute,” in the sense that this 
term is ordinarily used.  That is, it does not purport to be the way the right 
to equality before the law should be implemented, but rather presents a way 
it could be done, along with suggesting some alternative approaches that 
others might prefer.  Similar to a restaurant menu, for most elements in-
cluded in the draft statute below there were an array of possible options. 
Ultimately we picked one from column “A” and another from column “B,” 
etc.  But the Task Force did not mean to suggest it was prescribing these 
choices as the only, or even necessarily the best ones, for a given state to 
implement.  Rather the draft sets forth the Task Force’s preferences, often 
only marginally preferred over other possible formulations or features.  
With that understanding about the role of the draft “State Equal Justice 
Act,” the following paragraphs provide an overview while the Appendix 
contains the full text of the Act, along with its accompanying “Task Force 
Commentaries” and “Notes.” 
The draft statute begins with a series of legislative findings (sections 
101-08), some of which are similar to those the California legislature 
adopted in a recently-enacted law, the “Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel 
Act.”180  This act establishes a pilot project to experiment with providing 
counsel as a matter of right in selected courthouses. 
The draft statute then defines the levels of service the statute guarantees–
starting at the top with “full legal representation” (section 202), “limited 
legal representation” (section 203), “legal advice” (section 204), and “legal 
assistance” (section 205), all provided by lawyers, followed by “non-
lawyer representation” (section 206), and three levels of “self-help assis-
tance—personal “one-on-one” guidance” (section 207.1), “computer-
assisted or online self-help assistance” (section 207.2), and “community 
self-help assistance” which is general education, not individualized help 
(section 207.3).  This section of the statute also defines, among other 
things, what is required to qualify as a “qualified non-lawyer advocate” 
(section 209), or a “qualified non-profit legal services organization” (sec-
tion 210), a category which becomes relevant later in the statute, and final-
ly, the State Equal Justice Authority (“SEJA”).  The latter is the statewide 
body the Act establishes to administer the entire program and is mentioned 
in various places throughout the Act. 
The next major section (section 300) sets forth the scope of the right and 
eligibility criteria for each level of service for which there is a right.  Fi-
 
 180. Assem. B. 590, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (see infra note 244 and accompa-
nying text for a further explanation of this legislation and the “legislative findings” that are 
similar to provisions of the draft “generic” statutes the Commission task force prepared). 
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nancially eligible plaintiffs are entitled to full public legal representation 
“only if a reasonable person . . . with the financial means to employ coun-
sel, would be likely to pursue the matter” (section 301.1); defendants, on 
the other hand, are entitled to such representation “unless they lack a rea-
sonable possibility of achieving a favorable outcome” (section 301.2).  Eli-
gibility for representation on appeal is a second independent decision with 
appellants being eligible only if there is a “reasonable probability” of rever-
sals, while respondents are eligible unless the trial court’s decision was 
“clearly erroneous” and thus there is no “reasonable possibility the appel-
late court will affirm” (section 301.3). 
But even if applicants satisfy the above criteria, full legal representation 
will still be denied if: (1) lawyers are barred from representing any parties 
in that court or forum (for instance, small claims courts in California and 
some other states) (301.4.1); (2) if legal representation is available through 
contingent fee lawyers or through an insurance policy, or otherwise at no 
cost to the applicant (301.4.2); (3) certain types of cases such as defama-
tion, name change, disputes between business organizations, uncontested 
dissolution cases not involving children, etc. (301.4.3); (4) if limited legal 
representation is sufficient for fair and equal justice  and the opposing party 
does not have full representation (301.4.4); or (5) if self-help assistance is 
sufficient for a fair and equal hearing because the dispute is being decided 
in a court or other forum that meets certain conditions, (e.g., uses an inqui-
sitorial process, with procedures and legal issues so simple non-lawyers can 
represent themselves, and the opposing party is not represented and the ap-
plicant has the intellectual and language ability to represent himself/herself 
(301.4.5)). 
“Limited legal representation” shall be provided in lieu of full legal re-
presentation when it is sufficient for fair and equal justice either alone or in 
combination with self-help assistance, but not in the forums or types of 
cases where full legal representation is barred (302). 
“Legal advice” shall be available in person or through other means but 
only through non-profit legal services organizations or through lawyers 
those organizations certify and supervise, and not on issues related to an 
applicant’s business enterprise (303). 
“Legal assistance” shall be available for document preparation and in the 
pre-litigation phase of disputed matters if there is a reasonable possibility 
this will avoid litigation (304). 
“Non-lawyer representation” through lay advocates supervised or certi-
fied by non-profit legal services organization shall be the level of service 
provided in cases heard by forums that permit this form of representation 
and if it is more economical than legal representation and the opposing par-
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ty is not represented by a lawyer and self-help assistance is not a sufficient 
alternative (305). 
“Self-help assistance” shall be available without regard to financial eli-
gibility in designated forums and types of matters (306). 
The next section (400) concerns “financial eligibility” and requires the 
SEJA to establish the standards, including a schedule of co-payments for 
clients whose incomes are sufficient to make partial payments, with the 
maximum income eligible for service topping off at 300% of the federal 
poverty level (except for self-help assistance which may have no income 
limit or top out at 500%, but above 250% requires a 50% of cost co-
payment (404)).  The SEJA is instructed to make annual adjustments in eli-
gibility standards and co-payment levels (405). 
Section 500 covers the delivery system.  The services of lawyers and 
non-lawyer advocates are to be provided through a “subject matter mixed 
system” utilizing both salaried lawyers and compensated private counsel. 
Non-profit legal services organizations employing salaried lawyers and 
when appropriate, non-lawyer advocates, shall be essentially the exclusive 
providers in government benefit, eviction, domestic abuse, dependency 
(called neglect in some jurisdictions), consumer (except in sub-categories 
where a private market for legal services exists), employment (except in 
sub-categories where a private market for legal services exists), and other 
categories the SEJA determines can be handled more efficiently yet effec-
tively through salaried attorneys than by compensated private counsel.  But 
within all these categories of cases, compensated private counsel will be 
employed in cases of conflict, or where the case requires expertise the sala-
ried lawyers do not possess, or when no reasonably accessible salaried of-
fice exists, or if the salaried office has reached capacity and needs to send 
its overflow elsewhere (501). 
Compensated private counsel, on the other hand, are essentially the ex-
clusive providers of services in ordinary tort, contract, or property cases 
(except those within the special categories defined in 501); ordinary family 
law issues such as dissolution, child custody and support, domestic abuse 
and dependency proceeding (except those within the subset defined in 501), 
and any other categories in which the SEJA finds private lawyers can pro-
vide more efficient yet still effective representation (502). 
The next section (600) describes the eligibility determination process.  
The SEJA is authorized to establish detailed criteria and to delegate respon-
sibility for individual eligibility determinations to non-profit legal services 
organizations, state court self-help centers, judges, or special offices the 
SEJA chooses to establish (601-602).  Those denied service can appeal to a 
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three-member appellate committee composed of independent administra-
tive law judges (603). 
The final section (700) describes SEJA itself, the body charged with ad-
ministering the Act.  It is to have a nine or ten-member board with mem-
bers chosen by the Chief Justice, the state bar, the governor, the state legis-
lature, and the Attorney General (but only in a state where that official is 
elected and not appointed by the governor) (701).  The SEJA board selects 
the SEJA President who in turn selects and supervises the remaining staff 
(702).  The SEJA has overall responsibility for establishing, implementing, 
and enforcing policies guaranteeing all eligible people the level of advice, 
assistance, and representation needed to provide them fair and equal justice 
in the matters in which they are involved (703).  Included is the duty of en-
suring clients served through the Act “receive the same independent, confi-
dential, competent, and otherwise ethical representation as those persons 
who can afford to pay for legal representation” (703.8).  The SEJA also is 
instructed to conduct studies assessing the need and demand for legal ser-
vices, the sufficiency of the services provided, and the like (703.7).181 
 
 181. In addition to this summary version of the State Equal Justice Act, some readers 
may be interested in learning about the process the task force used in drafting the statute.  
We began by reviewing and discussing at length a number of legal aid statutes from coun-
tries that had “rights-based” systems, but used different approaches to organizing, adminis-
tering, and delivering the services.  This helped the members define the issues and the 
processes that the draft statute would have to address as well as identifying some solutions 
other societies had devised.  Different task force members then took responsibility for draft-
ing one of the more difficult provisions—the “merits” test in the eligibility section, for in-
stance, or the basic delivery system section.  These rough drafts were submitted to the other 
task force members and after discussion usually sent back for redrafting. 
       When that short list of critical issues had been resolved, we determined one person 
should produce a first draft of the entire statute, including the many sections that had not 
been subjected to intensive study before, in order to avoid a patchwork of styles and minim-
ize inconsistencies and conflicts among provisions.  I volunteered to undertake that task.  
This first draft, in turn, was circulated to the full task force for review, comment, and mod-
ification.  By the time this internal “review and revise” phase of the process was completed 
nearly a year later, some provisions of the statute were in their sixth draft. 
       Finally, the task force felt comfortable enough with the product to send it out for a con-
fidential review by a half-dozen reviewers in other parts of the country.  The task force 
chose these individuals because of their knowledge and expertise as well as their interest in 
some sort of comprehensive legal services delivery system.  They included Debra Gardner 
of Maryland’s Public Justice Center, who also chairs the National Coalition for a Civil Right 
to Counsel, Debi Perluss of the Northwest Justice Center in Seattle, who also is very active 
in the National Coalition, Richard Zorza, co-director of the Bellow-Sachs Access to Justice 
Project at Harvard Law School, Professor Russell Engler of New England College of Law 
and author of a number of articles related to access to justice, Laura Abel of the Brennan 
Center who is heavily involved in the National Coalition and also has written several articles 
in the field, and Andy Scherer, long-time Executive Director of Legal Services of New York 
City, one of the nation’s largest legal-aid programs, and an active  proponent of expanding 
the right to counsel in civil cases.  All of these reviewers sent extensive and insightful com-
JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:25 PM 
202 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
This draft State Equal Justice Act may draw quite heavily on foreign ex-
periences, but it is designed to operate within an American context, which 
has some unique aspects that affect a number of provisions.  Merely as an 
example, the United States is almost unique in having a “contingent fee” 
system that affords representation to parties, irrespective of income, in per-
sonal injury and many other tort cases where victims experience substantial 
compensable injuries.182  There is neither motive nor a reason to provide 
government-funded lawyers in such cases.  Thus, as readers will find, this 
draft statute excludes these cases from coverage, even though in many oth-
er countries legal aid would be the only possible source of representation 
for low-income people in those same cases.  The United States also is al-
most unique in not having a “loser pays” fee-shifting arrangement, which is 
a complication other nations’ legal aid statutes must address but which this 
draft statute did not have to consider. 
As emphasized repeatedly in the “Notes” accompanying the draft sta-
tute’s provisions, the task force made choices throughout—many of them 
close calls among equally attractive alternatives.  It would be quite possible 
to assemble a different mix of key features—the scope of services pro-
vided, eligibility standards, delivery system, administrative arrangements, 
 
ments and recommendations for changes.  The final draft found in the Appendix incorpo-
rates many, but not all, of those recommended changes.  Thus, these outside experts should 
not be held responsible for any perceived deficiencies in that final draft. 
 182. Several years ago, England adopted a “conditional fee” system that, after a recent 
expansion, applies to all non-family law cases.  This system theoretically offers poor people, 
as well as others, access to the courts without government-funded legal aid in many catego-
ries of cases, but especially those where a substantial financial award is at stake.  It is built 
on England’s traditional “loser pays” fee-shifting arrangement.  Under this “conditional fee” 
system, English lawyers may agree to represent a client on a “no win, no fee” basis—that is, 
when cases are lost, the clients are not required to pay their lawyers any fee. When the cases 
are won, however, the lawyers not only recover their fees from the losing parties, but also an 
“uplift” equal to all or some percentage of their regular fees—thus potentially doubling the 
fee they recover for winning the case.  To protect clients against the risk they will have to 
pay the other sides’ fees should they lose, they may purchase insurance that will cover those 
costs.  If they succeed in the litigation, they may recover those insurance premiums from the 
losing side, while their lawyers are recovering their fees, plus an “uplift.”  This is only a 
brief outline of the “conditional fee” system as it has developed in England, which has gone 
through several revisions since it began on an experimental basis in the early 1990s.  It was 
institutionalized in the Access to Justice Act, 1999, when most damage actions other than 
“medical negligence” were removed from legal aid with the expectation that access to jus-
tice could be achieved through this new fee-shifting system.  For an excellent overview of 
the “conditional fee” system in England, as well as several other countries that have adopted 
this approach, see a thoughtful study conducted by the Hong Kong Law Reform Commis-
sion while deciding whether to recommend a similar system for that jurisdiction. CONDI-
TIONAL FEES SUBCOMM., THE LAW REFORM COMM’N OF HONG KONG, CONSULTATION PA-
PER: CONDITIONAL FEES, available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/panels/ajls/ 
papers/aj1024cb2-122-5e.pdf. 
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and the like—that would implement the right to equal justice in ways many 
readers might find preferable to this particular configuration.  But however 
a statutory right to equality before the law is designed, or a court’s declara-
tion of a constitutional right is implemented, society’s willingness to pro-
vide adequate funding will determine whether the right is truly effective.  
Thus, we now turn to the issue of cost. 
VI.  WHAT FOREIGN—AND DOMESTIC—EXPERIENCE SUGGEST ABOUT 
THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING A RIGHT TO EQUAL JUSTICE 
Almost always, the first and often only objection raised when someone 
mentions the possibility of the United States implementing a right to 
equality before the law is: it will cost too much and American taxpayers 
will never support that amount of funding.183  Often this is followed by the 
argument that we do not even adequately fund healthcare.  This last com-
ment carries the clear implication that we shouldn’t invest more public 
funds in making the justice system fair for lower income Americans until 
we have taken care of all their needs for health care. 
What this specie of objection raises are really only questions of political 
will (or willingness), comparative cost, and societal priorities.  We will first 
explore them in the light of what some other comparable industrial demo-
cracies have been willing to spend on civil legal aid.  Then we will turn to 
what the United States itself has been willing to do in the past as well as 
what it might cost to provide equal justice to the poor compared to what we 
already spend on health care for that population. 
A. Comparative Expenditures on Civil Legal Aid 
If democratic societies have an inherent unwillingness to support the in-
vestment of significant resources in programs providing equal justice to 
lower income citizens, one would expect public investments in those pro-
grams to be minimal in all democratic societies, not just the United States.  
But the statistics reflect something very different.  Several comparable in-
dustrial democracies, most but not all in Europe, invest anywhere from 
three times to twelve times as much of their nation’s income on civil legal 
aid as does the United States.  These comparisons are reflected in Table 1. 
 
 
 183. See, e.g., TED FRANK, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, THE TROUBLE 
WITH THE CIVIL GIDEON MOVEMENT 1 (2008), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/ 
20080807_23374LOAugustg.pdf. 
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Table 1. Comparative Public Expenditures On Civil Legal Aid (2004)184 
Nation 
Total 
Public Civil  
Legal Aid  
Investment185 
Popula-
tion186 
Public 
Civil Legal 
Aid 
Investment 
Per Capita 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
(Per Pur-
chasing 
Power) Per 
Capita187 
Public Civil 
Legal Aid 
Investment as 
Percentage of 
GDP (in thou-
sandths of a 
percent) 
United 
States 
$800 
million188 
295 
million 
$2.70 $40,100 .0067 % 
(less than 
7 thousandths 
of a percent) 
Ireland $26.9 
million 
4.0 
million 
$6.72 $31,900 .019 % 
(19 thou-
sandths of a 
percent) 
Germany $520 
million 
82.4 
million 
$6.44 $28,700 .022 % 
(22 thousanths 
of a percent) 
Finland $35.6 
million  
5.2 
million 
$6.84 $29,000 .024 % 
(24 thou-
sandths of a 
percent) 
Canada $257 
million 
32.8 
million 
$7.83 $31,500 .025 % 
(25 thou-
sandths of a 
percent) 
 
 184. Expenditures compiled by author from information gathered from the 2005 ILAG 
Conference. 
 185. The civil legal aid expenditure figures of each country are from the “National Re-
ports” prepared by national legal aid administrators or academics from those countries, and 
submitted to the 2005 Conference of the International Legal Aid Group, Killarney, Ire., June 
2005. 
 186. The population figures were obtained from U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE 
WORLD FACTBOOK: COMPARATIVE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ON CIVIL LEGAL AID (2005). 
 187. Id.  The per capita GDP figures reflect “Purchasing Power Parity” GDP, not “offi-
cial exchange rate” GDP. 
 188. As with all nations, this figure does not include private sources such as foundation 
grants, private donations, etc., but does include all public funding—Legal Services Corpora-
tion (“LSC”), Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (“IOLTA”), state government, local and 
non-LSC federal funding. 
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New 
Zealand 
$30 
million 
4.0 
million 
$7.50 $23,200 .032 % 
(32 thou-
sandths of a 
percent) 
Scotland $72.5 
million 
5.08 
million 
$14.50 $29,600 
(for U.K.) 
.049 % 
(49 thou-
sandths of a 
perecnt) 
Nether-
lands 
$300 
million 
16.4 
million 
$18.29 $26.900 .068 % 
(68 thousanths 
of a per cent) 
England $1.63 
billion 
(excluding 
immigration) 
53 
million  
$30.75 (ex-
cluding im-
migration) 
$29,600 
(for U.K.)  
.103 % 
(103 thou-
sandths, or 
1 tenth of a 
percent) 
 
With the exception of England,189 the expenditure statistics were com-
piled from “national reports” prepared by legal aid administrators, or in 
some cases, academics from the nations included on the table and submit-
ted for the 2005 biennial conference of the International Legal Aid 
Group.190  The expenditure figures include only public funding and not pri-
vate sources of funding, whether those private funds were derived from 
client contributions, court awarded fees, foundation grants, or private dona-
tions.  Most of the data are from calendar or fiscal year 2004.  But there is 
no reason to expect any substantial changes since then in the comparative 
standings of the nine nations included on the table. 
 
 189. The English figures were derived from the Legal Services Commission’s Annual 
Report for England and Wales.  LEGAL SERVS. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, availa-
ble at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc01/0167/0167.pdf. 
 190. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., INT’L LEGAL AID GROUP, KEY FEATURES OF FIFTEEN NA-
TIONAL LEGAL AID PROGRAMS 157-71 (2005) (distributed as part of the ILAG Conference: 
Legal Aid in the Global Era) (summarizing in chart form the essential elements and statis-
tical data gleaned from the National Reports included in the book produced from that confe-
rence’s proceedings). Exchange rates used to convert from local currency to U.S. dollars 
were those in effect on June 30, 2004.  At that point, a Euro = $1.25, a Canadian dollar = 
$0.83, a New Zealand dollar = $0.72, a Hong Kong dollar = $0.13, and a British pound = 
$1.81.  Per capita GDP figures for each country are from the World Fact Book (2004) and 
were based on the “Purchasing Power Parity” (“PPP”) GDP which is corrected for the rela-
tive purchasing power of the nation’s currency.  The Legal Services Commission received 
government grants totaling 905 million British pounds, which on June 30, 2004, at the pre-
vailing exchange rate of $1.81 to the pound, was the equivalent of $1.63 billion. 
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 As the above table makes quite apparent, in no country, even the most 
generous, is the investment in civil legal aid anything but a tiny, virtually 
miniscule portion of the nation’s GDP.  At one end, the United States in-
vestment in civil legal aid was only seven thousandths of a percent of our 
GDP in 2004.  At the high end, England’s was slightly over one-tenth of a 
percent of that nation’s GDP.  To put it another way, the U.S. was at seven 
thousandths and England at one hundred-and-three thousandths of a per-
cent of their respective national GDPs—making England more than four-
teen times more generous than the U.S. in its commitment to providing 
equality before the law for its lower income people.  Yet England’s invest-
ment seems negligible compared to the nation’s ability to pay and also 
compared to the fundamental nature of the national promise of “justice for 
all” that expenditure fulfills. 
Another revealing comparison among the same nine countries is pre-
sented on the next table.  It is based on the $11.75 trillion GDP the World 
Fact book reported the United States earned that year, and shows what the 
U.S. public expenditure on civil legal aid would be if this country invested 
as much of its GDP for that purpose as these other eight nations did in 
2004. 
 
Table 2. U.S. Expenditures on Civil Legal Aid if it Invested the Same Per-
centage of its GDP in Civil Legal Aid as These Nations (2004) 
Ireland Germany Finland Canada 
New 
Zealand Scotland Netherlands 
England 
& Wales 
$2.2 
billion 
$2.6 
billion 
$2.8 
billion 
$2.9 
billion 
$3.75 
billion 
$5.75 
billion 
$8.0 
billion 
$12.1 
billion 
Note: For England, the public investment figure does not include expenditures on immigra-
tion cases. 
 
In addition to comparative per-GDP statistics, other revealing compari-
sons focus on the justice system itself.  Unfortunately, the statistics are dif-
ficult to obtain and thus only a few two-nation snapshots are available at 
this point.  But those limited snapshots are rather dramatic.  A decade ago 
in England, the government’s investment in civil legal aid represented 12% 
of that nation’s total spending on lawyers by all individuals, businesses, 
governments and other possible clients,191 while in the United States civil 
 
 191. MIKE HOPE, U.K. DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, EXPENDITURE ON LEGAL 
SERVICES (1997), http://www.dca.gov.uk/research/1997/997esfr.htm.  While this informa-
tion is now a dozen years old, there is no reason to expect any dramatic change in the ratio 
of legal aid-funded legal work to overall expenditures on lawyers since that time. 
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legal aid received less than a half a percent (.5%) of our nation’s total ex-
penditures on lawyers. 192 
Another revealing measure compares nations in how they allocate the 
publicly-funded resources they commit to the dispute resolution function.  
The table below portrays a nation’s willingness to expend resources on civ-
il legal aid compared to its willingness to expend resources on the courts.  
The data used to calculate the percentages for the European countries re-
flected on the table come from a recently published report “European Judi-
cial Systems” prepared by the European Commission for the Efficiency of 
Justice and published by the Council of Europe.193  Because the “European 
Judicial Systems” report only supplied a combined figure for civil and 
criminal legal aid, it was not sufficient by itself as a source for comparisons 
of investments on the judicial and civil legal aid components of the justice 
system.  Thus, the only nations included on the table were ones for which 
data was available from other sources regarding the level of civil legal aid 
funding (independent of funding on defense of the criminal accused).194 
 
 
 192. In 2004, an estimated $209 billion was spent on the services of lawyers in the United 
States, most in the form of legal fees paid to private law firms by individuals, businesses, 
governments, and other entities. In 2006 an estimated $236 billion was spent on such servic-
es, an increase of over 12% from 2004. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2009 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, at tbl.1247.  In the meantime, expenditures on civil legal aid from 
all sources, public and private, totaled roughly $1 billion in those years, less than a .5% of 
total expenditures on lawyers.  Whether that 5% estimate held true amidst the economic 
downturn in 2009 warrants some discussion, although precise statistics are not available at 
this time. The deep downturn the U.S. economy suffered in 2009 clearly affected private 
law firms adversely, undoubtedly reducing the total national expenditures on lawyers that 
year by an unknown, but likely significant, amount.  Meanwhile, financial support for civil 
legal aid also has been impacted, primarily because of a sharp decline in interest rates, great-
ly reducing the revenues generated by IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts).  IOL-
TA is second only to Legal Services Corporation grants as a source of income for civil legal 
aid programs and supplied scores of millions of dollars less in 2009 than it did in 2008.  De-
pending on how much total expenditures on lawyers declined relative to what was a likely 
reduction in financial support for civil legal aid, the latter may have received slightly more 
or somewhat less than the half a percent (.5%) it did in the earlier years for which statistics 
are already available. But that it remained close to that ratio seems a safe statement. 
 193.  “Public budget allocated to courts, legal aid and public prosecution in 2006, in [Eu-
ros].” EUROPEAN COMM’N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE, EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS: 
EDITION 2008 (DATA 2006): EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY OF JUSTICE, 20-21 tbl.2 (2008). 
 194. The civil legal aid expenditure figures used to calculate the percentage comparison 
with the judicial budgets are the same as reflected on Table 1, supra.  The judicial expendi-
ture figures were then converted to U.S. dollars, to make the comparison possible.  The fig-
ures are for 2004 while the court expenditure figures, as noted, are for 2006.  However, it is 
unlikely a significant change occurred in civil legal aid expenditures in any of these coun-
tries between 2004 and 2006, especially an increase or decrease so large that it would distort 
the comparison with judicial expenditures in that same country. 
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Table 3. Comparison Between Civil Legal Aid Expenditures as Percentage 
of Judicial Expenditures in Selected Nations195 
Nation 
Civil Legal 
Aid Budget 
as Percent of 
Judicial 
Budget 
U.S. Civil Legal Aid Expenditures if 
They Were the Same Percentage of U.S. 
Judicial Expenditures as This Nation’s 
Civil Legal Aid Expenditures are of its 
Judicial Expenditures 
Finland 13.6% $2 billion 
Netherlands 27.0% $4 billion 
Ireland 35% $5.25 billion 
Northern Ireland 37% $5.5 billion 
Scotland 63% $9.4 billion 
England & Wales 79% $12 billion 
United States 7.5% $1 billion 
 
An adversary system such as the United States uses depends on the pri-
vate parties rather than the judges to discover the relevant facts and the 
operative legal principles then present them to a neutral fact finder (judge 
or jury).  In contrast, an inquisitorial system expects the judges to play a 
major role, independently and actively discovering the facts and applicable 
law as well as deciding the case.  Thus, one would expect a nation using an 
adversarial system to devote more funds proportionately to subsidizing pri-
vate parties who could not afford to perform these vital functions on their 
own than does a nation using an inquisitorial approach where the publicly-
funded judiciary is doing more of this hard work. 
With the exception of the United States (which uses an adversary sys-
tem) this expectation is confirmed by the limited number of nations in-
cluded on the above table.  In Finland, which uses a system that is fairly 
close to a pure inquisitorial approach, the civil legal aid budget is only 
13.6% as large as the judicial budget.  The Netherlands use a system which 
has elements of both the inquisitorial and adversarial systems and its civil 
legal aid budget is 27% as large as its judicial budget.  But in those coun-
tries using a classic adversarial system the civil legal aid budget ranges 
from 35% to 79% the size of the judicial budget.  The United States is the 
 
 195.  EUROPEAN COMM’N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE, supra note 193. 
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outlier—indeed on the outer fringes—only spending an estimated 7.5% as 
much on civil legal aid as it does on the judicial system.196 
This is not to suggest this disparity is attributable in any sense to overly 
generous funding of the judiciary in the United States.  To the contrary, 
state and local courts are notoriously underfunded in this country, as con-
firmed by research disclosed by the National Center for States Courts.197  
What the statistics on Table 3 do demonstrate, however, is that, compared 
to similar industrial democracies, and especially our fellow common law 
countries, civil legal aid is even worse off than the courts in the United 
States. 
But one does not have to look to other countries for revealing (some 
might say embarrassing) comparisons.  Our own past can do the same.  If 
this nation merely matched what it had been willing to do thirty-nine years 
ago, we would be a long way toward being able to fund a right to equal jus-
tice in this country. 
In fiscal year (FY) 1981, the Legal Services Corporation’s (“LSC”) 
budget reached its high point—in real terms—$321 million.198 This was the 
realization of the interim, so-called “minimum access” goal of one legal 
services lawyer for every 5,000 indigents.199  At that time, the LSC Board 
 
 196. Unfortunately, no agency compiles precise nation expenditure figures for state 
courts in the United States.  In many states, the courts are funded by a combination of state, 
county, and sometimes municipal governments, thus complicating the problem of aggregat-
ing budget or expenditure data.  But recently, the National Center for State Courts had occa-
sion to produce an estimate of total expenditures by the nation’s state courts.  Reflecting the 
admittedly imprecise nature of the estimate, the Center concluded combined state court ex-
penditures ranged somewhere between $11 billion and $13 billion. Interview with Gregory 
Hurley, Knowledge Mgmt. Analyst, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts (Aug. 28, 2009).   To this 
should be added the $5.8 billion expended by the Federal Judicial Branch U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU, 2008 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbl.458, because many civil legal 
aid agencies provide representation in federal as well as state courts. Combining the federal 
court expenditures and the National Center for State Courts’ (“NCSC”) estimate of state 
court expenditures, it is possible to safely estimate that total judicial expenditures easily ex-
ceed $15 billion in the United States, the figure used on Table 3, supra. 
 197. See supra note 196. 
 198. See HOUSEMAN, supra note 112, at 16. 
 199. The goal was phrased as “two lawyers for every 10,000 poor people.”  Id. at 16.   
This equals one lawyer for every 5000 indigents.  But that “two lawyers for every 10,000 
poor people” formula (rather than expressing it as one lawyer for every 5000 indigents) 
probably is explained by what occurred a decade earlier.  When drafting the “Guidelines for 
the OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity] Legal Services Program” in 1965, “we wanted 
to insure there were no one lawyer offices and set a minimum of two lawyers for each 
neighborhood office we would be willing to fund and that no such office should be expected 
to serve an area with more than 10,000 poor people.”  (The author was Deputy Director of 
the OEO Legal Services Program at the time and personally participated in the drafting of 
those Guidelines, including the section setting out the two lawyers for 10,000 poor people 
provision.) Id. 
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viewed this as only a first step toward “full access” or at least “adequate 
access” for the poor.200  But the next year the new President, Ronald Rea-
gan, “zero-budgeted” the LSC in the budget his administration submitted to 
Congress, as part of his effort to eliminate the program entirely.201  The 
outcome of the legislative struggle that ensued was a one-third reduction in 
the LSC budget—and since then, although there have been some ups and 
downs over the years, LSC’s appropriation has never approached the 1981 
level in inflation-adjusted dollars.202 
Since the 1981 LSC budget was enacted, thirty-eight years of inflation 
have drained the dollar of more than 60% of its value.  That 1981 LSC 
budget only amounted to a tiny percent of the total federal government 
budget.203  Yet even that tiny percent of the federal budget represented 
 
 200. This “minimum access” goal was never viewed as an ultimate goal for the size of 
the LSC budget or of the legal services program in the United States.  Indeed, at that time 
there already existed a number of local legal services programs that had a significantly larg-
er budget and a much higher number of lawyers per 10,000 indigents in the geographic areas 
they served, without being able to represent all the applicants who arrived at their offices. 
 201. Reagan Proposals Detail Further Trims in Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1981, at 
B5.  Although Reagan did not succeed in eliminating the Legal Services Corporation, the 
compromise with Congress did result in a drastic reduction in the LSC budget—from $321 
million to $241 million.  Reagan also zero-budgeted the LSC each year for the rest of his 
term in office, but each time Congress nevertheless funded the Corporation, usually increas-
ing the budget slightly.  See HOUSEMAN, supra note 112, at 16. 
 202. Alan Houseman’s paper for ILAG’s 2009 conference contains a chart reflecting 
those ups and downs.  As that chart reveals, whether trending slowly upward or twice preci-
pitously downward over the years, the LSC budget has never come near to equaling the 
1981 “minimum access” figure of $321 million in inflation-adjusted dollars, much of the 
time hovering around half that level, where it remains in 2009. See HOUSEMAN, supra note 
112, at 16.  That revenue loss is compounded by the fact that the number of people eligible 
for LSC-funded legal services has increased by 25% between 1980 and the present—from 
40.7 million to nearly 51 million (50.876 million) in 2007. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1980 STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbl.689; U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty 
Tables – People tbl.6, [hereinafter Historical Poverty] available at http://www.census.gov/ 
hhes/www/poverty/histpov/perindex.html (follow “Table 6: People Below 125 Percent of 
Poverty Level and the Near Poor” hyperlink).  Thus, LSC funding per eligible person has 
shrunk in real terms by some 70% since 1981.  During late 2008 and into 2009, the popula-
tion under 125% of the poverty level undoubtedly has increased by several million “new 
poor” because of the economic downturn and associated job losses, further aggravating the 
long-term reduction in LSC funding per eligible person. 
 203. In 1981, federal outlays totaled slightly over $678 billion and the LSC budget was 
$321 million.  Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Historical Tables: Budget of the United States 
Government: Fiscal Year 2009 26 tbl.1.3, available at www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/ 
pdf/hist.pdf.  The original proposed federal outlays for the 2009 fiscal year budget totaled 
slightly over $3.1 trillion dollars—over 4.5 times the 1981 federal expenditure.  Id.  If the 
LSC budget were as large a percentage of the FY 2009 federal budget as it was in 1981, it 
would have reached $1.45 billion in current dollars in FY 2009, instead of lagging behind at 
only a few million more than it was in 1981. 
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1.4% of what the nation’s citizens, corporations, and other entities spent on 
lawyers that year.204  What does this all mean? 
 
٠ What the federal government was willing to allocate to the Legal 
Services Corporation in 1981 would amount to $752 million in 
2008—after adjusting for inflation—not just the $390 million ap-
propriated that year.205 
 
٠ Because the numbers of people eligible for LSC-funded legal ser-
vices grew by 25% between 1981 and the present—from 40.8 mil-
lion to 51 million206—in order to restore the LSC funding per poor 
person to the level it was in 1981 would have required an LSC ap-
propriation of $941 million in FY 2009 not the $390 million Con-
gress appropriated for that fiscal year. 
 
٠ If the federal government was willing to devote the same percentage 
of the federal budget to the LSC in FY 2009 as it did in FY 1981, 
the LSC budget would have been $1.45  billion that year not $390 
million.207 
 
٠ In 1981, the federal government, through the LSC budget, was will-
ing to provide the nearly 20% of the nation’s people who are poor 
with a modest 1.4 percent of the nation’s legal resources.  Because 
the nation’s expenditures on lawyers soared from $23 billion in 
1981 to $236 billion in 2006,208 if the government would have been 
willing to give poor people that same 1.4% of the nation’s legal re-
sources in FY 2009, the LSC budget would have been over $3.3 bil-
lion that year rather than only $390 million.209 
 
 
 204. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1982-83 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 800, 
available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1982_83-01.pdf 
 205. See HOUSEMAN, supra note 112, at 16. 
 206. See statistics from 2009 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 
192, and Historical Poverty, supra note 202. 
 207. The Legal Services Corporation received .047% of the U.S. Government’s total 
$678 billion outlays in FY 1981.  If LSC received that same .047% of the U.S. Govern-
ment’s $3.1 trillion outlays in FY 2009, the Corporation’s budget would be $1.45 billion. 
 208. See statistics from 2009 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 
192. 
 209. $321 million is 1.4% of $23 billion but $390 million is only .18% (eighteen hun-
dredths of a percent) of $236 billion, while 1.4% of that $236 billion would be $3.3 billion. 
JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:25 PM 
212 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
Admittedly, no matter which of the prior governmental commitments to 
civil legal aid the federal government might agree to restore, the United 
States would still remain short of the average proportional civil legal aid 
investment for the eight other comparable industrial democracies reported 
on Table 2, that is, over $4 billion.210  But at least our country would match 
some of the countries at the lower end of the scale and be much closer to 
Scotland and the Netherlands, and within sight of England.  Indeed, if the 
LSC budget were somehow to return the poor to the 1.4% of legal re-
sources reached in 1981, our nation would be within striking distance of the 
appropriation needed to fund a right to equal justice.  This is especially true 
if we were to implement that right through the sort of cost-effective model 
outlined in Part VI, supra (and presented in more detail in the Appendix), 
that properly integrated self-help assistance, lay advocates, limited legal re-
presentation, and full legal representation. 
Thus, whether measured by either our own historical commitments or by 
our standing among other industrial democracies, the United States as a 
whole, and the federal government in particular, continue to demonstrate 
something less than tepid support for that fundamental precept of the social 
contract—equality before the law.  Some would ask whether our nation’s 
support for other values of importance to the poor isn’t equally tepid.  
Whether that is true and, if so, what that says about what society should 
spend on equal justice is the subject of the next section. 
B. Expenditures on Civil Legal Aid Compared with Other Public 
Expenditures Benefiting the Poor 
In order to make some relevant comparisons, the starting point is the 
share of total legal resources civil legal aid organizations have to serve the 
population eligible for their services.  Recall, at the present time, that share 
is only one-half of one percent.211  This miniscule share of legal resources 
is expected to serve over fifty million people—one sixth of the nation’s to-
tal population.212  Those fifty million, in fact, represent the minimum who 
need civil legal aid—those who are under 125% of the federal poverty line 
and thus eligible for LSC-funded legal services.  But many of the non-LSC 
funded legal aid programs have decided another strata of people are unable 
to afford counsel and drawn the line at 200% of the poverty line.213  Apply-
ing this standard, over ninety million Americans—nearly a third of the 
 
 210. See Table 2, supra. 
 211. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra note 202. 
 213. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611 (2009). 
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population—would be eligible for civil legal aid.214  This means that at the 
current time civil legal aid is funded at an average of $20 a year per eligible 
poor person assuming the fifty million figure represents the total population 
needing their services and a bit over $10 per poor person if the more realis-
tic estimate of those unable to afford counsel in most legal problems they 
face is ninety million. 
Another relevant statistic for comparison purposes is the roughly one bil-
lion dollars from all sources which the U.S. currently invests in civil legal 
aid.  Contrast that with the $323 billion annual national government ex-
penditure on the Medicaid program in FY 2006.215  Medicaid, unlike civil 
legal aid, is presently a “rights based” program.  That is, if an applicant is 
financially eligible and has a health problem covered by the program he or 
she is legally entitled to government-paid health services that address that 
problem.  At this point, the United States spends on justice for the poor less 
than a third of a percent (.33%) of what it spends on health care for the 
poor.  Another way of expressing the stark difference, and one that makes it 
easier to comprehend, is that the Medicaid budget provides over $4,500 per 
eligible patient,216 while civil legal aid only has $20 per eligible client. 
On another and more relevant scale of comparison, the combined feder-
al-state Medicaid program expenditure of $323 billion in 2006 amounted to 
fully 15% of the nation’s total public and private spending on health care 
that year, which amounted to slightly over $2.1 trillion.217  (The total 
spending statistic includes all the private health insurance premiums Amer-
icans or their employers pay, their personal co-payments and non-insured 
payments to providers, as well as Medicare, Medicaid and other govern-
 
 214. As of 2006, the Census Bureau estimated 91,091,199 people in the United States had 
incomes below 200% of the poverty level.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY STATUS IN THE 
PAST 12 MONTHS (2006), available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?_ 
bm=y&-qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_S1701&-geo_id=01000US&-ds_name=ACS_200 
6_EST_G00_&-_lang=en&-redoLog=false&-CONTEXT=st. 
 215. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2006 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURES FOR HEALTH SERVICES AND SUPPLIES 97 tbl.128.  In addition to Medicaid, 
this figure includes most other miscellaneous health expenditures on the poor, but not con-
tributions to Medicare made on behalf of poor people, nor expenditures Medicare may make 
for health services to elderly poor people. 
 216. Statehealthfacts.org, United States: Medicaid Payments per Enrollee, FY 2006, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=183&cat=1&rgn=1 (last visited Feb. 28, 
2010). 
 217. In 2006, combined private and public expenditures on health care totaled $2.106 tril-
lion.  See 2006 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 215, at 95 
tbl.124. National Health Expenditures from 1960 to 2017.  The $323 billion federal and 
state governments allocated to health care for the poor in 2006 represented 15.33% of the 
combined health expenditures from all sources, public and private, for all Americans during 
that year. 
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ment health programs.)  Thus, poor people are receiving fifteen percent of 
the nation’s health care expenditures, but only a half of a percent of its ex-
penditures on “legal care.” 
The lesson of these statistics is not that civil legal aid should be funded 
at or near the level of Medicaid.  Rather, it is to highlight two points.  First, 
poor people get a far larger share of the nation’s health care resources than 
they do its legal resources.  And second, the nation’s investment in civil le-
gal aid could be increased rather dramatically without making a dent in the 
funds devoted to Medicare.  A 500% increase in funding for civil legal aid, 
for instance, would only represent a little over 1% of the Medicaid budget.  
So it makes little sense to say the United States is unable to afford to give 
its low income population the resources needed to afford them equality be-
fore the law until it fully funds their health care.  Foregoing adequate fund-
ing for civil legal aid adds nothing meaningful to the resources available 
for health care—and also would not be meaningful in relation to the na-
tion’s investments in education or public welfare.218 
VII.  IF AND WHEN AND WHY IT HASN’T HAPPENED ALREADY 
In 1919, Elihu Root, one of the most venerated lawyers and public ser-
vants in American history, wrote the Foreword to Reginald Heber Smith’s 
landmark book, Justice and the Poor.219  In that foreword, Root observed: 
New projects are continually suggested for improving the condition of the 
poor by the aid of government, and as to many of them there is a debata-
ble question whether they come within the proper province of government 
. . . . No one, however, doubts that it is the proper function of government 
to secure justice.  In a broad sense that is the chief thing for which gov-
ernment is organized.  Nor can any one question that the highest obliga-
tion of government is to secure justice for those who, because they are 
poor and weak and friendless, find it hard to maintain their own rights.220 
 
 218. In 2004, state and municipal governments spent $655 billion on education and $335 
billion on public welfare. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2009 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 265 tbl.417. 
 219. Elihu Root, Foreword to REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR, at ix 
(1919).  Smith’s book was the first to expose the problems faced in America’s legal system.  
It also proved influential in persuading the ABA to adopt the expansion and improvement of 
legal aid as one of its primary missions in 1920. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND 
REFORM 5-8 (1974). 
 220. Root, supra note 219.  At the time Elihu Root wrote this foreward to Smith’s book, 
he was a renowned and revered figure in the bar and in the nation.  In the last decade of the 
nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, he served as Secretary of 
War and later Secretary of State, a Senator from New York, President of the ABA, almost 
became a Republican candidate for U.S. President, and was awarded the 1912 Nobel Peace 
Prize.  In between his stints in public service, he was one of the most successful and sought-
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Root wrote this passage several decades before our federal government 
created social security, Medicare, Medicaid, welfare, and like programs for 
improving the condition of the poor and sometimes other disadvantaged 
Americans. Given his own record during the Progressive Era, it seems 
doubtful Root would now object to those initiatives.  But he most certainly 
would be disappointed, if not befuddled, by the comparatively low priority 
accorded what he saw as the “highest obligation of government,” that is, to 
secure justice for the poor.221 
As Root recognized, the rationale for government investing in civil legal 
aid is different and reposes at a more fundamental level than is true for so-
cial programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and welfare.  As explored earli-
er in this Article, equality before the law is at the core of the social contract 
just as peacefully resolving disputes between citizens, including between 
citizens of different economic and social classes is, as Root wrote, the 
“chief reason,” but obviously not the only purpose, for government it-
self.222 
The primacy of the dispute resolution function and the necessity that it 
be performed justly has been recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court in Boddie v. Connecticut. 
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more 
fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defin-
ing the various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to govern 
their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an orderly, predict-
able manner. . . .  Without [the] guarantee that one may not be deprived of 
his rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the 
State’s monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution could 
hardly be said to be acceptable under our scheme of things.  Only by pro-
viding that the social enforcement mechanism must function strictly with-
in [those] bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered society that is also 
just.223 
In a very real sense, a citizen’s right to equality before the law in civil 
cases is as important as his or her right to vote in a democratic society—
and as critical to full participation as a citizen in that democracy. Without 
the ability to effectively litigate in court, citizens are in no position to en-
force the substantive rights their votes may have allowed them to gain. For 
those lacking counsel, the law does not exist as a practical matter—at least 
 
after lawyers in New York and the nation. YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN 
LAW 467-68 (2009). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See supra notes 7-8. 
 223. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1971). 
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as a benefit and not just a threat—and their right to vote gains them little.  
They can be sued and lose as defendants despite laws favoring their posi-
tion that they have no way of knowing about or being capable of asserting.  
Conversely, they have no way of effectively enforcing legal protections 
they possess under the law by bringing a lawsuit they have any prospect of 
winning.  For all these reasons, equality before the law and the right to 
counsel when needed for that equality is an inherent element of citizen-
ship—and civil legal aid thus is more than a social program but an inherent 
and essential term of the social contract.  Indeed, without that equality be-
fore the law, poor people are far less than full citizens in our democracy. 
California Chief Justice Ron George recognized this fundamental truth 
when he warned the state legislature in 2001, “If justice for all becomes 
justice only for those who can afford it, we threaten the very underpinnings 
of our social contract.”224  Unfortunately, of course, we are already violat-
ing the social contract because we are not providing justice for all, but jus-
tice only for those who can afford it or, who are lucky enough to find a le-
gal aid lawyer or a pro bono lawyer with enough time to take on their 
cases.  That, as we know, is a distinct minority of the nation’s lower in-
come people. 
And so, one might ask, as Elihu Root certainly would, why has civil le-
gal aid lagged behind so many social programs in the government’s fund-
ing priorities?  Part of the reason is probably historical as well as a product 
of our distance from the European continent.  We simply missed out on that 
continent’s nation-by-nation translation of social contract principles into 
statutes conferring a right to counsel in civil cases.  Indeed, in most of 
those countries, government guaranteed poor people free lawyers in the 
courts before they gave them health care or welfare or other purely social 
benefits.  Had this country been on or near the European continent, it might 
well have been caught up in the movement to create statutory rights to 
counsel in civil cases as it spread from nation to nation.  But distance from 
Europe may not be the only explanation.  Americans also may be guilty of 
a bit of chauvinism about the virtues of our justice system, much of it de-
served, which would tend to discourage any serious attention to what was 
happening in Europe.  Then, once legal aid started here in 1876 as a charit-
able, not a governmental, responsibility, the pattern was set—a fixed re-
source of salaried lawyers working in special offices dedicated solely to 
serving the poor and funded as private charities. 
 
 224. Ronald M. George, Chief Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, State of the Judiciary Ad-
dress (Sept. 8, 2001). 
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The national legal aid movement backed by the ABA began in 1920225 
and from the start favored private charity as its source of financial sup-
port.226  Indeed, in the 1950s those in charge of the legal aid movement 
strongly opposed a proposal for federal funding of civil legal aid in the 
United States.227  This proposal emanated from a number of lawyers and 
the National Lawyers Guild who were inspired by England’s new compre-
hensive government-funded legal aid program.228  Coming at the height of 
the McCarthy era, this initiative provoked an outcry against government 
funding of civil legal aid from bar leaders and legal aid proponents alike.  
SMU law school dean and former ABA president Robert Storey wrote in 
the ABA Journal that “the greatest threat aside from the undermining influ-
ences of Communist infiltration, is the propaganda and campaign for a fed-
eral subsidy to finance a nationwide plan for legal aid and low-cost legal 
service.”229  The ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent De-
fendants issued a report trumpeting charitably-funded legal aid societies as 
the “American way” to deliver justice to the poor230 and the President of 
the National Legal Aid and Defender urged they were the primary bulwark 
against “socialization of the legal profession.”231 
It took the nation’s brief “War on Poverty” to awaken the federal gov-
ernment to the plight of the poor in our courts and the rest of our legal sys-
tem—and to turn the organized bar from an opponent to a supporter of 
government funding of civil legal aid.232  With that came the Office of 
 
 225. See JOHNSON, supra note 219, at 6-8. 
 226. Id. at 14-19.  Municipally-funded civil legal aid organizations were fairly common 
in the early decades of the twentieth century, but the trend was definitely downward until 
nearly none remained by mid-century.  Then, when some began urging the U.S. to emulate 
England’s new comprehensive government-funded legal aid program in the early 1950s, it 
provoked a cry against “socialism” of the legal profession, and privately funded legal aid 
societies were touted as the “American way to meet the need” and as the prime buffer 
against socialization of the profession.  Id. at 18-19. 
 227. Id. at 19. 
 228. Id. at 18. 
 229. Robert Storey, The Legal Profession Versus Regimentation: A Program to Counter 
Socialization, 37 A.B.A. J. 100, 101 (1951). 
 230. EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 18 (1978). 
 231. Orison S. Marden, Legal Aid, The Private Lawyer and the Community, 20 TENN. L. 
REV. 757, 761 (1949).  Ironically, when Marden became ABA President in the mid-1960s, 
he proved to be a staunch supporter of the federally-funded OEO Legal Services Program, 
showing what a difference a decade can make. 
 232. On February 7, 1965, through the skill and determination of then ABA President 
Lewis Powell and his leadership team, the ABA House of Delegates unanimously autho-
rized the Association to “cooperate with the Office of Economic Opportunity . . . in the de-
velopment and implementation of programs for expanding availability of legal services to 
indigents and persons of low income . . . .” JOHNSON, supra note 219, at 63. 
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Economic Opportunity (“OEO”) Legal Services Program and the first fed-
eral funding of civil legal aid.233  There is no reason to rehearse the many 
ups and downs of that program and its successor, the Legal Services Corpo-
ration.  An earlier section of this paper documented how far behind we re-
main in our commitment to equal justice for the poor—whether measured 
against other comparable industrial democracies or our own federal gov-
ernment’s earlier willingness to invest in civil legal aid, or our nation’s in-
vestment in another major social program for the poor, Medicaid.234 
Although the organized bar is owed many thanks for its strong support 
of the OEO Legal Services Program and the Legal Services Corporation 
over the years, the legal profession and those supporting civil legal aid also 
bear considerable responsibility for the continued low priority accorded 
equality before the law in the nation’s funding decisions.  Viewing and 
hearing our public rhetoric, one would think our nation already provides 
justice for all, including the poor.  We chisel equal justice under law over 
the entrance to the U.S. Supreme Court building, a guarantee seen repeat-
edly on television, our constitution purports to offer all citizens, irrespec-
tive of income, “due process”235 and “equal protection of the laws,”236 and 
our “Law Day” and “July 4th” speeches tend to praise our legal system ra-
ther than criticize it for its failure to provide equality before the law to low-
er income Americans.  Now, the ABA is in the midst of a multi-million 
dollar campaign to promote the “Rule of Law” around the world,237 imply-
 
 233. It took until September of 1965 to find a director for that program who was accepta-
ble to both Shriver and the ABA, and also willing to take on the responsibility.  That person 
was E. Clinton Bamberger, a young partner in Baltimore’s largest law firm. It was the 
Spring of 1966 before a significant number of grants had been made to either enlarge and 
improve existing legal aid societies or to start new local legal services agencies.  Id. at 64-
102. 
 234. See supra Part VI.A-B. 
 235. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 236. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
 237. As explained in the introduction to the large section devoted to this program on the 
ABA’s main website: 
The ABA Rule of Law Initiative is a public service project of the American Bar 
Association dedicated to promoting rule of law around the world. The ABA Rule 
of Law Initiative believes that rule of law promotion is the most effective long-
term antidote to the pressing problems facing the world community today, includ-
ing poverty, economic stagnation, and conflict. 
See A.B.A., Rule of Law Initiative, http://www.abanet.org/rol/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).  
William Neukom, the ABA President during 2006-07, launched this “Rule of Law Initia-
tive” as his signature program and it remains as a continuing project of the Association.  Al-
though it has several aspects, the most visible element of the Initiative so far was a “World 
Justice Forum” in Vienna, Austria during July 2008. This conference brought together more 
than 450 governmental and non-governmental leaders from eighty-three nations, including 
Asia and the Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, and North America.  
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ing to many that all of our nation’s citizens fully enjoy the benefits of such 
a legal regime already.  Even the stories about legal aid that occasionally 
pop up in our nation’s newspapers usually feature the success stories—the 
poor people legal aid lawyers managed to save from a difficult legal prob-
lem, not what happens to the far greater number those lawyers lack the time 
to help. 
This was brought home to me recently at a conference on “The Justice 
Gap and the Right to Counsel” sponsored by the San Francisco Bar Associ-
ation in October 2008.  The moderator was the former long-time publisher 
of San Francisco’s daily newspaper.  He listened to a series of panelists de-
scribing how few resources the U.S. allocates to civil legal aid, how far we 
are behind other countries, the statistics about unmet need, and from a legal 
aid lawyer telling of the pain she experienced in having to turn away the 
majority of the applicants who came to her office.  Finally, this sophisti-
cated and knowledgeable journalist shook his head and told the audience he 
had no idea about any of this.  He had assumed poor people had all the civil 
legal aid they needed.  Small wonder, given what the American public, 
educated or not, are told about justice in this country, from childhood on 
reciting a pledge of allegiance that emphasizes two values this country 
represents—liberty and justice for all. 
The San Francisco publisher felt only mildly relieved about his own ig-
norance on this subject when told that public opinion polls have revealed 
nearly 70% of Californians238 and nearly 80% of the American public think 
poor people already have a right to counsel in civil cases just as they do in 
criminal prosecutions.239 
If we want to raise the priority of civil legal aid to the status it deserves 
among the panoply of programs meriting public funding, we will have to 
level with the American public, the nation’s legislators and other officials, 
its journalists, and other opinion makers.  Our justice system has a secret—
one we can no longer afford to conceal or fail to mention.  We do not pro-
vide the promised justice for all.  Indeed, to be fully honest, we probably 
don’t provide justice at all to the majority of the people in the bottom one-
third of the nation’s population—especially when, as often happens, they 
have a dispute with a higher income person or entity.  Also, we have to 
 
Edited versions of the papers prepared for the conference were published recently as WORLD 
JUSTICE FORUM, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW (R. L. Nelson, J. Heckman & 
L. Cabatingan eds., 2009). 
 238. See Cal. State Bar, Bar Survey Reveals Widespread Legal Illiteracy, CAL. LAW., 
June 1991, at 68, 69. 
 239. See poll results reported in ASS’N OF TRIAL LAWYERS, 1991-1992 DESK REFERENCE 
SUPPLEMENT: COMMEMORATING THE 200TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS (1991). 
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admit that when it comes to equality before the law we are not guaranteeing 
fair hearings to the poor as many other comparable democracies do.  Nor 
have we demonstrated nearly the financial commitment to equality before 
the law as have several other comparable industrial democracies.  We also 
have to tell the tragic stories of what happens to the many poor people 
whom legal aid lawyers cannot represent because of the present lack of 
adequate resources. 
On the positive side, supporters can emphasize this nation can fund a 
right to equal justice for a small fraction of the cost of many social pro-
grams already provided to the poor.240  They also can promise to achieve 
equality before the law in a cost-effective way, where possible by revamp-
ing our justice system in ways that allow disputants from the same econom-
ic class to resolve many of their disputes with self-help assistance rather 
than requiring representation by lawyers.241 
In this time of economic collapse, it may not be reasonable to expect an 
immediate infusion of government funding for civil legal aid no matter how 
powerful a case is made at this point.  But that does not mean those con-
vinced of the importance of equality before the law should hold up on ef-
forts to build that case and spread the message, actually messages, out to 
the general public, the legislatures, and beyond.  It usually takes a long 
time to overturn public misconceptions, especially comforting ones, such as 
the widely-held assumption America indeed already provides justice for all.  
Likewise, it takes an even longer time to build an understanding of the crit-
ical importance of equality before the law in a democratic society and the 
urgency of ending our present failure to make that a reality for our lower 
income people. 
For too many years, the right to equality before the law, and to counsel 
when needed, has been nothing but a long-term dream in this country—and 
even then shared by relatively few people.  Only recently has that dream 
transformed into a goal shared by a broad coalition of legal services law-
 
 240. See supra notes 208, 217-218 and accompanying text. 
 241. For a recent article outlining in greater depth the possible ingredients of a cost-
effective system for delivering justice to lower income Americans, see Johnson, supra note 
143, at 410-21.  Those ingredients include (1) aggregate remedies, such as class actions and 
legislative reforms, for common claims; (2) self-help assistance to unrepresented litigants 
coupled with forums using an inquisitorial rather than adversarial approach; (3) lay advo-
cates in administrative proceedings; (4) technology—both present and future—deployed to 
lower  the cost of and improve the availability of access to justice; and (5) an effective “tri-
age” system matching problem with solution, that is, that matches each client and his or her 
problem with the level of advice, assistance, or representation needed to deliver fair and 
equal justice in the forum that will decide the case. 
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yers, academics, private law firms, and even some judges.242  It now is time 
this goal becomes a movement and begins expanding beyond the legal pro-
fession.  Frankly, it will not be a movement for the short-winded.  But what 
could be more satisfying for any lawyer or judge—or any American for 
that matter—than to help make “justice for all” a reality in this country and 
not just a motto we mouth when holding hand over heart and reciting our 
Pledge of Allegiance. 
 
 242. Beginning in 2001, some public interest lawyers and pro bono lawyers in local law 
firms decided it was time to bring a case to the Maryland Court of Appeals raising the right 
to counsel issue under the common law and the state constitution.  Meanwhile, in the state 
of Washington, a committee of the Washington Access to Justice Board was researching the 
jurisprudence of a civil right to counsel under the Washington constitution.  Lawyers partic-
ipating in these two efforts put on a panel discussion at the November 2003 National Legal 
Aid & Defender Association (“NLADA”) meeting.  At the end of the session, they invited 
attendees to sign up if they were interested in pursuing the issue.  Thus was born a “National 
Coalition for the Right to Counsel in Civil Cases.”  The Coalition now has some 150 mem-
bers from thirty states—legal services lawyers, law professors, private law firm lawyers, and 
others.  See TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT SUPPORTING 
ABA RESOLUTION FOR CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 10-12 (2006).  Five organizations have 
formed a “support group” supplying ongoing research, strategic planning, and coordination 
activities for the loose-knit coalition. This support group includes the Brennan Center for 
Justice at New York University School of Law, the Public Justice Center in Baltimore, the 
Northwest Justice Center in Seattle, the Shriver Center on Law and Poverty in Chicago, and 
the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants.  This “support group” 
has a website reporting recent developments in this field. 
JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:25 PM 
222 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
APPENDIX 
STATE EQUAL JUSTICE ACT 
 
[NOTE: This is a draft of a generic state statute implementing a com-
prehensive “right to equal justice” but not an automatic right to coun-
sel.  As drafted, it is comprehensive in several senses.  First, it provides 
a full range of legal services in the civil arena—including legal advice, 
assistance with preparation of documents, and appropriate levels of 
representation before non-judicial as well as judicial forums.  Second, 
it is comprehensive in the sense that it covers any and all categories of 
non-criminal cases and legal problems that require some level of ad-
vice, assistance, or representation.  Third, it is comprehensive in using 
a full range of types and levels of law-related services to implement the 
right to equal justice as to different types of cases, forums, and 
clients—including self-help assistance, lay advocates, and limited legal 
representation as well as full legal representation.  Finally, it is com-
prehensive in the sense that it extends the right to equal justice not on-
ly to the poor but to the lower middle class as well. 
 
It, of course, is possible to contemplate narrowing the statute and the 
right it implements as to any of the above dimensions.  It also is possi-
ble to conceive alternatives to the policy choices reflected in other parts 
of the statute, such as the design of the system proposed for delivering 
the legal services provided and the mechanisms and procedures estab-
lished for administering the right.  In addition to the “DRAFTING 
COMMITTEE’S COMMENTARY” at the end of each major section of the 
statute that clarify some of the statute’s terms, there also are “NOTES” 
in boldface.  The latter describe in general terms some of the alterna-
tive formulations that were considered and which some readers might 
find worthy of writing up as full-blown draft provisions.  Inasmuch as 
this draft statute is very much a work in progress, such drafts are most 
welcome—along with any more general comments and suggestions.  
Please e-mail any drafts or other input to Clare Pastore at  
cpastore@law.usc.edu.]243 
 
 243. Clare Pastore is now a Professor of Law at the University of Southern California and 
her preferred e-mail address is clare.pastore@law.usc.edu. Many of the “legislative find-
ings” contained in this draft “State Equal Justice Act” and its companion “State Basic 
Access Act” have been adopted by the California legislature as its own “legislative find-
ings” in the recently-enacted Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, Assem. B. 590, 2009 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).  This legislation was signed into law by Governor Arnold Schwarze-
negger on October 12, 2009.  It authorizes and provides funding for a series of pilot projects 
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100. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS. 
 
The Legislature finds and declares: 
 
101.  Access to justice is a fundamental right in a democratic society.  It is 
essential to the enforcement of all other rights and responsibilities in any 
society governed by the rule of law. It also is essential to the public’s con-
fidence in the legal system and its ability to reach just decisions. Recogniz-
ing its responsibilities in a democratic society, the State government as-
sumes the duty to guarantee this right to all its citizens. 
 
102.  The adversary system of justice used in this State and elsewhere in 
the United States inevitably allocates to the parties the primary responsi-
bility for discovering the relevant evidence, finding the relevant legal prin-
ciples and presenting them to a neutral judge or jury.  Discharging these re-
sponsibilities generally requires the knowledge and skills of a legally-
trained professional. 
 
103.  Because in many civil cases lawyers are as essential as judges and 
courts to the proper functioning of the justice system, the State government 
has just as great a responsibility to ensure adequate counsel is available to 
both parties in those cases as it does to supply judges, courthouses, and 
other forums for the hearing of those cases. 
 
104.  It is recognized that many of those living in this State cannot afford to 
pay for the services of lawyers when needed for them to enjoy fair and 
equal access to justice. In order for them to enjoy this essential right of par-
ticipants in a democracy, and to protect their right to liberty and property, 
the State government accepts its responsibility to provide them with law-
yers at public expense.  Other residents cannot afford the full cost of 
needed lawyer services and the State government accepts its responsibility 
to provide a partial public subsidy so these people can exercise their right 
to fair and equal access to justice. 
 
 
providing counsel as a matter of right in certain categories of civil cases in a few courts to 
be selected through a competitive process.  The pilots will commence operating on July 1, 
2011, and funding continues through June 30, 2017.   The pertinent findings in the Califor-
nia legislation are found in sub-sections (h)-(n) of Section 1 of the Act.  See infra note 244.  
Other concepts from the two draft “generic statutes,” such as a “merits test” and a “signific-
ance test,” also are important elements in the new California law. 
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105.  While in many cases decided in the State’s adversary system of civil 
justice the parties cannot gain fair and equal access to justice unless they 
are advised and represented by lawyers, there are some forums in which it 
may be possible for most parties to have fair and equal access if they have 
the benefit of representation by qualified non-lawyer advocates and other 
forums where parties can represent themselves if they receive self-help as-
sistance.  In those cases where non-lawyer advocates or self-help assistance 
will be sufficient for that purpose, the State government has a responsibility 
to ensure such representation or assistance is also available to all, irrespec-
tive of their economic means. 
 
106.  The State government has an interest in supplying publicly-funded le-
gal representation and non-lawyer advocates or self-help advice and assis-
tance, when the latter is sufficient, in a cost-effective manner by ensuring 
the level and type of service provided is the lowest-cost type of service 
consistent with providing fair and equal access to justice.  Several factors 
can affect the determination of when representation by an attorney is 
needed for fair and equal access to justice and when other forms of assis-
tance will suffice.  These factors include the complexity of the substantive 
law, the complexity of the forum’s procedures and process, the individual’s 
education, sophistication and English language ability, and the presence of 
counsel on the opposing side of the dispute.  The State government recog-
nizes the importance of establishing mechanisms and criteria that will en-
sure appropriate levels and types of publicly-funded advice and assistance 
are provided, including representation by lawyers when appropriate, to 
guarantee fair, equal, and cost-effective access to justice to those unable to 
afford counsel. 
 
107.  If those advised, assisted, or represented by publicly-funded lawyers 
are to have fair and equal access to justice those lawyers must be as inde-
pendent, ethical, and loyal to their clients as those serving clients who can 
afford to pay for counsel. 
 
108. The services provided for in this Act shall be funded by the appropria-
tions provided in this Act and are not intended to and shall not supplant ex-
isting legal services resources from any other source.  The services pro-
vided for in this Act do not entitle any person to receive services from a 
particular legal services provider, nor do they override the local or national 
priorities of existing legal services programs.  The services provided for in 
this Act are likewise not intended to undermine any existing pilot programs 
or other efforts to simplify court procedures or provide assistance to pro se 
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litigants. Furthermore, nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit the 
provision of full legal representation or other appropriate services funded 
by another source in those cases or circumstances in which there is not an 
entitlement to the services funded under this Act. 
 
DRAFTING COMMITTEE’S COMMENTARY: 
 
 The findings and declarations in section 100 et seq. express the legisla-
ture’s intent in enacting this remedial statute and are expected to guide the 
courts and the State Equal Justice Agency in their interpretation of the re-
maining provisions of the statute.244 
 
 244. Below appear several legislative findings the California Legislature included in Sec-
tion 1 of the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act it enacted recently as part of Assem. B. 590, 
2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), explained supra note 180 and accompanying text.  As 
readers will note, these sections incorporate the same concepts and sometimes adopt the 
same language as the “generic statutes” produced by a task force of the California Commis-
sion on Access to Justice—some of those findings appearing in the draft “State Equal Jus-
tice Act” found in this appendix and the others in the draft “Basic Access Act” which is lo-
cated on the Internet. 
(h) Equal access to justice without regard to income is a fundamental right in a democratic 
society. It is essential to the enforcement of all other rights and responsibilities in any socie-
ty governed by the rule of law. It also is essential to the public’s confidence in the legal sys-
tem and its ability to reach just decisions. 
(i) The adversarial system of justice relied upon in the United States inevitably allocates to 
the parties the primary responsibility for discovering the relevant evidence, finding the rele-
vant legal principles, and presenting them to a neutral judge or jury. Discharging these re-
sponsibilities generally requires the knowledge and skills of a legally trained professional. 
The absence of representation not only disadvantages parties, it has a negative effect on the 
functioning of the judicial system. When parties lack legal counsel, courts must cope with 
the need to provide guidance and assistance to ensure that the matter is properly adminis-
tered and the parties receive a fair trial or hearing. Those efforts, however, deplete scarce 
court resources and negatively affect the court’s ability to function as intended, including 
causing erroneous and incomplete pleadings, inaccurate information, unproductive court 
appearances, improper defaults, unnecessary continuances, delays in proceedings for all 
court users, and other problems that can ultimately subvert the administration of justice. 
(j) Because in many civil cases lawyers are as essential as judges and courts to the proper 
functioning of the justice system, the state has just as great a responsibility to ensure ade-
quate counsel is available to both parties in those cases as it does to supply judges, court-
houses, and other forums for the hearing of those cases. 
(k) Many of those living in this state cannot afford to pay for the services of lawyers when 
needed for them to enjoy fair and equal access to justice.  In some cases, justice is not 
achievable if one side is unrepresented because the parties cannot afford the cost of repre-
sentation. The guarantees of due process and equal protection as well as the common law 
that serves as the rule of decision in California courts underscore the need to provide legal 
representation in critical civil matters when parties cannot afford the cost of retaining a law-
yer. In order for those who are unable to afford representation to exercise this essential right 
of participants in a democracy, to protect their rights to liberty and property, and to the pur-
suit of basic human needs, the state has a responsibility to provide legal counsel without 
cost. In many cases decided in the state’s adversarial system of civil justice the parties can-
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200. DEFINITIONS.  For purposes of this statute only, the following defi-
nitions apply: 
 
201.  “Public legal services” includes full legal representation, limited legal 
representation, non-lawyer representation, legal advice, legal assistance, 
personal self-help assistance, and computer-assisted and online self-help 
assistance as defined in sections 207.1-207.3 below. 
 
202.  “Full legal representation” is the performance by a licensed legal pro-
fessional of all activities (such as investigation of facts, research of law, 
preparation of pleadings, negotiations, appearance at pre-trial, trial, and 
post-trial proceedings, preparation of appellate briefs and appearance at ap-
pellate oral arguments) that may be involved in representing a party in a 
court or other tribunal in which by law or uniform practice parties may not 
be represented by anyone other than licensed members of the legal profes-
sion. 
 
203.  “Limited legal representation” is the performance by a licensed legal 
professional of one or more but not all of the tasks involved in advocating a 
party’s position before a tribunal in which by law or tradition any represen-
 
not gain fair and equal access to justice unless they are advised and represented by lawyers. 
In other cases, there are some forums in which it may be possible for most parties to have 
fair and equal access if they have the benefit of representation by qualified nonlawyer advo-
cates, and other forums where parties can represent themselves if they receive self-help as-
sistance. 
(l) The state has an interest in providing publicly funded legal representation and nonlawyer 
advocates or self-help advice and assistance, when the latter is sufficient, and doing so in a 
cost-effective manner by ensuring the level and type of service provided is the lowest cost 
type of service consistent with providing fair and equal access to justice. Several factors can 
affect the determination of when representation by an attorney is needed for fair and equal 
access to justice and when other forms of assistance will suffice. These factors include the 
complexity of the substantive law, the complexity of the forum’s procedures and process, 
the individual’s education, sophistication, and English language ability, and the presence of 
counsel on the opposing side of the dispute. 
(m) If those advised, assisted, or represented by publicly funded lawyers are to have fair and 
equal access to justice, those lawyers must be as independent, ethical, and loyal to their 
clients as those serving clients who can afford to pay for counsel. 
(n) The services provided for in Section 5 of this act are not intended to, and shall not, sup-
plant legal services resources from any other source. This act does not entitle any person to 
receive services from a particular legal services provider, nor shall this act override the local 
or national priorities of existing legal services programs. The services provided for in Sec-
tion 5 of this act are likewise not intended to undermine any existing pilot programs or other 
efforts to simplify court procedures or provide assistance to unrepresented litigants. Fur-
thermore, nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit the provision of full legal repre-
sentation or other appropriate services funded by another source. 
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tation other than self-representation must be provided by members of the 
bar.  This limited legal representation must comply with established rules 
permitting the legal professional to so limit the legal representation pro-
vided, and shall be confined to cases and circumstances in which such li-
mited representation is sufficient to afford the applicant fair and equal 
access to justice consistent with criteria set forth in section 302 below.  De-
pending on circumstances, this form of assistance may or may not be 
coupled with self-help assistance as defined in section 207. 
 
204.  “Legal advice” is individualized advice provided by a licensed legal 
professional about the law and its implications for a person and that per-
son’s conduct, transactions, and the like, but not involving the preparation 
of any documents or any contacts with other persons. 
 
205. “Legal assistance” is assistance provided by a licensed legal profes-
sional in the preparation of legal documents such as contracts, wills, etc. in 
undisputed matters or in pre-litigation activities in disputed matters, such as 
preparing correspondence or otherwise contacting an adverse party. 
 
206.  “Non-lawyer representation” is representation by qualified non-
lawyer advocates in tribunals in which representation by such advocates is 
permitted and in which, in the particular circumstances of the case, the 
State Equal Justice Authority or its delegated agent or designee considers 
such representation sufficient to afford the applicant fair and equal access 
to justice. 
 
207.  “Self-help assistance” is assistance short of representation before a 
court or other forum which is provided to parties who are representing 
themselves in such forums.  It may consist of one or more of the following 
forms of assistance: 
 
207.1  “Personal self-help assistance” is “one-on-one” guidance 
provided by lawyers or lawyer-trained and supervised non-lawyer 
staff to persons in the preparation of required court documents, fa-
miliarization with procedures and practices in the court or other 
tribunal, and other assistance short of appearing before the court or 
other tribunal as an advocate for that person. 
 
207.2  “Computer-assisted or online self-help assistance” is pro-
vided electronically to parties enabling unrepresented persons to 
fill out required court forms, and providing guidance in properly 
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and effectively representing oneself in the court or other tribunal 
through specially designed computer programs available at kiosks, 
on computers, or on the Internet.  This assistance may be general or 
individualized. 
 
207.3  “Community self-help assistance” is general education not 
specific to an individual, provided through classes, on the Internet, 
or otherwise, about how to prepare court forms or other legal doc-
uments, or about how to properly and fair and equally represent 
oneself in court or other tribunal, or other relevant legal topics.  It 
may or may not be coupled with personal, computer-assisted, or 
online self-help assistance. 
 
208.  “Licensed legal professional” is a member of the State Bar, a certified 
law student participating in a supervised clinical program, or a member of 
the bar of another jurisdiction who is legally permitted to appear and 
represent the particular client in the particular proceeding in the court or 
other forum which is hearing that matter. 
 
209.  “Qualified non-lawyer advocate” is a person trained and certified to 
represent parties before certain forums, often administrative bodies, and 
which the State Equal Justice Authority or its designee finds qualified to 
provide fair and equal justice to such parties in proceedings before those 
forums. 
 
210.  “Qualified non-profit legal services organization” is a non-profit cor-
poration or law school clinic which has the primary purpose of benefiting 
those unable to afford counsel and that employs licensed legal profession-
als, qualified non-lawyer advocates, and/or uses pro-bono licensed legal 
professionals and pro bono qualified non-lawyer advocates for the purpose 
of delivering appropriate public legal services to persons who cannot afford 
to pay for their own counsel and which the State Equal Justice Authority 
determines qualifies as an organization suitable to discharge the functions 
this statute allocates to such organizations.  Any such organization which 
the federal Legal Services Corporation has deemed qualified to receive 
funding support from the Corporation is automatically considered a quali-
fied non-profit legal services organization for purposes of this statute. 
 
211.  “State Equal Justice Authority” is the statewide body responsible for 
administering State’s public legal services program. It is authorized to im-
plement the statute by enacting regulations pursuant to the state Adminis-
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trative Procedures Act, Gov. Code ____ et seq.  The regulations shall pro-
vide, inter alia, for delegation of eligibility decisions to designated public 
or non-profit bodies as described in section 700 et seq. 
 
300. RIGHT TO PUBLIC LEGAL SERVICES. 
Subject to the exceptions and conditions specified in sections 301-306 be-
low, appropriate public legal services shall be available to any financially 
eligible person [or group].  Depending on circumstances described in these 
sections, appropriate public legal services may consist of full legal repre-
sentation, limited legal representation, non-lawyer representation, legal ad-
vice, legal assistance, self-help assistance, or other advice or assistance as 
needed for the person [or group] to enjoy fair and equal access to justice for 
the particular dispute or problem that person [or group] confronts.  The 
standards for “financial eligibility” are defined in section 400 et seq. 
 
301.  Full Public Legal Representation 
In the courts or any other forum in this state where by law or established 
practice parties can only appear pro se or be represented by licensed mem-
bers of the legal profession, public legal services shall consist of full legal 
representation as defined in section 202 above, provided under the follow-
ing conditions and with the following exceptions: 
 
301.1  Full public legal representation services shall be available to 
a plaintiff only if a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, 
with the financial means to employ counsel, would be likely to 
pursue the matter in light of the costs and potential benefits.  In 
making that determination it shall be presumed that a reasonable 
person would be likely to pursue matters involving any of the fol-
lowing: the sole housing for the plaintiff or plaintiff’s family; the 
maintenance of plaintiff’s present employment or occupation; the 
plaintiff’s current right or future right to income maintenance, 
health benefits, and other substantial benefits from the federal, 
state, or local government; custody and/or parental rights to child-
ren; and protection from domestic violence.  This list shall not be 
considered exhaustive and the State Equal Justice Authority or its 
designees shall apply the general criteria to applications for legal 
representation which do not fall within any of the above presump-
tive categories. 
 
301.2  Except in exceptional circumstances, full public legal repre-
sentation services shall be available to financially eligible defen-
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dants when they are defendants in a court or other forum defined in 
section 202 above unless they lack a reasonable possibility of 
achieving a favorable outcome. 
 
301.3  Eligibility for full public legal representation services in an 
initial proceeding is limited to that proceeding. Eligibility for full 
public legal representation in the appellate courts is a new and dif-
ferent determination after the proceedings in a trial court or other 
forum conclude.  If the financially eligible applicant is an appellant 
or petitioner rather than a respondent or real party-in-interest, ex-
cept in extraordinary circumstances, full legal representation ser-
vices shall be available only if there is a reasonable probability of 
success on appeal.  If the financially eligible applicant is a respon-
dent or real party-in-interest, however, except in extraordinary cir-
cumstances full legal representation services shall be available, un-
less the trial court decision is clearly erroneous and thus, there is no 
reasonable possibility the appellate court will affirm the decision of 
the superior court or other forum which the opposing party is chal-
lenging in the appellate court. 
 
301.4  Full public legal representation services shall not be availa-
ble to an applicant in the following circumstances: 
 
301.4.1  In proceedings in any court or other forum where 
parties are not allowed to be represented by licensed legal 
professionals.  However, this does not preclude a financial-
ly eligible person from receiving self-help assistance in 
such proceedings, nor does it preclude the provision of full 
legal representation services if the opposing party in such a 
forum appeals a decision of that forum which was favora-
ble to the applicant, to a forum where licensed legal pro-
fessionals are permitted to provide representation, and that 
opposing party is represented by a licensed legal profes-
sional in that appeal. 
 
301.4.2  If legal representation is available to the applicant 
in the particular case through the services of a lawyer who 
provides such representation on a contingent fee basis, or 
as the result of the provisions of an insurance policy, or for 
some other reason is willing to provide such representation 
at no cost to the applicant or at a cost that is substantially 
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the same as any co-payment the applicant would be ex-
pected to pay if provided counsel at public expense under 
this statute. 
 
301.4.3  Except in extraordinary circumstances, in the fol-
lowing lawsuits: plaintiffs in libel, slander, or defamation 
actions; actions seeking a name change; uncontested mar-
riage dissolution cases not involving children or disputes 
over property, support, or other significant issues [assum-
ing state involved has no-fault divorce system]; disputes 
between business enterprises; and other categories of dis-
putes that the State Equal Justice Authority determines by 
regulation to be so insignificant that they do not warrant 
public legal services or that are uncontested and so simple 
that public legal services are unnecessary to have fair and 
equal access to justice. 
 
301.4.4  If under standards established by the State Equal 
Justice Authority, and under the circumstances of the par-
ticular matter, the Authority deems a certain type and level 
of limited legal representation is sufficient to provide fair 
and equal access to justice and such limited public legal 
representation is provided.  It shall be presumed limited le-
gal representation is insufficient in actions before courts or 
other forums in which representation can only be provided 
by licensed legal professionals if the opposing party has 
full legal representation by such a professional. 
 
301.4.5  In designated courts or other forums the State 
Equal Justice Authority evaluates and certifies after public 
hearings that: 
 
(a) these courts or forums: (1) operate in an inquisitorial 
rather than adversarial manner, with a judicial officer ac-
tively developing the facts and the law; (2) follow relaxed 
rules of evidence; and (3) follow procedural rules and ad-
judicate legal issues so simple that non-lawyers can 
represent themselves before the court or other forum and 
still enjoy fair and equal access to justice; and 
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(b) in the particular matter to be decided by such designat-
ed courts or other forums (1) the opposing party is not 
represented by a licensed legal professional; and (2) the 
particular applicant possesses the intelligence, knowledge, 
language skills (or assistance), and other attributes ordina-
rily required to represent oneself and still enjoy effective 
fair and equal access to justice. 
 
Nothing shall preclude the State Equal Justice Authority from 
funding self-help assistance in such cases before the designated 
courts or other forums even though the SEJA certifies full legal 
representation is not required and such assistance shall be of-
fered to the applicant unless the SEJA further certifies the ap-
plicant can receive fair and equal access to justice in the par-
ticular case without any such assistance. 
 
302.  Limited Legal Representation 
Limited legal representation, as defined in section 203, shall be available to 
financially eligible individuals [or groups] where the limited service pro-
vided is required because self-help assistance alone would prove inade-
quate and where such limited legal representation is sufficient in itself or in 
combination with self-help assistance to provide the applicant with effec-
tive access to justice in the specific case in the specific forum.  In matters 
before those courts or other forums in which representation can only be 
provided by licensed legal professionals, however, limited legal representa-
tion can only be substituted for full representation when permitted by sec-
tions 301.2 through 301.4 above, nor shall it be available in the matters ex-
cluded under section 301.4.3. 
 
303.  Legal Advice 
Legal advice as defined in section 204 above, shall be available to finan-
cially eligible individuals [and groups] on an individualized basis, and may 
be provided in person, by telephone or other communication device, or by 
computer or other interactive device.  [Such advice shall be provided only 
through qualified non-profit legal services organizations, as defined in sec-
tion 210, or through lawyers certified and supervised by such organiza-
tions.]  Legal advice shall not be available for issues related to an appli-
cant’s business enterprise, or for other issues related to the classes of 
problems excluded under section 301.4.3. 
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304.  Legal Assistance 
Legal assistance, as defined in section 205, shall be available to financially 
eligible individuals [and groups] when required for the proper preparation 
of significant legal documents in undisputed matters or for the review and 
possible revision of such documents generated through computer programs 
or other self-help assistance.  It also shall be available in the pre-litigation 
phase of disputed matters in which there is a reasonable possibility such 
services may avoid a proceeding in court or other forum, whether that pro-
ceeding would be filed by or against the applicant. 
 
305.  Non-lawyer Representation 
Non-lawyer representation, as defined in section 206, shall be available 
from qualified non-lawyer advocates to financially eligible individuals [and 
groups] in proceedings in forums which permit non-lawyer representation 
of parties and in which: (1) the criteria for full legal representation set forth 
in 301.1, 301.2 or 301.3 are satisfied; (2) non-lawyer representation is more 
economical than full legal representation; (3) the opposing party is not 
represented by a licensed legal professional; (4) the non-lawyer advocate 
works under the supervision of attorneys in a non-profit legal services or-
ganization or has been certified by a non-profit legal services organization 
or by an official body the SEJA designates to possess adequate training, 
knowledge, and skill to provide appropriate representation in that forum; 
and (5) the forum and the circumstances do not fit the exception defined in 
section 301.4.1 or 301.4.5 [in which self-help assistance is sufficient to af-
ford parties fair and equal access to justice.].  This section is not intended 
to and does not supersede existing state law governing non-attorneys or pa-
ralegals. 
 
306.  Self-help Assistance 
Self-help assistance, as defined in section 207, shall be available to all per-
sons without regard to financial eligibility in those forums and categories of 
disputes or problems the SEJA [or the state court system] designates and 
through the means the SEJA [or the state court system] provides. 
 
DRAFTING COMMITTEE’S COMMENTARY: 
 
 This section defines the scope of the right to different forms of represen-
tation, advice and assistance funded under this Act which are to be availa-
ble to financially eligible applicants.  Depending on the circumstances, an 
applicant may be entitled to full legal representation or limited legal repre-
sentation by a lawyer in disputed matters, or to legal advice or non-
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litigation assistance from a lawyer, or to representation by a qualified non-
lawyer advocate, or to self-help assistance.  While there are several cate-
gories of cases or circumstances in which representation or other services 
will not be available from licensed legal professionals or qualified non-
lawyer advocates under this Act, as declared by the Legislature in section 
108, this will not prohibit the provision of such services by other lawyers 
who are not funded under this Act in those cases and circumstances. For 
example, pro bono attorneys or those legal aid lawyers, whose funding 
does not come from the state government funds specifically appropriated 
under this Act, would be able to provide full legal representation to liti-
gants in those cases. 
 
 Full legal representation in litigation before courts and other adversary 
forums is the most expensive of the services provided as a matter of right 
under this Act.  Consequently, much of section 300 is devoted to defining 
the parameters of the right to this level of service. 
 
First, full legal representation is not available under any circumstances: 
 
(1) In forums (such as small claims courts in California) in which law-
yers are prohibited [sub-section 301.4.1]. 
 
(2) In certain categories of cases such as those that are deemed trivial, 
undisputed, or otherwise to not justify representation [sub-section 
301.4.3].  These categories must either be defined as such in the Act or 
subsequently so defined by the SEJA based on empirical data and after ap-
propriate proceedings. 
 
(3) In cases in which lawyers are willing to represent the applicant with-
out government funding because of other sources of financial support 
[sub-section 301.4.2].  This includes services available because of the 
prospect of a contingent fee, the duty to defend under a liability insurance 
policy or the provisions of a prepaid legal insurance policy, or for some 
other reason—which could include the prospect of a statutory or contrac-
tual court-awarded fee, a class action recovery, or on a pro bono basis.  To 
deny government-paid counsel on this basis, however, the availability of 
counsel must be real, not merely theoretical.  Thus, merely because the 
case is one in which a contingent fee might be available or where conceiv-
ably it might be aggregated with other similar cases in a class action law-
suit does not necessarily mean there is no right to receive full legal repre-
sentation under the Act.  Rather, in order to deny service, a contingent fee 
lawyer would have to indicate a willingness to provide representation to 
JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:25 PM 
2010] EQUALITY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 235 
the applicant in the particular case or there would have to be a lawyer who 
has expressed a willingness to bring this case or include this case in a class 
action lawsuit where a fee would be available to that lawyer, if successful. 
 
(4) In cases in which other, less expensive forms of representation or as-
sistance are sufficient to provide fair and equal access to justice.  These 
less expensive forms of representation and assistance are either limited le-
gal representation (sometimes called unbundled legal services) by lawyers, 
representation by qualified non-lawyer advocates, or self-help assistance.  
Where these less expensive forms of representation or assistance are 
deemed sufficient, however, there is a right to receive that representation 
or assistance just as there is a right to receive full legal representation 
when that is what is sufficient. 
 
As to limited legal representation, the SEJA or its designees must make the 
determination this level of assistance (usually in combination with self-help 
assistance) is sufficient and full-legal representation is not needed on a 
case-by-case basis [subsection 302].  An important caveat is that limited 
legal representation cannot be deemed sufficient if the opposing party en-
joys full legal representation, except in unusual circumstances. 
 
As to representation by non-lawyer advocates, this is confined to forums in 
which non-lawyer advocates lawfully and traditionally provide the repre-
sentation, and to cases heard in those forums in which the other side is not 
represented by a lawyer [subsection 305]. 
 
As to self-help assistance, several criteria must be satisfied.  First, the 
court or other forum must be tailored in a way that is calculated to make 
self-representation sufficient—such as a judge or hearing officer who ac-
tively finds the applicable legal principles and develops the facts, uses sim-
plified procedures, and the like.  Second, the case itself must be relatively 
simple so a non-lawyer can be reasonably expected to comprehend and 
present it, at least with appropriate self-help assistance.  Third, the appli-
cant must possess personal characteristics (such as intelligence, mental 
stability, and English language facility) sufficient to represent himself or 
herself [subsection 306].  Supplying an interpreter, however, ordinarily 
will compensate for lack of English language facility if a foreign-speaking 
applicant possesses the other required characteristics. 
 
Second, full legal representation is available in the remaining cases only 
when the following criteria are satisfied: 
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If the applicant’s legal problem requires initiation of a lawsuit as a plain-
tiff, the applicant will receive full legal representation if a person who 
had personal resources sufficient to pursue that litigation would do so 
[subsection 301.1].  In making this assessment, the hypothetical client 
would consider the value of what is at stake, the likelihood of success in the 
lawsuit, and the estimated cost of achieving success.  The rationale for re-
quiring applicants to satisfy this test before providing them with govern-
ment funding is that a new lawsuit, no matter how it is financed, imposes 
costs on the judicial system and on the opposing party.  This test seeks to 
mimic the economic considerations that constrain prospective plaintiffs 
who can afford to employ their own lawyers when they are contemplating 
the possibility of filing a lawsuit.  There is an important qualification, how-
ever, affecting one element of the equation—the value of what is at stake.  
Recognizing that the monetary value of many matters of great consequence 
to lower-income people is lower than the cost of the legal representation 
required to properly litigate those issues, the Act creates a presumption 
that any rational person would employ a lawyer to pursue those cases if 
there was any reasonable possibility of a favorable outcome.  This adjust-
ment is necessary both because the cost of legal representation is so high 
and because, by definition, the absolute economic value of many essentials 
on which lower-income people survive is relatively low.  The wages they 
earn or the welfare benefits they receive, the apartment rents they pay, the 
personal property they own, etc., often are less than the cost of the legal 
representation required to preserve those vital interests should they be 
threatened.  Yet, it is fundamentally unfair to deprive them of the opportu-
nity to secure those basic human needs merely because of the high cost of 
legal representation.  Subsection 301.1 lists some of those high priority 
concerns, but also allows the SEJA to add others. 
 
If the applicant is a defendant, he or she is entitled to full legal represen-
tation unless there is no reasonable possibility that representation will re-
sult in a favorable outcome [subsection 301.2].  The test for defendants is 
different from that for plaintiffs in that the amount at stake is not part of the 
equation.  This is because the opposing party has decided the stakes are 
substantial enough to warrant employment of a lawyer and is the party re-
sponsible for imposing costs on the judicial system as well as seeking to use 
that system to deprive the low-income party of something he or she would 
otherwise retain.  It is fundamentally unfair to deny lower-income people 
legal representation and thus, condemn them to lose the property or other 
interests they formerly possessed to a better-funded party merely because 
the costs of justice might outweigh the financial value of the dispute.  
Therefore, the applicant is to be provided full legal representation unless 
the applicant lacks a reasonable possibility of achieving a favorable out-
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come.  Obviously, a favorable outcome can be something less than a de-
fense verdict, so long as it is substantially better than the likely result if the 
applicant were not represented. 
 
Different criteria also apply when deciding whether there is a right to full 
legal representation at the appellate stage [subsection 301.3].  For appli-
cants asking to appeal the trial court’s decision against them, the right at-
taches only if there is a reasonable probability of obtaining a reversal or 
partial reversal of the trial court decision.  On the other hand, applicants 
who prevailed at the trial level are entitled to full legal representation un-
less the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous and thus, there is no 
reasonable possibility the applicant’s position will be sustained on appeal. 
This distinction is based on the reality that there is a comparatively low 
rate of reversal on appeal and also that the party appealing from the trial 
court decision, whether initially a plaintiff or a defendant, imposes addi-
tional costs on the judicial system than the party resisting the appeal and 
thus, a higher threshold is warranted before providing full legal represen-
tation as a matter of right.  Conversely, applicants who gained a favorable 
decision in the trial court should not be forced to surrender that victory 
simply because they lack the financial resources to respond to the other 
party’s appeal of that favorable decision—unless the trial court’s decision 
was clearly erroneous.  In any event, consistent with the legislative intent 
expressed in section 108, nothing prevents lawyers funded from a different 
source or acting on a pro bono basis from providing appellate representa-
tion to an applicant who is denied representation as a matter of right under 
the above standards. 
 
Limited legal representation [section 302, 301.4.4] and non-lawyer repre-
sentation [section 305] are provided in lieu of full legal representation 
only in circumstances where they are sufficient to afford litigants fair 
and equal justice in the court or other forum in which these forms of 
public legal service are to be provided.  Except in unusual circumstances, 
neither is deemed sufficient if the opposing party in the particular case has 
full legal representation.  Furthermore, non-lawyer representation is 
deemed sufficient only in forums where officially permitted and where by 
tradition most parties are represented by non-lawyer advocates rather than 
by lawyers. 
 
Legal Advice [section 303] and Legal Assistance [section 304] are pro-
vided by lawyers in undisputed matters or in potential disputes before ad-
versarial proceedings have commenced.  Legal advice is to be provided in 
the most cost-effective manner possible, including by telephone, over the 
Internet, or by computer program or printed materials, and should only be 
JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:25 PM 
238 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
supplied on a personalized basis when required.  To ensure adherence with 
these standards, legal advice as a matter of right shall only be available 
through non-profit legal aid organizations, or lawyers certified and super-
vised by such organizations.  Furthermore, legal advice and legal assis-
tance are not available in certain categories of matters—generally those 
excluded from full legal representation in courts and other forums. 
 
[NOTE: There are several alternative ways of reconfiguring the right 
defined in sections 300 et seq.–most of which would narrow its scope.  
One possibility would be to limit the right to court proceedings—
eliminating sections 303 (legal advice), 304 (legal assistance), and 305 
(non-lawyer representation) entirely, and also removing references to 
other forums in sections 301 and 302.  Another possibility would be to 
limit the right to those situations where full or limited representation 
by a lawyer was appropriate and not provide a right to self-help assis-
tance–leaving the decision whether to provide that level of service to 
the discretion of the courts or other potential suppliers of same.  
Another would be to limit the right to certain categories of cases—
essentially turning the “presumptive” categories of legal problems 
listed in section 301.1 (or a shorter or longer or different list) into the 
“exclusive” categories to which the right attached.  (This approach 
would raise some other problems not addressed in this draft “compre-
hensive” statute, such as ensuring the categories enjoying the status of 
a right did not absorb all the legal resources devoted to representation 
of the poor.)  Still another possibility would be to extend the right to all 
categories of problems, but only for defendants, not plaintiffs.  (This 
again raises problems not addressed in this draft “comprehensive” sta-
tute, such as the many plaintiffs with urgent needs (e.g., domestic 
abuse victims, etc.) who would be denied a right to equal justice under 
such a definition of the right.)] 
 
400. FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY. 
 
401.  The State Equal Justice Authority (“SEJA”) shall establish financial 
eligibility standards which must be satisfied in order to receive full public 
legal representation or other forms of public legal services.  The SEJA also 
shall establish a schedule of co-payments for applicants with income-asset 
levels sufficient to make partial payments for the services they are to re-
ceive.  No co-payments shall be required for those applicants whose in-
comes are at or below the federal poverty level.  With rare exceptions li-
mited to unusual circumstances, applicants with incomes above 300 percent 
of the official federal poverty level shall be ineligible for full or partially 
JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:25 PM 
2010] EQUALITY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 239 
subsidized public legal services [OR possible alternative add the following 
clause: with the exception of self-help assistance]. 
 
402.  The SEJA shall construct and publish a matrix of financial eligibility 
and co-payment levels that takes into account the following factors regard-
ing the financial circumstances of an applicant for services: (1) current in-
come; (2) current assets, taking into account reasonable exemptions for ne-
cessities of life, assets essential to potential earning and homeownership; 
(3) family size and relationships with dependents; and (4) other economic 
factors relevant to the applicant’s ability to pay attorney fees and other liti-
gation expenses. In setting eligibility and co-payment levels, the SEJA 
shall not take into account the income or resources of persons who are not 
financially responsible for the individual seeking legal assistance. 
 
403.  The SEJA may establish and publish categorical financial eligibility 
rules for persons whose sole income is derived from public assistance.  The 
SEJA may also establish special matrices of financial eligibility and co-
payment levels for different types of public legal services.  The SEJA may 
also establish different matrices for different regions of the state, taking in-
to account significant differences in cost-of-living, the cost of public legal 
services, and other economic circumstances. 
 
404.  The SEJA shall establish a special matrix of financial eligibility stan-
dards and co-payment levels for self-help assistance services.  Such servic-
es may be provided to any applicants [at any income level OR whose in-
comes are no more than 500 percent of the poverty level], but at or above 
250 percent of the poverty level they shall be charged 50 percent of the es-
timated costs of such services. 
 
405.  The SEJA shall adjust financial eligibility and co-payment levels an-
nually to ensure they fully account for changes in the cost of living and 
other inflationary factors.  The SEJA also may allow those making the eli-
gibility determinations in individual cases to exercise some limited measure 
of flexibility in applying these standards in order to account for unusual 
circumstances, but the SEJA shall review such cases retroactively to ensure 
there are no abuses. 
 
406.  The SEJA shall establish financial eligibility standards for groups 
composed principally of financially eligible individuals, and for non-
membership groups whose purpose is to benefit financially eligible indi-
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viduals, which groups are of insufficient size to afford to pay counsel and 
otherwise lack the resources to do so. 
 
DRAFTING COMMITTEE’S COMMENTARY: 
 
 The legislature recognizes the impracticality of adopting rigid financial 
eligibility standards as part of the statute.  Instead, this statute only defines 
the general criteria to be applied and delegates to the SEJA the task of es-
tablishing standards consistent with those criteria, and revising the stan-
dards on a periodic basis. These standards are to be expressed in matrices 
which shall guide those making individual eligibility decisions (as ex-
plained in section 403).  The statutory criteria embody several principles: 
 
(1) Those individuals in the lowest eligibility strata, roughly cor-
responding to the federal poverty level, shall not be required to 
make any co-payments for any public legal services.  Those above 
that line shall make co-payments in an amount commensurate with 
their income and assets. 
 
(2) Different eligibility standards (including co-payment levels) 
shall be set for different geographic areas to the extent there are 
substantial differences in the cost of living, cost of legal services, 
and other relevant factors.  Different eligibility standards (includ-
ing co-payment levels) shall be set for different forms of public le-
gal services to the extent there are substantial differences in the 
cost of those services. 
 
(3) A group in contrast to an individual or family may be eligible 
for public legal services only if composed principally of financially 
eligible persons, or if it is a non-membership organization commit-
ted principally to benefiting financially eligible persons, and only 
then if the group lacks the resources to employ legal counsel. 
 
[NOTE: This particular draft statute envisions the provision of gov-
ernment subsidized services not just to what society considers poor 
people, but to others whose personal resources are insufficient to af-
ford the full cost of legal services when confronting more serious legal 
problems.  Accordingly, it requires the SEJA to establish and adminis-
ter schedules imposing co-payments on a sliding scale basis determined 
by what it is reasonable to expect persons at different income levels to 
contribute to the cost of the legal assistance provided.  Other basic pol-
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icy alternatives exist.  One would be to limit the right solely to those at 
and below the current federal eligibility level for legal services—that is, 
125 percent of the federal poverty guideline and with no co-payments.  
Such an approach would simplify the administration of the right con-
siderably.  However, there are political, humanitarian, and equal jus-
tice reasons for extending the coverage of the right to the income strata 
somewhat above the poverty line.  Studies show that the “near poor”, 
and even the middle classes, can’t afford lawyers for many or at least 
some of their legal problems.  Indeed, many European and common-
wealth countries extend the right well up into the middle classes—with 
half and sometimes more of the population eligible for some level of 
government-subsidized legal services. 
 
In this draft, groups as well as individuals can be financially eligible to 
be entitled to representation.  In order to be financially eligible, the de-
finition in section 406 requires the group to be “principally composed” 
of financially eligible individuals.  Other possible alternative formula-
tions include a requirement the group be “entirely” or “predominant-
ly” composed of such financially eligible individuals.  Or, if the prima-
ry need is confined to groups of poor people–not of individuals in the 
income strata above the poverty level who are entitled to receive par-
tial subsidies—the language could be changed to require the group to 
be composed “principally of individuals in the lowest eligibility catego-
ry or categories.”  (Obviously, the question whether the statute should 
confer a right to equal justice on groups or should cover groups at all 
is also an open question.)] 
 
500. THE PROVISION OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES. 
 
Professional services include the services of licensed legal professionals (as 
defined in section 208, performing the functions defined in sections 201-
205), and the services of non-lawyer advocates in forums in which the ser-
vices of the latter are permitted and deemed sufficient pursuant to section 
206.  Professional services can be provided through salaried staff attorneys 
or salaried non-lawyer advocates employed by qualified non-profit legal 
services organizations, as defined in section 210, or by private attorneys [or 
private qualified non-lawyer advocates]. 
 
It is the purpose and intent of the following sections to provide these ser-
vices in a manner that is both efficient and guarantees recipients fair and 
equal access to justice.  To this end, professional services shall be provided 
through salaried staff attorneys and salaried non-lawyer advocates em-
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ployed by qualified non-profit legal services organization in those catego-
ries of cases in which the services of such attorneys and advocates ordinari-
ly best serve the goals of efficient and effective access to justice.  Profes-
sional services shall be provided through private lawyers [and private non-
lawyer advocates] in those categories of cases in which it is deemed the 
services of such attorneys [and non-lawyer advocates] ordinarily best serve 
the goals of efficient and effective access to justice.  Section 501 designates 
some of the categories of cases initially allocated to salaried staff attorneys 
and salaried non-lawyer advocates employed by non-profit legal services 
organizations, while section 502 designates some of the categories of cases 
initially allocated to private attorneys [and private non-lawyer advocates].  
The State Equal Justice Authority is authorized to add additional categories 
of cases to either list on the basis of experience or empirical research and 
after public hearings, as well as to establish procedures for both salaried 
staff attorneys and private attorneys to provide services in the remaining 
categories of cases. 
 
501.  Provision of professional services through salaried lawyers and 
salaried non-lawyer advocates employed by non-profit legal services 
organizations 
 
(1)  Subject to the exceptions described below, professional services shall 
be supplied exclusively by salaried staff attorneys or, as appropriate, sala-
ried non-lawyer advocates employed by non-profit legal aid organizations 
in the following categories of cases in which the applicant is entitled to ser-
vices, pursuant to section 301: 
 
(a)  Cases involving client’s eligibility, benefit levels, and other is-
sues regarding government income maintenance, welfare, unem-
ployment compensation, means-tested disability benefits, or health 
benefit programs. 
 
(b)  Cases involving a client tenant’s eviction from, or the condi-
tion of, private or public residential housing that the client occu-
pies. 
 
(c)  Cases involving protection from domestic abuse in courts or 
geographic areas where the volume of such cases makes it substan-
tially more economic to provide effective representation through 
salaried attorneys than by private lawyers. 
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(d)  Cases involving the representation of parents or children in de-
pendency [sometimes called neglect] cases in courts or geographic 
areas where the volume of such cases makes it substantially more 
economic to provide effective representation through salaried at-
torneys than by private lawyers. 
 
(e)  Subject to regulations established by the SEJA to exclude cases 
for which a private market exists, cases involving goods or services 
a client purchased. 
 
(f)  Subject to regulations established by the SEJA to exclude cases 
for which a private market exists, cases involving the continuation 
of a client’s employment. 
 
(g)  Any other categories of cases in which the SEJA determines, 
that salaried attorneys or salaried non-lawyer advocates can pro-
vide more efficient yet still effective access to justice to the clients 
to be served.  Such determinations shall be made on an experimen-
tal basis, and for a limited period, and after public hearings at 
which all interested groups shall have an opportunity to appear and 
express their views and shall be in effect for no longer than 3 years, 
unless the SEJA extends such authority by regulation following the 
expiration of the experimental period. 
 
(2)  Exceptions within designated categories. 
 
In the following specific circumstances, services in categories ordinarily to 
be provided by salaried staff attorneys or salaried non-lawyer advocates 
may be provided instead by a private attorney [or private non-lawyer advo-
cate]: 
 
(a)  When the applicant requests services in a case in which the 
non-profit legal aid organization already is representing a party 
with an adverse interest and it is not feasible, economic, or conve-
nient to the applicant to refer that applicant to a different legal aid 
organization. 
 
(b)  When the applicant requests services in a case in which, be-
cause of its unusual nature, the case requires specific expertise not 
possessed or economically acquired by salaried staff employed by 
the legal aid organization, and it is not feasible, economic, or con-
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venient to the applicant to refer that applicant to a different legal 
aid organization possessing the required expertise. 
 
(c)  When no non-profit legal aid organization is located in, or 
serves, or is reasonably accessible to the geographic area in which 
the applicant resides, and one or more private attorneys is available 
to that client and willing to provide the desired service. 
 
(d)  When the legal aid organization has insufficient staff to pro-
vide effective access to justice to the applicant while still providing 
such access to clients it already has undertaken to represent. 
 
502.  Provision of professional legal services through private attorneys 
and [and private qualified non-lawyer advocates] 
 
(1)  Subject to the exceptions described below, professional services shall 
be supplied primarily by private attorneys [or, as appropriate, private qual-
ified non-lawyer advocates] in the following categories of cases in which 
the applicant is entitled to services pursuant to sections 301-305: 
 
(a)  Cases involving ordinary tort, contract, or property claims that 
do not fall within any of the specialized categories defined in sec-
tion 501 above. 
 
(b)  Cases involving dissolution, child custody, child and spousal 
support, and other ordinary family law issues that do not fall within 
any of the specialized categories defined in section 501 above. 
 
(c)  Cases involving protection from domestic abuse or dependency 
proceedings which do not satisfy the criteria set forth in section 
501 above. 
 
(d)  Any other categories of cases in which the SEJA determines 
that private attorneys [or private non-lawyer advocates] can pro-
vide more efficient yet still effective, fair and equal access to jus-
tice to the clients to be served.  Such determinations shall be made 
on the basis of experience or empirical research and after public 
hearings at which all interested groups shall have an opportunity to 
appear and express their views. 
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DRAFTING COMMITTEE’S COMMENTARY: 
 
 With respect to public legal services to be provided by licensed legal 
professionals and non-lawyer advocates, these sections assign certain de-
fined categories of cases to salaried lawyers employed by non-profit legal 
aid organizations (except in certain defined circumstances), and assign 
other defined categories of cases to private attorneys.  The SEJA is autho-
rized to add other categories of cases to the lists assigned to either salaried 
or private attorneys.  Either type of lawyer may provide services in yet oth-
er categories of cases.  The guiding standard for any allocations the SEJA 
authorizes is that the preferred source of legal representation be not only 
the most economical but also an effective provider of the service involved.  
Effectiveness, in turn, means the provider is proven to supply represented 
parties fair and equal access to justice. 
 
[NOTE: The sections above implement one of several possible delivery 
systems—a “subject matter mixed system.”  This system delivers legal 
services through a combination of salaried staff lawyers (the primary 
delivery model presently used by American legal aid organizations) 
and compensated private lawyers (often called judicare).  A “subject 
matter mixed system” allocates some categories of cases and legal 
problems to be handled by salaried lawyers and other categories to be 
handled by compensated private counsel. 
 
Another possible form of “mixed system” that might be considered as a 
worthy substitute is the “client option mixed system.”  This system 
combines a network of salaried staff offices alongside a judicare sys-
tem.  Each applicant is given a choice whether a salaried attorney or a 
compensated private attorney will handle the particular problem he or 
she is experiencing.  (In some nations using this model, and if there is a 
substantial difference in cost between salaried and private counsel with 
respect to a given category of legal problem, the legal aid administra-
tors are allowed to deny the option of choosing private counsel, when 
budgetary constraints dictate.)  Examples of national legal aid pro-
grams using a client option mixed system include Quebec Province and 
Finland (the latter as to litigation in the courts only, but not legal ad-
vice and non-litigation assistance which are the exclusive province of 
salaried staff lawyers.) 
 
Another possible form of “mixed system” might be called an “overflow 
mixed system”, but is primarily a salaried staff lawyer program with 
the compensated private lawyer component limited to handling those 
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cases the salaried lawyers cannot handle in a timely and effective way.  
Ireland is an example of such a mixed system.  (In some, if not many 
jurisdictions in the U.S., criminal defense systems provide most of their 
representation through salaried public defenders, but use compensated 
appointed counsel for the overflow of cases those salaried lawyers can’t 
handle, as well as for conflict and like situations.) 
 
There also remain the options of a pure compensated private attorney 
system or a pure salaried staff attorney system, either employed direct-
ly by the government (similar to public defender offices utilized to pro-
vide indigent defense in criminal cases), or by a non-profit organiza-
tion as is common  in the civil field.  However, it is difficult to imagine 
how a right to equal justice can be implemented effectively with a 
completely fixed resource unable to accommodate an overflow of ap-
plicants for those services.  As to a pure compensated private attorney 
system, most nations of which we are aware which started with such a 
system, have found it worthwhile, if not necessary, to introduce a sala-
ried staff attorney component.  Moreover, all such nations of which we 
are aware have found it difficult, if not impossible, to control the costs 
of a pure judicare system. 
 
The “subject matter mixed system” was chosen primarily because it 
appears to offer the most economical approach to providing effective 
access to justice—allocating those categories of legal problems to sala-
ried lawyers which they can handle both most efficiently and effective-
ly, and to compensated private counsel those categories which they can 
handle most efficiently and effectively.  Whether the draft statute has 
accurately identified the categories each type of attorney can best 
supply will determine whether it succeeds in the objective of providing 
effective access to justice in the most cost-efficient manner.  Any state 
contemplating the use of a subject matter mixed system would be well 
advised to consider this question anew, taking account of local condi-
tions.] 
 
600. ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS. 
 
601.  Irrespective of which provider is to supply the services, the SEJA may 
allow applications for public legal services to be granted only by specific 
entities it certifies from among the following: (1) non-profit legal services 
organizations; (2) self-help centers operated by State courts; (3) members 
of the State judiciary; or (4) special eligibility determination offices the  
SEJA may establish. Before granting an application, the above organiza-
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tions and individuals shall consider and apply criteria the SEJA promul-
gates, which implement the provisions of sections 300 et seq. and 502 et 
seq. of this Act.  Pursuant to section 502, private lawyers and private non-
lawyer advocates may provide services in many circumstances, but they 
may not make the eligibility determinations in those or any other cases.  In 
no case shall a judge who participates in an eligibility determination handle 
any aspect of the case as a judicial officer. 
 
602.  The SEJA shall establish procedures for the organizations delegated 
to make eligibility determinations which ensure those decisions are made 
both accurately and in a timely fashion, and take account of the financial 
eligibility standards promulgated pursuant to sections 401 et seq. and the 
other criteria promulgated pursuant to sections 301 et seq.  These organiza-
tions shall maintain the relevant records reflecting the financial and other 
data used in finding applicants eligible or ineligible, and these records shall 
be available for audit by the SEJA under procedures which maintain the 
confidentiality of information protected by the lawyer-client privilege. 
 
603.  Applicants who are denied service shall be informed that they may 
lodge an appeal within fifteen days of the denial, which shall be heard in a 
timely fashion by a three-member appellate committee composed of inde-
pendent administrative law judges.  By majority vote, this independent 
committee shall be authorized to reverse the denial and order the SEJA to 
provide the requested public legal service or to provide another form of 
public legal service to the applicant. 
 
604.  The SEJA shall, by regulation, establish procedures for emergency, 
provisional eligibility determinations by private providers. 
 
DRAFTING COMMITTEE’S COMMENTARY: 
 
 This section funnels the determination whether persons are eligible for 
public legal services to a selected set of decision makers, which either al-
ready have experience with this process (such as qualified non-profit legal 
aid organizations), or which the SEJA certifies have become qualified to do 
so.  The SEJA may not designate private attorneys or law firms as qualified 
to certify persons eligible for public legal services except on a provisional 
basis in emergency situations and consistent with criteria the SEJA defines 
in regulations.  Once a person is deemed to be eligible, the organization 
that made the determination shall refer that person to the appropriate type 
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of public legal service (as defined in sections 300 et seq.) and the appro-
priate provider. 
 
 This section allows an applicant who is denied service an opportunity 
for a prompt administrative review of that denial.  This review is performed 
by an independent panel consisting of three administrative law judges.  If 
the panel finds the SEJA or its designee erred in denying the requested ser-
vice, it is empowered to order the SEJA to provide that service or, if ap-
propriate, a different form of service.  Thus, for instance, if the applicant 
only requests full legal representation and the appeal panel determines the 
decision to deny this level of service was appropriate but that limited legal 
representation was both sufficient and justified, it may order the SEJA to 
provide that lesser degree of service to the applicant. 
 
[NOTE: Although this first draft uses a “subject matter mixed system,” 
it does not allow private attorneys to determine if applicants meet the 
financial, merits, and significance tests defined in sections 300 et seq. 
and 400 et seq. above.  There are at least two reasons.  First, these de-
terminations involve expertise and procedures unfamiliar to private 
lawyers and law firms.  Second, there is a potential conflict since a pos-
itive eligibility determination will inure to the direct financial benefit 
of the lawyer or law firm making that decision.  (Notably, nearly all 
foreign legal aid programs that use private attorneys to provide gov-
ernment-paid representation nevertheless assign the eligibility deter-
mination decisions to public offices.) 
 
Other possible formulations might assign all these eligibility determi-
nations to special offices created by the SEJA or using Internet tech-
nology it might be feasible to channel the needed information from a 
variety of input locations (even possibly private attorneys and law 
firms) to a centralized eligibility determination office maintained by 
the SEJA.] 
 
700. STATE EQUAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY. 
 
Responsibility for policy-making and overall administration of the program 
defined in this chapter, and which has the purpose of guaranteeing people 
in the State their rights to fair and equal access to justice, reposes in an in-
dependent public body, the State Equal Justice Authority. 
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701.  Composition, Terms, and Compensation of State Equal Justice 
Authority Board of Directors 
 
The SEJA shall be governed by a board of directors with nine members se-
lected as follows: 
 
(1)  Two members who shall be members of the State Bar selected 
by the Chief Justice, and at least one of whom shall have expe-
rience representing low-income people; 
 
(2)  Two members who shall be members of the State Bar selected 
by the State Bar, at least one of whom shall be a full-time salaried 
attorney employed by a qualified non-profit legal services organi-
zation; 
 
(3)  Three members selected by the Governor, at least one of whom 
shall be a member of the State Bar, and at least one of whom shall 
be a person eligible to receive full legal representation under the 
statute; 
 
(4)  One member selected by the [lower house] of the State legisla-
ture; 
 
(5)  One member selected by the [upper house] of the State legisla-
ture; 
 
(6)  [In states with an elected Attorney General:] One member se-
lected by the Attorney General. 
 
Board members shall serve staggered three-year terms, which can be re-
newed for a maximum of one additional term.  After the initial board is se-
lected, all members shall participate in a draw to determine which three 
members shall have initial one-year terms, which three shall have initial 
two-year terms, and which members shall have initial three-year terms.  
The members of the Board shall elect one of their number to serve as the 
Chair of the SEJA, and another of their members as Vice-Chair.  Board 
members shall be compensated at the rate of $200 a day for their prepara-
tion for and attendance at board meetings and board committee meetings, 
and shall be reimbursed for all legitimate expenses attendant to discharging 
their responsibilities as board members. 
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702.  Staff of the State Equal Justice Authority 
 
The Board of Directors of the SEJA shall select a person to serve as the 
President of the Authority who shall be an ex officio, non-voting member 
of the Board.  The President of the Board shall be the SEJA’s chief execu-
tive officer and this shall be a full-time staff position compensated at the 
same salary as an Associate Justice of the State Court of Appeal, but the 
benefits shall be defined by the Board of Directors.  Under the direction of 
the Board of Directors, the President shall exercise all the powers and dis-
charge all the responsibilities this Chapter confers on the SEJA.  Based on 
recommendations from the President, the Board shall create and define oth-
er staff positions, but the President shall select the persons who occupy 
these positions.  The Board of Directors shall establish the compensation 
and benefit levels for these other positions, but in doing so shall establish 
categories consistent with comparable positions in the executive and judi-
cial branches of the State government and in no event may compensate any 
other staff member at a level exceeding the salary of a State trial judge. 
 
703.  Functions of the State Equal Justice Authority 
 
The SEJA shall have overall responsibility for the administration of the 
public legal services funded by the State Equal Justice Act.  The Authority 
is empowered to enact regulations pursuant to the Administrative Proce-
dures Act.  The SEJA also is empowered to delegate eligibility determina-
tions in individual cases as well as other applications of its regulations and 
basic policies to designated organizations. 
 
The State Equal Justice Authority shall: 
 
(1)  Ensure all eligible persons residing in the State receive appro-
priate public legal services when needed.  In determining what lev-
el of services are appropriate, the SEJA shall ensure those services 
are sufficient to afford the client fair and equal access to justice 
while also taking account of the relative cost of those services. 
 
(2)  Ensure there is a comprehensive network of qualified non-
profit legal services organizations reasonably accessible to appli-
cants in all geographic areas of the State in which substantial popu-
lations of financially eligible persons reside.  To the extent legal 
services organizations, funded by the federal Legal Services Cor-
poration or those deemed qualified to receive funding from the 
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State IOLTA program, provide services in or near the geographic 
area to be covered, the SEJA shall give priority to funding expan-
sion of those organizations rather than creating or encouraging the 
creation of new legal aid organizations. 
 
(3)  Identify and certify specific organizations to which it delegates 
the authority to make eligibility determinations pursuant to section 
600.  Legal services organizations funded by the federal Legal Ser-
vices Corporation, those funded under the State IOLTA, and any 
self-help centers the State court system certifies as qualified are au-
tomatically considered certified to perform this function. 
 
(4)  Supplement the funding provided to non-profit legal services 
organizations by the Legal Services Corporation, IOLTA, the 
Equal Access Fund, and other government sources, to the extent 
required to ensure these organizations can fulfill their responsibili-
ty to provide cost-effective legal representation in all the cases al-
located to them pursuant to section 501. 
 
(5)  Identify and contract with private lawyers and private law 
firms willing and able to provide any or all of the types of public 
legal services defined in sections 202-207, on terms that ensure 
both that the services will be sufficient to provide clients fair and 
equal access to justice and that they will be provided at reasonable 
cost.  In performing this function, the SEJA is authorized to nego-
tiate contracts based on hourly-fee rates, per-service rates, or per-
case rates, but not on a capitation basis. 
 
(6)  Through its own staff, contracts with media firms, and other 
means, the SEJA shall inform the general public, especially popu-
lation groups and geographic areas with large numbers of financial-
ly eligible persons, about their legal rights and responsibilities and 
the availability of public legal services should they experience a 
problem that might be addressed through one of the public legal 
services defined in section 201. 
 
(7)  Directly and through contracts with organizations and individ-
uals possessing appropriate expertise in evaluation, social science, 
and empirical research, the SEJA shall conduct studies which, 
among other subjects, assess the need and demand for public legal 
services, the sufficiency of different levels of public legal services 
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to provide fair and equal access to justice in various circumstances, 
the effectiveness of those services in positively impacting people’s 
lives and legal situations, the quality and cost-effectiveness of dif-
ferent providers of public legal services, and address other relevant 
issues. 
 
(8)  Ensure clients served by public legal services funded through 
the State Equal Justice Act receive the same independent, confi-
dential, competent, and otherwise ethical representation as those 
persons who can afford to pay for legal representation, and as is 
guaranteed to all clients by the code of ethics applicable to licensed 
legal professionals. 
 
(9)  Ensure those served who are not clients receive competent, 
timely, and accurate information and assistance. 
 
(10)  Prepare and submit an annual report to the Governor, the Leg-
islature, and the Judicial Council.  Among other subjects, this re-
port shall include: (1) a summary of the SEJA’s activities for the 
year and the results of any special studies or evaluations the SEJA 
conducted or commissioned during the year; (2) the current status 
of the combined federal-state-local government effort to provide 
State residents full and fair access to justice in non-criminal mat-
ters; (3) quantitative and qualitative data about costs, the quantity 
and quality and other relevant performance measures regarding 
public legal services of different types provided during the year; 
and (4) recommendations for changes in the SEJA legislation and 
other State statutes, court rules, or other policies which would im-
prove the quality or reduce the cost of public legal services re-
quired to guarantee all residents of State their right to fair and 
equal access to justice in non-criminal matters. 
 
DRAFTING COMMITTEE’S COMMENTARY: 
 
 These sections establish an independent body charged with responsibili-
ty for administering the public legal services system as well as for dis-
charging the broader responsibility to constantly study and make recom-
mendations for changes to the legal system which would enhance access to 
justice for all residents of this State. To accomplish its administrative re-
sponsibilities, the SEJA is authorized to establish policies and set stan-
dards, to designate those entitled to perform various functions, to delegate 
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certain of its functions (including eligibility determinations), and to employ 
consultants.  Before promulgating regulations it must adhere to the 
processes, including public hearings, required by the State Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
 
[NOTE: This draft creates an independent body to administer the 
SEJA.  The board of this independent body is selected by different go-
vernmental bodies, the judiciary, and the legal profession. 
 
Alternative possible arrangements include administration by the state 
bar association or by the court system or as a separate part of the ex-
ecutive branch.  Notably, most nations with advanced legal aid pro-
grams—including the United States—have chosen to establish some 
form of independent or semi-independent board to administer their le-
gal aid systems.  Smaller states, however, may find it too cumbersome 
or expensive to set up a free-standing independent body to administer 
their legal aid system.] 
